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THE COURT, THE LEGISLATURE, AND
GOVERNMENTAL TORT LIABILITY IN
MICIDGAN
Luke K. Cooperrider*
I.

THE ERA OF CAMPBELL AND COOLEY

The Original Image of the Problem: Nonfeasance and Mere
Neglect, Misfeasance and Trespass, Independent Public Officers, and Legislative Decisions

A.

1961, when Justice Edwards of the Michigan supreme court said,
"From this date forward the judicial doctrine of governmental
immunity from ordinary torts no longer exists in Michigan,"1 he went
on to say that he was eliminating from the law of Michigan "an ancient rule inherited from the days of absolute monarchy,"2 a "whim of
long-dead kings."8 Justice Carr, dissenting, agreed that the doctrine
in question "came to us as a part of the common law,"4 for which
reason he thought it was protected by the reception clause of the
Constitution of 1850° from the overruling action of the court. If the
learned justices had looked more closely, they would have discovered
that their statements were not historically accurate. The doctrine of
"governmental immunity," as it has been known in recent yearsthat is, the rule that governmental entities are immune from tort liability for the acts of their employees whenever the injury-causing
activity is "governmental" in nature or involves the performance of a
"governmental function"-is not, so far as the law of Michigan is
concerned, "ancient." It did not exist in 1850 and therefore can
scarcely "have come to us as part of the common law" or by inheritance from monarchs, absolute or otherwise. Rather it was imported
into the law of Michigan in the first two decades of the twentieth
century by a generation of judges and lawyers who found it easier to
read about the law in Judge Dillon's treatise on municipal corporations than to track down their own legal heritage. The instruments

I
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• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1940, Harvard University; J.D.
1948, University of Michigan; Editorial Board, Vol. 46, Michigan Law Review.-Ed.
1. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 250, 111 N.W.2d 1, 20 (1961).
2. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 250, 111 N.W.2d 1, 20 (1961).
3. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 258, 111 N.W.2d 1, 28 (1961).
4. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 240, 111 N.W.2d 1, 5 (1961).
5. MICH. CoNsr. sched. § 1 (1850): "The common law and the statute laws now in
force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by
their own limitations or are altered or repealed by the legislature."
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with which the justices of the Michigan supreme court in its salad
days operated upon problems of municipal tort liability were products of their mvn environment and experience, bore little resemblance to the blunt instrument of later years-"govemmental function"-and had almost nothing to do with the divine right of kings.
In the early days, the Savoyard Creek, a minor watercourse meandering through the area that is now downtown Detroit, was used by
the householders along its banks as a place to dispose of refuse, until
it became so noisome that the city fathers, in 1836, walled it in, covered it over, and created the first underground sewer in that city. It
was known as the "Grand Sewer," and its success was such as to convince a doubting citizenry of the merits of underground drainage;
however, for many years yet there was no general system. Private parties built their mvn sewers in their own ways, many lots had no drainage, and for many others the drainage available was most imperfect.
A system did not begin to emerge until a new city charter in 1857
gave a board of sewer commissioners control over all sewers, public
and private.6
In that same year the supreme court, in Dermont v. Mayor of
Detroit,7 entertained the first case involving a claim against the city
arising out of its management of such matters. During a heavy rainfall in 1853 the Grand Sewer backed up into the cellar of Dermont's
store. Dermont claimed the damage was caused by the city, which had
introduced too many tributaries into the main trunk and had connected the Woodward Avenue sewer, at the very comer where his
store was located, at right angles instead of on a curve; all of this was
done after he had, with the city's consent and at the cost of an annual
fee, connected his private drain to the sewer.8 The court rejected his
claim, resting its decision upon the proposition that the city had no
obligation to furnish private drainage to individual property owners.0
It was conceded that the city would be liable if plaintiff's damage had
happened "directly" in consequence of defendant's want of prudence
or skill in the construction of the sewer, or if the water had flowed up
through the manholes and flooded his cellar. But it was asserted that
his damage had, in fact, resulted from his connection of his private
drain to the sewer for his own convenience, and that the rule in such
case was no different from what it would be if a private individual
6.

s. FARMER, THE HlsrORY OF DETROIT AND MICHIGAN 60-61

7. 4 Mich. 435 (1857).
8. 4 Mich. at 436.
9. 4 Mich. at 442.

(2d ed. 1889).
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had dug a drain and permitted his neighbor to tie into it.10 The annual fee paid by plaintiff did not alter these conclusions, for it was
viewed as payment for a license only, and not as the consideration for
an obligation, express or implied, to furnish sufficient drainage for
the premises connected to the sewer.11
Since Dermont's assertions appear sufficient to support a claim of
misfeasance, the factual image from which the decision proceeds, i.e.,
that the claim was based on nonfeasance, a "failure to provide sufficient drainage," seems questionable. Nevertheless, the decision did
rest on an application of tort doctrine not peculiar to the liabilities
of governments. The opinion did contain, however, the statement
of a position, applicable particularly to governmental defendants,
which echoed down through subsequent cases:
The powers granted to Municipal Corporations for the laying out
and making of highways, and for opening and grading streets, and
the construction of sewers, involve the exercise of discretion on the
part of the municipal authorities, ancl. should be employed for the
benefit of the public at large, and not for the private convenience or
advantage of individuals; nor are the officers of a Municipal Corporation justified in the exercise of those powers, except in reference to
the public demands.12
It was thought that to recognize liability in this case would "impose
upon the city the obligation to furnish private drainage for individuals; and the question presented to its officers would not be, what the
public exigencies demanded in reference to its capacity, but how
they might best discharge its legal obligations to individuals."13
Another landmark in the area of municipal liability was established by the court at the same term when, in Commissioners of Highways v. Martin,1 4 it rejected a claim for damage arising from the nonrepair of a bridge. Judge Douglass, the reporter responsible for the
publication of the first volumes of Michigan supreme court reports,
asserted in his opinion that the court was unaware of any previous
attempt in Michigan to assert such a liability. While he carefully
noted.'>the state of authorities in England and the historical origins
of duties in regard to maintenance of highways and bridges there
reposed in local units of government, he focused primarily upon
indigenous conditions and upon American authorities, which, in the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

4
4
4
4
4

Mich.
Mich.
Mich.
Mich.
Mich.

at 443.
at 444.
at 442.
at 443.
557 (1857).
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absence of statute, he found to be almost unanimously contrary to the
claim.15
Unlike the situation in Russell's pursuit of the Men of Devon,10
Martin's problem was not the absence of a suable entity, for under
Michigan statutes the inhabitants of each organized township constituted a body corporate that could sue and be sued, hold and dispose
of property, and enter into contracts.17 His difficulty, as the judges
viewed the scene in Michigan, was that the corporate township had,
not just no liability, but no duty at all, even of an operational character, in respect to the maintenance of bridges. The reason they saw
the situation in this light had little to do with the immunity of sovereigns, but much to do with the way in which such matters had been
handled on the frontier.
At that time the inhabitants of a Michigan township assembled
each year in an annual meeting to elect certain officers and transact
such other business as required their action.18 One of the officers
elected at the meeting was a highway commissioner. Since his term of
office was three years, each township had three such commissioners,
who together constituted the Board of Highway Commissioners.10
In addition, an overseer of highways was elected for each road district
that had been set aside within the township. 20 The highway commissioners were, by statute, directly burdened with responsibility for
the care and superintendence of highways and bridges within the
township, and with the duty to see that they were kept in repair. 21
15. 4 Mich. at 562.
16. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788). RtlSsell, which is generally identified as the basis for common law doctrine concerned with the liability or
immunity of municipal corporations, was an action for damages arising from an unrepaired bridge. It was the county's duty to repair the bridge, but the county was not
a corporate entity, and a demurrer was interposed by two of the inhabitants of the
county for themselves and the other inhabitants. The judges concluded that no action
could be maintained without statutory authorization because of the difficulties tliat
would be created with regard to the collection of the award and the identification
of the inhabitants bound to contribute to it, there being no corporate fund out of
which it might be paid. This reasoning was imported into American doctrine via dicta
in Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks & Canals, 7 Mass. 169 (1810), and the decision in
Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812), wherein the court assumed it was
applicable to a claim against a town, though the town apparently was possessed of a
corporate identity, and stated the proposition that quasi-corporations (i.e., towns and
counties) "created by the legislature for purposes of publick policy are subject by the
common law to an indictment for the neglect of duties enjoined on them: but arc not
liable to an action for such neglect, unless the action be given by statute." 9 Mass. at
250. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 977 (4th ed. 1971), and sources cited therein at
978 n.80.
17. MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 16, § 2 (1846).
18. MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 16, §§ 8, 12 (1846).
19. MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 16, § 12 (1846).
20. MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 16, § 10 (1846).
21. MICH. REv. STAT. ch. 22, § I (1846).
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Their "department" for this purpose consisted of the overseers, themselves elected representatives of the inhabitants, upon each of whom,
within his own district, fell the explicit duty "to repair and keep in
order the highways." 22 The commissioners and the overseers were
subject to indictment and fine for refusal or neglect to perform the
duties imposed upon them by law, 23 and the commissioners were
required to prosecute an overseer against whom a complaint was
filed, with security for costs, by any resident. 24
While the duties of the commissioners were explicit, as were their
risks of office, their resources were limited. Although the township
board was authorized, at the behest of the highway commissioners,
to request of the annual township meeting an appropriation for the
improvement of highways and bridges,25 the amount of that appropriation was expressly limited to 250 dollars, and the principal resource for the maintenance and improvement of the highway system
was the labor of the township inhabitants, who were conscripted
through an assessment system administered by the highway commissioners. Each male inhabitant between the ages of twenty-one and
fifty was annually assessed one day of labor on the highways, and the
remaining labor required for the maintenance program was assessed
against all property owners in proportion to the value of their assessed
property, not in excess of one day of labor per one hundred dollars
valuation.26 It was the duty of the overseer, who was assessed along
with the rest, to notify persons when to come to work and to supervise their labors when they appeared.27
This mobilization of the inhabitants for the repair and construction of highways had been in effect in Michigan from early territorial
days. The same basic system is found in a statute promulgated in 1805
by the governor and judges of the Michigan territory, coupled with
the declaration, essential to their power to legislate, that it was
"adopted from the laws of one of the original States, to wit, the State
of New York, as far as necessary and suitable to the circumstances of
the territory of Michigan." 28 It was this system the judges had in
22. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 5 (1846).
23. MlcH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 16, §§ 85-86, ch. 22, § 13 (1846).
24. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 14 (1846).
25. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 4 (1846).
26. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 23, § 5 (1846). The labor could be commuted in cash at the
election of the person assessed, MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 24, § 3 (1846), or he could hire a
substitute to work out his obligation. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 24, § 6 (1846).
27. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 22, § 5 (1846).
28. Act of Sept. 18, 1805, 1 MICH. TERR. LAws 75, 79 (1871). Numerous revisions appeared thereafter, e.g., one adopted in 1819 that was then attributed to "the laws of
three of the original states; to wit, the states of New-York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio."
Act of Dec. 30, 1819, 1 MICH. TERR. LA.ws 449, 461 (1871). The final territorial version

192

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:187

mind when they considered Martin's claim against the Niles commissioners.
His action was brought, not against the township as such, but
against the commissioners of highways as a "quasi corporation" under
a procedural chapter (chapter ll9) of the Revised Statutes that authorized the commissioners, and other similar public boards, to sue
in the name of their office on contracts made by them or their predecessors, or to enforce any legal duty, or to recover damages for injuries to their official property or rights.29 They were made subject
to suit in the same fashion, and it was provided that if judgment were
recovered in such an action, payment thereof was to be made by the
township treasurer after the amount had been levied and collected
from the taxpayers like other township charges.80 There was no specification, however, of the kinds of claims that could be asserted against
the board. The judges thought that the township as such could not
be held liable for the nonperformance by the commissioners of a
duty that was imposed directly upon them, since in the performance
of such duties they were neither responsible to nor controlled by the
township. Moreover, the judges could not bring themselves to believe
that the procedural provisions of chapter 119 were intended to create
such a liability, which, by virtue of the collection machinery that the
law provided, would ultimately come to rest on the inhabitants of the
township.81 Their conclusion was that those provisions authorized
a suit only for acts done by the commissioners or on contracts made
by them within the scope of their authority and did not extend to
claims for damages caused by an alleged neglect of official duty. The
opinion added without explication that, "if liable at all, [the commissioners] are liable individually, and not officially, as a quasi
Corporation." 82
These conclusions were perhaps not inevitable, but neither were
they unreasonable. They were not the product of a mindless obeisance
to Russell v. Men of Devon,83 although they were influenced by the
was adopted by the Legislative Council in 1833. Act of April 17, 1833, 8 MICH. TERR.
LAws 1049 (1874). It was then reiterated in MICH. R.Ev. STAT. pt. 1, tit. IV, ch. 1 (town•
ship organization) & tit. VI, ch. 1 (highways) (1838),
29, MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 119 (1846).
30. MICH. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 119, § 7 (1846).
31. 4 Mich. at 563-64.
32. 4 Mich. at 564.
33. For critiques of American decisions following Russell v. Men of Devon, discussed
in note 16 supra, see Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and
Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Cor•
porations, 16 ORE. L. R.Ev. 250, 264 (1937): Borchard, Government Liability in Tort,
34 YALE L.J. 1, 41-45 (1924).
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weight of American authority, which had in turn been influenced
by that decision. If one is inclined to speculate about unexpressed
premises, it may be that the judges saw the problem of imperfect
rural highways as one of the common perils of the times, which the
community dealt with as best it could through the efforts of its members, and that their sense of justice did not strongly suggest that the
community be required to assume the costs of individual misfortunes
arising from a risk to which all were exposed.
A few years later, in City of Detroit v. Corey,34 the city was again
before the court, this time as a result of an injury suffered by one
Corey, who drove his wagon into a Grand River Street excavation
that had been made and left unprotected by a contractor who was
building a sewer for the city. The court rejected the city's "independent contractor" defense and held it liable. The court argued that,
although the city streets were public highways, the sewers were the
city's private property, and the people of the state at large had no
interest in them.35 The grant of power to the city to locate sewers
in its streets was therefore a grant for private purposes, and the donee
of such a power, whether it be a corporation or an individual, took
it subject to the conditions that it shall be so executed as not unnecessarily to interfere with the rights of the public and that all proper
measures be taken to guard against accidents to persons lawfully using
the highway. Such an obligation is binding upon the donee personally and cannot be divested by delegating the execution of the power
to another.86
The first case to imply a possible public liability for nonrepair of
public facilities was Dewey v. City of Detroit.87 Plaintiff had tripped
on a loose plank in a city sidewalk. The trial judge told the jury that
the city would be liable only if it had had notice of the defect and
that notice might be inferred if the defect were open and notorious,
or of long standing and of such character that it would naturally arrest the attention of persons passing by. Plaintiff's counsel argued that
this condition was too restrictive, but Justice Campbell could find
no fault ·with the charge. He did not deny the implication that liability would arise from a failure to repair after notice. He answered
the plaintiff's claim of more extensive responsibility by pointing to
the fact that sidewalk repairs were required by the city charter to be
made under the supervision of street commissioners, that there were
34. 9 Mich. 165 (1861).

35. 9 Mich. at 184.
36. 9 Mich. at 184-85.
37. 15 Mich. 307 (1867).
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only two commissioners for the entire city, and that, as a practical
matter, the commissioners could not be expected to be aware of defects that were not apparent to every ordinary observer, since the
walks in a city the size of Detroit covered "many scores, and probably
several hundreds of miles."38 He thought that the "minute daily inspection which is possible and necessary on a line of railroad, where
a small break may endanger hundreds of lives, would be absurd and
impracticable in relation to sidewalks."39 Although it might be argued that the city could have decided to appoint more commissioners,
that decision, he was firmly convinced, was legislative in character
and not subject to judicial review; nor could it be made the basis of
a complaint against the city.40
Thus, in these early decisions the court had held that road and
bridge maintenance in rural areas was, under Michigan statutes, the
personal responsibility of certain elected officials, and not that of any
public entity, so injuries arising from the lack of repair of such facilities were not a source of community liability, and further, that the
charter of the city of Detroit did not impose upon the city any obligation to provide adequate drainage £or its inhabitants, so the city had
no liability to private parties £or failure of the drainage system to
conduct surface water away rapidly enough to avoid flooding. On the
other hand, the court had held that the city was liable to a private
party harmed by the negligence of the city's contractor in opening
an excavation in a public street without taking the necessary precautions to prevent accidents to users of the public way and had voiced
dicta to the effect that a city would be liable for harm caused by construction operations in building a sewer, or by a sewer that, because
of insufficient capacity, overflowed and cast water upon private premises. In another early case, Pennoyer v. City of Saginaw,41 wherein
plaintiff complained of ditches that cast surface water upon his premises, the court had also stated that a city would be liable for the continuance of a nuisance that it had created.
The evolving demarcation corresponded generally to the boundary between misfeasance and nonfeasance, with two jogs, one on each
side of the line. The court had disclaimed power to interfere, under
the warrant of an action for damages, with decisions that it viewed as
within the legislative or discretionary powers entrusted to other
branches of government. This idea was advanced as part of the argu38. 15 Mich. at 313.
39. 15 Mich. at 313.
40. 15 Mich. at 313.
41. 8 Mich. 534 (1860),
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ment in Dermont and in Dewey that the decisions as to how much
drainage and how many street commissioners should be provided by
the city were not subject to judicial review. But in Larkin v. County
of Saginaw 42 the idea was also applied to bar a claim for damages
allegedly caused to a steamboat by the county's action in building,
across the Tittibawassee River, a bridge that the claimant asserted
constituted an unlawful obstruction to navigation.43 On the other
side of the misfeasance-nonfeasance line was the tacit assumption in
Dewey that the city might be liable for an injury resulting from failure to repair a notoriously long-standing defect in the public ways.
The latter deviation was not long-lived, however.
At a time when street paving was a sometime thing, crossing the
street in Detroit in inclement weather was a formidable experience.
According to one account:
The condition of all the streets up to 1835, and of most of them to
about 1850, was such as to preclude all unnecessary use. Especially in
the spring and fall, the fine black soil, saturated with water, and in
places mixed ·with clay, made the roads almost impassable. Children
living not two blocks away were carried to school on horseback, and
horses were kept hitched in front of stores or offices to enable their
owners to cross the streets, the animals literally wading from side to
side.44
In 1847, the city fathers took action to ameliorate the problem, providing by ordinance for the establishment by the city of crosswalks
of wooden planks laid on cross ties and for their funding by assessment.45 In the winter of 1868, Hannah Blackeby stepped into a hole
in a crosswalk over Michigan Avenue, tripped, and fell, breaking her
arm in two places. Her evidence, in an action against the city, tended
to show that the walk had been "notoriously out of repair" for several months prior to the accident. Chief Justice Campbell, in City of
42. 11 Mich. 88 (1862).

43. The argument was peculiar. Chief Justice Martin's opinion was as follows:
The board of supervisors of Saginaw county is clothed with legislative as well
as executive power; and while the county may be liable for its acts in the exercise
of the executive, it can not for its exercise of legislative power. The determination
that it was necessary to build a bridge across the Tittibawassee river, and the
whole action of the board in relation thereto, were legislative, and whether any
portion was usurpation or not, no action can be maintained against the county
for any consequences resulting therefrom. What would be a nuisance if erected by
an individual, is not such when erected by authority of law and by the public, so
as to confer a right of private action against the public therefor; and the same
principle I think controls in this case that would had the bridge been built by
authority of the Legislature.
11 Mich. at 91.
44. S. FARMER, supra note 6, at 928.
45. Id. at 931.
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Detroit v. Blackeby,46 brushed aside any implications to be found in
his dictum in Dewey as not required by that decision and posed for
decision the question "whether the city of Detroit is liable to a private action by an injured party, for neglect to keep a cross-walk in
repair."47 There was no statute imposing such an obligation, and in
view of the uniform opinion that, in the absence of statute, governmental units such as towns, townships, and counties had no such liability as to highways generally,48 there was, in his mind, a strong
presumption against liability where cities were concerned. Mrs.
Blackeby's counsel argued that a duty owed by the city to his client
arose from the control, by law exclusive of others including state and
county, that the city exercised over its streets; he cited a line of outside decisions that distinguished in this respect between towns and
counties, on the one hand, and incorporated cities and villages, on
the other.49 The pivotal decision was that of Judge Selden in the
New York case of Weet v. Trustees of the Village of Brockport/50
wherein he reviewed a number of English and American decisions
and concluded that although, in the absence of statute, towns and
counties were not subject to liability for failure to repair the public
ways, with incorporated municipalities it was otherwise.
The heart of the matter was the difficulty that courts of the time
experienced in identifying a vehicle for tort liability-a "duty"when the plaintiff's complaint was that he had suffered injury because the defendant did not do something he ought to have done,
and the "ought" was not derived from contract or any other special
duty-creating relationship between the parties. Public officials owed
to the public at large a duty to perform in a proper way the functions
entrusted to them, and their nonfeasances were sanctioned by indictment. But, with the exception of certain officials who, like sheriffs,
acted or were bound to act at the behest and in the interest of individuals from whom they also received a special compensation, what
was the source of any duty owed by the official to the individual citizen? And if there was none, then why would there be any difference
46. 21 Mich. 84 (1870).
47. 21 Mich. at 105.
48. 21 Mich. at 107.
49. 21 Mich. at 88.
50. The opinion of Judge Selden in this supreme court case was reported in a footnote to the court of appeals decision in Conrad v. Trustees of the Village of Ithaca, 16
N.Y. 158, 161-73 n. • (1857), where it was stated by Chief Justice Denio that the Selden
opinion had been adopted by the court of appeals as a correct exposition of the principles governing such cases in the course of the court's decision to reverse the supreme
court's decision in Hickock v. Trustees of the Village of Plattsburgh, 15 Barb. 427 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1853). See 16 N.Y. at 160-61 8c 161 n. •.
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in so far as the obligations of public corporations were concerned?
Judge Selden found his answer to the latter question in a theory,
spun from English cases, that the special grant of governmental
powers to a municipal corporation, normally made at the request
of the incorporators, constituted consideration for an implied obligation on the corporation's part to perform its duties in a proper way
and that this implied obligation was for the benefit of individuals injured by nonperformance, as well as for the benefit of the public at
large.61
But Justice Campbell would have none of this. The distinction
between towns and counties, on the one hand, and cities, on the
other, he thought irrational:
It is competent for the Legislature to give towns and countries powers
as large as those granted to cities. Each receives what is supposed to
be necessary or convenient, and each receives this because the good
government of the people is supposed to require it. It would be contrary to every principle of fairness to give special privileges to any
part of the people and deny them to others; and such is not the purpose of city charters. In England the burgesses of boroughs and cities
had very important and valuable privileges of an exclusive nature,
and not common to all the people of the realm. The charters were
grants of privilege and not mere government agencies. Their free
customs and liberties were put by the great charter under the same
immunity with private freeholds. But in this State, and in this country generally, they are not placed beyond legislative control. The
Dartmouth College case, which first established charters as contracts,
distinguished between public and private corporations, and there is
no respectable authority to be found anywhere, which holds that
either offices or municipal charters generally involve any rights of
property whatever.52
In sum, his view was "that simply as municipal corporations ... no
public bodies can be made responsible for official neglect involving
no active misfeasance"53 and that "it will require legislative action to
create any liability to private suit for non-repair of public ways.
Whether such responsibility should be created, and to what extent
and under what circumstances it should be enforced, are legislative
51. 16 N.Y. at 161 n.•, 170-71.
52. 21 Mich. at 116-17. This was not the first evidence of Justice Campbell's disapproval of the argument derived from W eet. He had dissented on similar grounds in
City of Detroit v. Corey, discussed in the text accompanying notes 34-36 supra, because
it seemed to him that the condition attached by the court to the city's exercise of its
charter power to open excavations in the public way for the implantation of sewers was
the product of some notion of implied contract between city and state in regard to the
manner of its use. See 9 Mich. at 187-92.
53. 21 Mich. at 116.
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questions of importance and some nicety. They cannot be solved in
courts. " 54
Justice Cooley, in dissent, was of a different opinion. To him it
was unquestionably sound policy "that a municipal corporation
which is vested with full control of the public streets within its limits,
and chargeable with the duty of keeping them in repair, and which
also possesses by law the means of repair, should be held liable to an
individual who has suffered injury by a failure to perform this
duty." 55 Being of this view, he was not disposed to buck the strong
trend of opinion in accord with Judge Selden's view for no better
reason than the questions that might be raised against the logic by
which it was derived. 5 6
Two years later the court's position was brought into bolder relief
by its decision in Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo. 51 The village trustees, having concluded that a number of property owners were maintaining fences within the boundaries of the street along Olmstead
Road, ordered the village marshal, in default of prior action by the
owners, to remove the offending structures. In response to that directive, the marshal removed Sheldon's fence, and Sheldon sued the
village, claiming that the fence was in fact on his property. The trial
judge refused to hear Sheldon's evidence on the ground that the
trustees had acted on their own responsibility as public officers and
that the village was therefore not responsible for any resulting damage. 58 This position was firmly rejected by Justice Campbell for a
unanimous court. He asserted that, although some local officers are
corporate agents and others are not, a public corporation is as much
a legal person as is a private corporation, and if an unlawful act is
brought home to the corporation itself, there is no reason why it
54. 21 Mich. at 117.
55. 21 Mich. at 117.
56. But when, ten years later, the question was raised again by a litigant who hoped
to benefit from a change in the court's membership, it was Justice Cooley who rebuked
him:
The case of Blackeby was very fully and carefully considered, and there can be
no ground for supposing that either of the judges participating therein has since
changed the opinion then deliberately formed and expressed. The case was decided
on the concurring opinions of a majority of the court, and the decision is authoritative. There has been a change in the court since that time, but it would be mis•
chievous in a high degree to permit the re-opening of controversies every time a
new judge takes his place in the court, thereby encouraging speculation as to the
probable effect of such changes upon principles previously declared and enforced
m decided cases. Nothing is more important than that the Jaw should be settled:
and when a principle has once been authoritatively laid down by the court of last
resort, it should be regarded as finally settled.
McCutcheon v. Common Council, 43 Mich. 483, 486, 5 N.W. 668, 668-69 (1880).
57. 24 Mich. 383 (1872).
58, 24 Mich. at 384.
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should not be answerable. On this point, he stated, there was no disagreement at all.
The only disagreement is concerning corporate responsibility in cases
of alleged neglect of duty, and concerning the bounds of what may
be termed their legislative discretion, as distinguished from their
other action. To hold that positive wrongs must in all cases be considered as purely individual and not corporate acts, would be a
novelty in jurisprudence. Although not subject like corporations to
the jurisdiction of courts, it has always been understood that even
states and nations may be held responsible for the wrongs of their
authorized agents, and the whole system of public law rests on this
assumption. The idea, therefore, that a corporate body has a discretionary power to do wrong and not suffer for it, is not in harmony
with any safe principle. There may be certain cases where there is,
of necessity, a final discretion; but there can be no absolute discretionary power over private persons or property. They are assured by the
law of the land against any improper interference, and no public
authority exists which can authorize their immunity to be taken
away. 59
The act complained of by Sheldon was a trespass, directly commanded
by the village fathers themselves. Worse yet, it was in effect a forcible
taking of private lands for public use and therefore in no way analogous to cases involving claims for incidental inconveniences arising
out of grade changes or other public improvements where a wide
latitude for legislative decision-making must be allowed. Under the
circumstances presented by plaintiff's complaint, neither the "nonagency" argument nor the "legislative discretion" argument was
applicable, and it was not a case of "mere neglect of public duty."
Consequently, there was no reason why the village should escape
responsibility for the act of its officers carried out in their corporate
capacity.60
During the remaining years in which the court enjoyed the counsel of either Justice Campbell or Justice Cooley,61 the reason most
commonly asserted by the court for a conclusion that a municipal
corporation was not subject to liability (where the case did not involve mere nonfeasance and the court was persuaded that the action
in question was the action of the municipal corporation and not that
of an independent officer or agency) was that the particular action
59. 24 Mich. at 385-86.
60. See also Rogers v. Randall, 29 Mich. 41 (1874) (similar reasoning applied to removal of sidewalk from plaintiff's premises witbout his consent); Jordan v. Thorp, 142
Mich. 515, 105 N.W. 1113 (1905).
61. Justice Cooley was defeated for re-election in 1885; Justice Campbell died in
1890.
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reflected a decision within the legislative or political discretion of the
policy-making organ of the unit. It is clear that both of these justices
harbored strong convictions that judges and juries had no business
second-guessing operational decisions made by the elected representatives of the people. Thus, in City of Pontiac v. Carter 02 it was held
that the city had no liability to a property owner for damages allegedly suffered by reason of a change in the grade of the street on
which his premises were located. While the facts are not set forth in
the opinion, the case was described in Ashley v. City of Port Huron° 3
as involving no intrusion upon plaintiff's premises, but only a claim
that the value of his property was adversely affected because he had
built by reference to the earlier grade. It was a case of first impression
in Michigan. Justice Cooley cited what he described as an overwhelming weight of authority contrary to plaintiff's claim, which he saw as
analogous to a claim £or loss arising from the removal of a public
market or public hall from the vicinity of plaintiff's land, or from the
bringing of a prison into its vicinity.64 He also cited Larkin v. County
of Saginaw 65 for the proposition that "no action would lie against a
municipal corporation or body £or an injury resulting from a lawful
exercise of its legislative authority," a principle that he thought was
applicable here.66
In Henkel v. City of Detroit 07 plaintiff complained that the city
was unlawfully interfering with his property rights by allowing traffic
to accumulate around a public market to such an extent as to block
access to his adjoining business premises. He sought an injunction.
Justice Cooley, again, held that plaintiff could not complain about
the establishment of the market even though it inconvenienced him,
£or the establishment of the market was a legislative act and "[a]n act
of legislation can never be counted on as a legal ·wrong, however injurious it may prove to be to private interests."88 He did, however,
review the facts of the case to determine whether the city's implementation of its legislative decision had been in any way wrongful;
he concluded that the wrong, if any, must arise from the city's failure
to establish and enforce due regulations to protect and preserve the
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

32 Mich. 164 (1875).
35 Mich. 296, 297-98 (1877).
32 Mich. at 171-72.
See note 43 and text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
32 Mich. at 169.
49 Mich. 249, 13 N.W. 611 (1882).
49 Mich. at 258, 13 N.W. at 615.
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right of passage, "[b]ut this would be a failure in duty of a political
nature and could give no right of action." 69
In Burford v. City of Grand Rapids70 plaintiff complained of the
city council's action in setting aside Fountain Street as a street on
which coasting would be permitted. He asserted that the large numbers of people who gathered there for that purpose constituted a
public nuisance and that he had suffered special injury when his
horse, which he was driving on the street, was hit by a bob occupied
by several men and boys. Justice Cooley held that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action, for the permission granted by council
was again the exercise of a legislative power conferred upon the city
to control the use 0£ its streets, and "legislative power, whether held
by the law-making authority of the State, or by municipal bodies, is
in its nature governmental and discretionary." 71 To plaintiff's claim
that the council had, in effect, licensed a nuisance, he replied that
coasting on a public highway is not necessarily a nuisance, and, this
being so,
[t]he case presented then, would seem to be this: The common council,
having full control of the streets, has licensed the use of a particular
street in a particular way differing from the ordinary use. In doing so
it must be supposed to have determined that the use in that way will
not interrupt or interfere with such customary use of it for passage
or travel as the public may have occasion for. The decision to this
effect is made in the exercise of its discretionary and governmental
authority over a subject confided by the state to its judgment, and is
presumptively correct. But, whether correct or not, no appeal from
the judgment to court and jury has been provided for, and therefore
none can be had. 72
In Hines v. City of Charlotte78 the court held that the plaintiff
had no cause of action against the city for a fire loss that he attributed
to the city's failure to enforce its ordinance prohibiting the erection
of wooden structures within certain areas, and in Amperse v. City of
Kalamazoo 74 it held that the city had no liability for the city council's
wrongful refusal to approve a bond offered by the plaintiff so that he
could engage in the sale of liquor. Both cases were treated as instances
69. 49 Mich. at 261, 13 N.W. at 616.
70. 53 Mich. 98, 18 N.W. 571 (1884).
71. 53 Mich. at 100, 18 N.W. at 571.
72. 53 Mich. at 105, 18 N.W. at 574.
73. 72 Mich. 278, 40 N.W. 333 (1888).
74. 75 Mich. 228, 42 N.W. 821 (1889).
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of mere nonfeasance, although in the latter case the council had
passed a resolution affirmatively disapproving the bond.
In sum, it was decided in these cases that the city was not required
to compensate a property owner for the prejudicial effect that a
change of street grade would have upon the value of his property, nor
for the inconvenience he suffered from the traffic near his place of
business generated by the operation of a public market nearby, nor
for a fire loss that would not have occurred if the ordinance pertaining to the use of wooden buildings had been enforced; nor was it
required to compensate a user of the highway for harm suffered at
the hands of another person using the highway in a manner permitted by the city, nor to compensate a citizen who claimed that the
city council arbitrarily refused to take action in his favor that he
was entitled to have taken.
The most dubious decisions during this era were City of Detroit
v. Beckman75 and City of Lansing v. Toolan,76 both products of the
questionable decision in Larkin v. County of Saginaw. 77 The "legislative discretion" argument was used in these cases to exempt the
municipal corporation from liability for personal injuries allegedly
caused by defects in the design or plan of public works. In Beckman
it was alleged that decedent's wagon had run off the end of a culvert
and overturned and that the city was negligent in causing so short a
culvert to be constructed. Justice Cooley's reaction was that, when
the complaint is that the plan of a public work is so defective as to
render it dangerous when completed, the fault found is with legislative action, for the determination to construct a public work and the
prescribing of the plan for it are matters of legislation. 78 In Toolan
the plaintiff claimed that he had fallen into a ditch that had been cut
by authority of the city and negligently left unprotected. It appeared
that a contractor employed by the city to make improvements on a
bridge had cut the ditch to protect his work from a flow of water after
a heavy rain, that he had covered the ditch with a plank to a width
of sixteen feet, and that the city thereafter allowed the ditch to remain as a permanent drain and paid the contractor for it. Plaintiff
relied upon acceptance and ratification to bring responsibility home
to the city. Despite the analogy of City of Detroit v. Corey,1° Justice
Cooley thought that the case was controlled by Beckman. In planning
75. 34 Mich. 125 (1876).

76. 37 Mich. 152 (1887).
77. See note 43 and text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
78. 34 Mich. at 126.
'19. See text accompanying notes 34-86 supra.
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a public work, he said, a municipal corporation must determine for
itself to what ex.tent it will guard against possible accidents, and
courts and juries are not to say it shall be punished in damages for
failing to give the public more complete protection. The public has
a right to require of the city that due care shall be observed in the
construction of the work after the plans are fixed, and in its management thereafter, but negligence is not to be predicated of the plan
itself.SO
Contemporary with these two decisions, on the other hand, was
Ashley v. City of Port Huron, 81 wherein plaintiff claimed that injury
to his premises was caused by the cutting of a sewer, the "necessary
result" of which was to collect and throw large quantities of water on
his premises where water would not otherwise have flowed. While the
trial judge thought that the "legislative discretion" argument precluded recovery, the supreme court was of contrary opinion. According to Justice Cooley, it was clear from the authorities that municipal
corporations have no exemption from responsibility where the injury
is directly caused by a corporate act in the nature of a trespass: "If
the corporation sends people with picks and spades to cut a street
through it without first acquiring the right of way, it is liable for a
tort; but it is no more liable under such circumstances than it is when
it pours upon his land a flood of water by a public sewer so constructed that the flooding must be a necessary result." 82 The principle
was the same as in Pennoyer v. City of Saginaw,83 where the city became liable by creating a nuisance that caused injury to an individual.
A distinction seems thus to have been drawn between a design
feature of a public work that necessarily results in an invasion of
plaintiff's property interest and a design feature that merely creates
a risk of personal injury and property damage. Liability could be
predicated of the former, but not of the latter. The trespass-appropriation image in the former situation made the difference.
Ashley thereafter furnished the rationale by which persons with
complaints against the municipality's handling of sewers and drains
could frequently avoid the nonfeasance difficulty created by Dermont.
In Defer v. City of Detroit84 the facts alleged by plaintiff were not
unlike those which Dermont had asserted. The claim was that the
city had rebuilt the junction between the sewers in Franklin and
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

37 Mich. at 154.
35 Mich. 296 (1887).
35 Mich. at 301.
See text accompanying note 41 supra.
67 Mich. 346, 34 N.W. 680 (1887).
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Riopelle Streets in such a way as to raise the grade of that junction
above the level of the Franklin Street sewer, so that the sewer ran
backward and flooded plaintiff's basement. The city argued that the
case was controlled by the proposition that a municipal corporation
is not liable for an injury resulting from the exercise of legislative
power, but the court cited Ashley as evidence that this is not universally true.85 When the plan adopted must necessarily cause injury to
private property equivalent to some appropriation of the enjoyment
thereof, the court said, liability arises. Only when fault is found with
the wisdom or sufficiency of the measure, or its adaptability to carry
out the purpose intended, is liability precluded.86 In this instance, the
allegation that the grade of the sewer had been changed in such a
way as to cause water to flood the plaintiff's premises was a charge of
misfeasance for which there would be liability. 87 At the same term,
in Rice v. City of Flint, 88 a claim was sustained against the city for
raising the grade of Saginaw Street without taking care to provide
for the surface water that, because of the change, was cast upon the
plaintiff's premises. Whereas in the past the street had carried the
water away, its flow was now dammed up so that the gutters discharged in front of plaintiff's buildings. The court said that "[£]or a
direct act which causes water to flow upon the premises of another
to his injury a municipality is responsible."89
B.

The Legislature Enters the Scene: Of Defects in the Public Ways

Meanwhile, back at the Capitol, the legislature was not content
with the outcome of Martin's action against the Niles highway commissioners.90 Four years after his case was decided, the following statute was enacted:
That any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the
public highways in this State, by reason of neglect to keep in repair
any bridge or culvert, by any township or corporation whose duty it
is to keep such bridge or culvert in repair, such township or corporation shall be liable to, and shall pay to the person or persons so in85. 67 Mich. at 349, 34 N.W. at 682.
86. 67 Mich. at 349, 34 N.W. at 682.
87. 67 Mich. at 350, 34 N.W. at 682-83.
88. 67 Mich. 401, 34 N.W. 719 (1887).
89. 67 Mich. at 403, 34 N.W. at 719. Accord, Seaman v, City of Marshall, 116 Mich.
327, 74 N.W. 484 (1898); Morley v. Village of Buchanan, 124 Mich. 128, 82 N.W. 802
(1900); McAskill v. Township of Hancock, 129 Mich. 74, 88 N.W. 78 (1901) (refused to
distinguish between "quasi-corporations," such as townships and counties, and incorporated towns and cities).
90. See text accompanying notes 14-32 supra.
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jured or disabled, just damages, to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case, before any court of competent jurisdiction.91

In section 2 of the act similar provisions were made for injuries to
horses and other animals and for injuries to vehicles and other property.92 A collection procedure was provided, which involved certification of the judgment to the township clerk, who was directed to
collect the amount of the judgment by normal procedures of taxation. 93
But the draftsmen had not read the court's opinion in Martin
with sufficient care, and the statute failed its first test in an action
against a township. In Township of Leoni v. Taylor, 94 wherein plaintiff sought compensation for injuries to his horses arising from a defective bridge, the court read the statute, saw that it, by its terms,
imposed liability only upon a township or corporation "whose duty
it is to keep such bridge or culvert in repair," recalled that the
Martin case had established that bridge and highway repair is not
the duty of the township, and decided that the plain meaning of the
statute required a decision that the township, not having acquired
a repair duty, still had no liability. "The courts are not at liberty,"
said Justice Graves, "in order to effectuate what they may suppose
to have been the intention of the Legislature, to put a construction
upon the enactment not supported by the words, though the consequences should be to defeat the object of the act," 95 and his brothers,
Campbell, Christiancy, and Cooley, concurred.
The wheels ground slowly, but the legislature's eventual reaction
to this decision was the enactment in 1879 of Public Act No. 244.96
This time the terrain had been more carefully reconnoitered, and an
effort was made to interdict all escape routes. The initial section of
the statute was as follows:
That any person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the
public highways or streets in this state, by reason of neglect to keep
such public highways or streets, and all bridges, crosswalks and culverts on the same in good repair, and in a condition reasonably safe
and fit for travel, by the toi.vnship, village, city, or corporation whose
corporate authority extends over such public highway, street, bridge,
crosswalk or culvert, and whose duty it is to keep the same in good
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Act of March 15, 1861, No. 197, § 1, [1861] Mich. Acts 407.
Act of March 15, 1861, No. 197, § 2, [1861] Mich. Acts 408.
Act of March 15, 1861, No. 197, § 2, [1861] Mich. Acts 408.
20 Mich. 148 (1870).
20 Mich. at 155.
Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 223.
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repair, such township, village, city, or corporation shall be liable to,
and shall pay to the person or persons so injured or disabled, just
damages, to be recovered in an action of trespass on the case, before
any court of competent jurisdiction.97
As in the earlier statute, a second section provided the same responsibility for injury to animals and other property,98 and in section
3 a procedure was provided for collection of the judgment.00 In section 4 it was explicitly made "the duty of townships, villages, cities, or
corporations to keep in good repair, so that they shall be safe and
convenient for public travel at all times, all public highways, streets,
bridges, crosswalks, and culverts that are within their jurisdiction
and under their care and control, and which are open to public
travel."100 Moreover, the public entities upon which the duty was
imposed were authorized to levy additional taxes, up to five mills,
for repair purposes if other means of financing provided by law
proved insufficient;191 it was further stipulated that "highway commissioners, street commissioners, and all other officers having special
charge of highways, streets, bridges, crosswalks, or culverts, and the
care or repairs thereof, are hereby made and declared to be officers
of the tmvnship, village, city, or corporation wherein they are elected
or appointed, and shall be subject to the general direction of such
to,vnship, village, city, or corporate authorities, in the discharge of
their several duties."192 All actions brought under the statute were
subject to the proviso that "it must be shown that such township,
village, city, or corporation has had reasonable time and opportunity
after such highway, street, crosswalk or culvert became unsafe or
unfit for travel, to put the same in the proper condition for use, and
has not used reasonable diligence therein."103
One hardy defense attorney argued thereafter that the 1879 statute was still ineffective to impose liability upon a township, because
the repair duty continued to rest upon the highway commissioners
as individuals and their office was created by the constitution, which
did not subject them to the general direction of the township authorities as the statute proposed to do.104 Justice Cooley, however, tendered
the court's surrender. He conceded that the legislature's intent in
97. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 1, [1879] Mich. Pub, Acts 223,
98. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 2, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 223.
99. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 3, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 224.
100. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 4, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 224.
101. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 4, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 224.
102. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 4, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 224.
103. Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, § 4, [1879] Mich. Pub. Acts 223, 224.
104. Burnham v. Township of Byron, 46 Mich. 555, 9 N.W. 851 (1881).
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1861 may have been to change the rule of Commissioners of Highways v. Martin and asserted that no doubt as to the existence of that
intent could remain after 1879. Wherever the operational duty was
located, section 4 of the statute had the effect of imputing neglect of
duty on the part of the commissioners "to the corporation by whose
people they are chosen and within whose limits they exercise their
authority,"105 and there could be no question of the legislature's
power to make the municipalities liable, regardless of where the duty
was located.
On the same day, in City of Grand Rapids v. Wyman,106 Justice
Cooley held that the legislature had also succeeded in overriding
Detroit v. Blackeby101 and that the statutory liability was now applicable to cities as well as to the other units named in the statute.
The city attorney had argued that the city still had only two street
commissioners, who could scarcely be expected to discover and correct promptly all the defects that might develop in the city ways. But
that argument was no longer viable: "The statute having imposed
the duty of repair and the liability for neglect, the city at its peril
must do whatever is needful to protect itself against actions for injury."108 It was quickly established, however, that the duty imposed
was only one of reasonable care; the municipalities did not have an
insurer's liability.100
In the 1879 version the coverage of the statute, which in 1861 had
been limited to bridges and culverts, was expanded to include highways, streets, and crosswalks. The very first case to reach the supreme
court thereafter was a claim for injury caused by a defective public
sidewalk. In City of Detroit v. Putnam 110 the court examined the
statute, noted that sidewalks had not been mentioned, and concluded
that they were not covered. Correction of this omission was attempted
in 1885 in a statute that added sidewalks to the list.111 But the lawmakers slipped again. That statute contained, in addition to the side105. Burnham v. Township of Byron, 46 Mich. 555, 558, 9 N.W. 851, 852 (1881).
106. 46 Mich. 516, 9 N.W. 833 (1881).
107. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.
108. 46 Mich. at 517, 9 N.W. at 834.
109. Fulton Iron&: Engine Works v. Township of Kimball, 52 Mich. 146, 17 N.W.
733 (1883); Township of Medina v. Perkins, 48 Mich. 67, 11 N.W. 810 (1882). Both cases
arose from the failures of bridges under heavy loads, apparently steam tractors. In the
latter case the court said that lack of reasonable care could be found in a failure to
discover the defect in the bridge, but that the jury should take into account all the
circumstances, including the size of the governmental unit involved and the degree of
engineering knowledge to be expected of the township officers. 48 Mich. at 72, 11 N.W.
at 811-12.
110. 45 Mich. 263, 7 N.W. 815 (1881).
111. Act of June 17, 1885, No. 214, [1885] Mich. Pub. Acts 289.

208

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:187

walk provision, a section abolishing common law liability for injuries
of the type covered by the statute112 and another setting dollar limits
on sidewalk claims, on a sliding scale from 300 dollars, when the
population of the defendant municipality was less than 500, to 1,800
dollars, for a population of more than 2,000.113 Unfortunately, these
provisions had not been described in the title of the act, which was,
for that reason, promptly held unconstitutional,114 and the whole
thing had to be done over.115
The court did not receive this derogation of the common law
with open arms. While Justices Cooley and Campbell were still pres•
ent, the new statutory liability developed at a conservative pace. In
Keyes v. Village of Marcellus 116 the village was held to have no lia•
bility where plaintiff departed from the traveled portion of a road in
the dark and fell into a hole that some youngsters had excavated
within the right of way. Nor was the city liable, in Williams v. City
of Grand Rapids,111 to a plaintiff who fell at a point where a city sidewalk came to the margin of an intersecting street, when it appeared
that no crosswalk had ever been constructed at that crossing. While
the statute required the city to keep crosswalks in repair, it imposed
no obligation to build one where none existed. How many crosswalks
should be built, and in what locations, was wholly a question of need,
within the discretion of the common council, and not to be reviewed
by any court.118
In Davis v. Mayor, Recorder b Alderman,119 when plaintiff ran
into a stone that marked the end of a drain running under the street,
it was error not to give the jury an instruction based on the "no liability for negligence in the plan or for legislative decisions" notion.
112. Act of June 17, 1885, No. 214, § 6, [1885] Mich. Pub. Acts 291.
IHI. Act of June 17, 1885, No. 214, § 6, [1885] Mich. Pub. Acts 291.
114. Church v. City of Detroit, 64 Mich. 571, 31 N.W. 447 (1887), The court noted
that the provision abrogating a common law liability that the court had held did not
exist was included in the act because the federal courts had held otherwise. As a result
a nonresident might recover where a resident could not. In the interest of uniformity,
the statute was designed to create a purely statutory liability. Since the 1885 enactment
purported to be only an amendment of existing law and contained no repealer, its
demise left the 1879 statute in effect.
115. Act of June 28, 1887, No. 264, [1887] Mich. Pub. Acts 345. This statute reiterated
the provisions of the 1879 statute, adding liability for sidewalks and the section abrogating common law liability, but, prudently it would seem, omitting the dollar limits on
sidewalk claims that had been included in the 1885 version. It repealed, and therefore
superseded, the 1879 statute. It was codified in 3 Mrca. GEN. STAT. §§ 1446c-h (A.
Howell ed. 1890).
116. 50 Mich. 439, 15 N.W. 542 (1883).
117. 59 Mich. 51, 26 N.W. 279 (1886).
118. 59 Mich. at 55, 26 N.W. at 281.
119. 61 Mich. 530, 28 N.W. 526 (1886).
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Focusing upon the duty to keep the ways "in repair," rather than
upon the following clause requiring them to be kept "in a condition
reasonably safe and fit for travel," the court, in McKellar v. City of
Detroit,120 held that the city was not liable for failing to remove snow
and ice from a crosswalk. A trial judge's opinion that Beckman121
and Toolan122 were abrogated by the 1879 statute was brusquely
corrected by Justice Campbell in Shippy v. Village of Au Sable.123
Pointing to Williams and Davis, he deprived a plaintiff of a verdict
based on a claim that the step-off from a sidewalk to a crosswalk was
too precipitous. Again, he was much concerned about the chaos that
would result if plans for public works were subjected to review by
juries: "If it can be referred to a jury to determine on the propriety
of such action, there will be as many views as there are juries, and it
can never be definitely known when a municipality is safe."124
Justice Campbell was also most reluctant to recognize a liability
on the part of the municipality for injury resulting from conditions
created by third persons.125 In McArthur v. City of Saginaw 126 he
·wrote that a lumber pile within the limits of the right-of-way but
outside its traveled portion was not a "defect" the failure to eliminate
which would represent a neglect of "repair." At most, it represented a
failure by the city to enforce its police regulations, and "the Legislature," he averred, "seldom imposes responsibility to individuals for
that kind of municipal negligence or misconduct."127
But in 1889 a turning point was reached. Justice Campbell, on a
single decision day, found himself in solitary dissent in Southwell v.
City of Detroit,128 which, in effect, reaffirmed the outcome of City of
Detroit v. Corey,129 and also in Joslyn v. City of Detroit,180 which,
without expressly overruling them, cut the ground from under his
120. 57 Mich. 158, 23 N.W. 621 (1885).
121. See text accompanying notes 75 & 78 supra.
122. See text accompanying notes 76 & 79-80 supra.
123. 65 Mich. 494, 32 N.W. 741 (1887),
124. 65 Mich. at 501, 32 N.W. at 744.
125, See, e.g., Agnew v. City of Corunna, 55 Mich. 428, 21 N.W. 873 (1885); McArthur
v. City of Saginaw, 58 Mich. 357, 25 N.W. 313 (1885); Joslyn v. City of Detroit, 74 Mich.
458, 42 N.W. 50 (1889) (dissenting opinion).
126, 58 Mich. 357, 25 N.W. 313 (1885).
127. 58 Mich. at 362, 25 N.W. at 315. By this statement he was putting the case
in the same category as Henkel v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes
67-69 supra; Burford v. City of Grand Rapids, discussed in text accompanying notes
70-72 supra; and Hines v. City of Charlotte, discussed in text accompanying note 73

supra.
128. 74 Mich. 438, 42 N.W. US (1889).
129, See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
130. 74 Mich. 458, 42 N.W. 50 (1889).
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decisions in McArthur and in Agnew v. City of Corunna.181 Mrs.
Joslyn's buggy upset when its wheels ran up on a pile of sand in the
traveled part of a street that she was traversing after dark. The sandpile had been placed there by a contractor who was building a house
for an abutting owner; it had been there for more than a month and
was unmarked by lights or other warnings at the time of the accident.
Justice Campbell sturdily contended that the city's only statutory
duty was to keep the streets in repair, that the sandpile did not constitute a condition of disrepair, that the city had no responsibility
for foreign articles placed on the street by others, and that the court
could not, consistently with its own precedents, sustain the claim.182
But Chief Justice Shenvood was of a different mind: "It was the
object of the Legislature in the passage of this statute to avoid the
decisions of this Court, by which, before the passage of the act, the
law by construction was made to relieve the municipality from all
liability of this kind, and we think the statute should be so construed
as to effect the object intended by the Legislature."133 The duty imposed by the statute was not just a duty to repair; rather, the statute
made the city liable for accidents that occurred by reason of its
neglect to keep its streets in a condition reasonably safe and fit for
travel: "The duty resting upon the city to make safe its streets ... is
entirely independent of the police power. It requires everything to
be done by the city necessary to make travel upon its streets reasonably safe."134 And, again over Justice Campbell's dissent, the same
reasoning was relied upon in Malloy v. Township of Walker136 to
sustain an action against the township based upon a claim of negligence in failing to provide railings along a steep embankment, the
defense having argued that this was at most a claim of negligence in
the design of the road:
This statute cannot be given a construction that would relieve a
township or other municipality, upon which a burden is cast to keep
its highways in repair and reasonably safe for travel, from liability
by saying that it had adopted a method of construction, and had built
according to the plan. A municipality cannot construct a dangerous
and unsafe road,-one not safe and convenient for public travel,and shield itself behind its legislative power to adopt a plan and
method of building and constructing in accordance therewith.•.•
131. 55 :Mich. 428, 21 N.W. 873 (1885).
132. See 74 Mich. at 461-65, 42 N.W. at 51-52.
133. 74 Mich. at 460, 42 N.W. at 50.
134. 74 Mich at 461, 42 N.W. at 51. See also Lombar v. Village of East Tawas, 86
Mich. 14, 48 N.W. 947 (1891); Sebert v. City of Alpena, '18 Mich. 165, 43 N.W. 1098
(1889).
135. 77 Mich. 448, 43 N.W. 1012 (1889).
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The statute is imperative to make a road reasonably safe, and whether
it is in that condition of safety and fit for travel must be a question
for the jury, under proper circumstances.186

C. Deflection of Responsibility Through State Intervention:
Independent Agencies; State and Local Functions

During the nineteenth century local political units in Michigan
frequently did not stand alone as agencies of government or of public
service within their geographical boundaries. The state government
was in close touch with local affairs, and when, in particular communities, particular problems proved intractable or new departures
were needed, the legislature frequently devised ad hoc solutions. One
common solution was to entrust the problem to a commission, specially created and empowered, which, although it might draw its
financial support in whole or in part from the local political unit,
operated more or less independently of the local legislative body.
By mid-century it had become apparent that Detroit had outgrown its town marshal system for enforcing the law and keeping
the peace, and it was generally agreed that the time had come to
create an urban police force; but all efforts of local authorities to
respond to the need foundered on the issue of cost.137 At last, in 1865,
the state legislature took charge and, overriding the protest of the
local establishment, enacted a special statute that established "a police
government for the city of Detroit."138 The statute created a commission that was entrusted with the police function within the city
and empowered to prepare an annual budget, the funds for which
were required to be provided by the city council. The original commissioners were named in the act, and the governor was empowered
to fill vacancies by appointment. In People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney,139 the supreme court quickly sustained the constitutionality
of the act against a challenge, "based on general principles," that it
was bad because it imposed upon the people of Detroit the obligation
to tax themselves to pay the expenses of a board in whose appointment they had no voice and over whose conduct they had no control.
Fire protection became an issue at about the same time. Prior to
1860 the city depended upon the protection provided by volunteer
fire companies utilizing man-powered equipment. But the interest
and elan that had sustained these companies was fading, and the
136.
137.
138.
139.

77 Mich. at 462, 43 N.W. at 1016.
S. FARMER, supra note 6, at 240.
Act of Feb. 28, 1865, No. 78, [1865] Mich. Acts 99,
13 Mich. 481 (1865).
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process of converting to steam fire engines in the care of companies
composed of paid officers and :firemen was begun. In 1867, the legislature created a fire commission to administer the new steam fire
department, designated its original membership and provided for the
filling of vacancies by appointment of the common council.140
A few years later the legislature attempted to deal in a similar
fashion ·with still another subject matter; it adopted an act "to establish a board of public works in and for the city of Detroit"141 to supersede the existing boards of sewer commissioners and water commissioners and assume control of the city's streets, parks, and other
public grounds. Again, the initial members of the board were designated in the act, and it was this feature that evoked, in People ex rel.
Le Roy v. Hurlbut,1 42 a subsequent quo warranto proceeding, a
chorus, unusual in its time, of opinions from each of the four members of the supreme court. Since the court had raised no objection
to the similar feature in the police commission act, its opposite reaction to the board of public works act required explanation. The
basis for the attack upon the provision was a clause in the state constitution that provided that "[j]udicial officers of cities and villages
shall be elected and all other officers shall be elected or appointed at
such time and in such manner as the legislature may direct."148 Chief
Justice Campbell construed that requirement as applicable only to
municipal officers and therefore saw the question to be whether
"the police commissioners are essentially city officers in the same sense
that the board of works are city officers."144 His answer to that question was negative:
The preservation of the peace has always been regarded, both in
England and America, as one of the most important prerogatives of
the state. It is not the peace of the city or county, but the peace of
the king or state that is violated by crimes and disorders.•..
The general purposes of the police act were such as appertain
directly to the suppression of crime and the administration of justice.
There is, therefore, no constitutional reason for holding it to be other
than a regulation of matters pertaining to the general policy of the
state, and subject to state management,145
On the other hand:
There is no dispute concerning the character of the public works
140. Act of March 26, 1867, No. 453, [1867] Mich. Acts 931.
141. Act of April 18, 1871, No. 494, [1871] Mich, Loe. &: Pers. Acts 278.
142. 24 Mich. 44 (1871).
143. Mrca. CONST. art. XV, § 14 (1850).
144. 24 Mich. at 79.
145. 24 Mich. at 83-84.
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act. Its purposes are directly and evidently local and municipal. And
the main point to be decided is, whether the legislature of the state
can, ·without the concurrence of the city of Detroit, select the local
officers of the city,146
He then proceeded to forge a theory of implied constitutional right
to local self-government that produced a negative answer to that last
question.147 In this, he was strongly supported by his brother Cooley,
who said, "The state may mould local institutions according to its
views of policy or expediency; but local government is a matter of
absolute right; and the state cannot take it away."148
Thus was stated, in cases concerned with the proper allocation of
certain decision-making powers between the state government and
the local community, and not ·with the question of community liability for the tortious acts of public officials, a portentous distinction
between functions performed by local officials as agents of state policy
and functions that relate instead to the "private" or parochial concerns of the local community. In the time of Cooley and Campbell
the reason for the distinction was remembered, and it did not bloom
out into the "governmental-proprietary" cliche of later days. There
were, however, some cases that edged in that direction.
When the city of Detroit decided to build and operate the Detroit
146. 24 Mich. at 84.
147. 24 Mich. at 89-90.
148. 24 Mich. at 108. Justice Cooley emphasized even more sharply the distinction
between state and local functions:
For those classes of officers whose duties are general,-such as the judges, the officers
of the militia, the superintendents of police, of quarantine, and of ports, by whatever name called,-provision has, to a greater or less extent, been made by state
appointment. But these are more properly state than local officers; they perform
duties for the state in localities, as collectors of internal revenue do for the general
government; and a local authority for their appointment does not make them local
officers when the nature of their duties is essentially general. In the case before us,
the officers in question involve the custody, care, management, and control of the
pavements, sewers, water-works and public buildings of the city, and the duties are
purely local•••• The municipality, as an agent of government, is one thing; the
corporation, as an owner of property, is in some particulars to be regarded in a
very different light•.•• In Detroit v. Corey ••• Manning, J., bases his opinion
that the city was liable for an injury to an individual, occasioned by falling into
an excavation for a sewer, carelessly left open, upon the fact that the sewers were
the private property of the city, in which the outside or public people of the state
at large had no concern•••• Other cases might be cited, but 1t seems not to be
needful. They rest upon the well understood fact that these corporations are of a
two-fold character; the one public as regards the state at large, in so far as they
are its agents in government; the other private, in so far as they are to provide the
local necessities and conveniences for their own citizens ••••
24 Mich. at 103-05.
The other cases cited in the argument, in addition to Corey, had nothing to do with
municipal liability, but related instead to the protection of municipal property rights
against state intrusion. These ideas were further elaborated by Justice Cooley in People
ex rel. Board of Park Commrs. v. Common Council, 28 Mich. 228 (1873) (legislature not
able to confer upon a special commission the power to obligate a municipal corporation
to provide funds for the acquisition of a park).
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House of Correction, the legislature provided by statute for its estab•
lishment and for the confinement of convicted persons therein. 140
The administration of the prison was, by this statute, put under the
control of a board of inspectors, three of whom were appointed by
the city council; the mayor and the chairman of the state board of
prison inspectors were made ex officio members. Some years later an
action was brought against the city of Detroit by a person who had
been confined in the prison for a period of time; he asserted that he
had suffered injury from being required by the prison officers to take
a cold bath under improper conditions and by subsequent exposure
in a cold cell. The supreme court, in City of Detroit v. Laughna,160
reversed a judgment favorable to the plaintiff on the ground that the
city had no control over the management o.f affairs within the prison,
since the prison had been entrusted to a board that served as an
agency of the state rather than as an agency of the city:
The whole subject of personal liberty is one of general state concern, and imprisonment in all its incidents has always been regulated
by statute. The law of 1861, adopting the house of correction as a
public prison, has provided for a state representative on the governing board, and has provided expressly, and has not left to the action
of the common council to determine, under whose control its regulation shall be placed.
It is impossible under such a law to regard the city of Detroit
either as custodian of the prison or as jailer and guardian of the
prisoners. The officers are not city agents, and the city has nothing to
do with their responsibility.161

It was a limited holding: not that the correctional officers were, by
reason of their function, state rather than municipal agents, but that
they were so by reason of the way in which the legislature had organized this particular activity.
In 1889, in Coots v. City of Detroit,152 the court affirmed a judgment against the city of Detroit in favor of a fireman who was injured
when the wheel of the engine being driven to a fire struck a street
defect and threw him against the machinery. Two of the majority
justices rejected the city's assumption of risk and fellow servant defenses on the ground that they were not applicable to a claim based
on breach of the city's statutory street repair obligation,163 but the
third, Justice Champlin, argued that they were inapplicable because
149.
150.
151.
152.
153,

Act of March 15, 1861, No, 164, [1861] Mich. Acts 262,
34 Mich. 402 (18'76).
34 Mich. at 404-05.
'75 Mich. 628, 43 N.W. 1'7 (1889),
'75 Mich. at 636, 43 N.W. at 20.
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members of the fire department were not servants or agents of the
city.164 Justice Campbell, in dissent, was persuaded that the judgment
should not stand and desired to rest his decision in part on the fellow
servant doctrine, an approach that was somewhat difficult in view of
the independent status of the fire department.155 That difficulty did
not prove insuperable, but the significance of the opinion lies in the
difference that was revealed between his perception of the municipal
situation and that of Justice Champlin. The latter had asserted that
firemen, as such, were "public officers, who perform duties imposed
by law for the benefit of all the citizens, the performance of which the
city has no control over, and derives no benefit from in its corporate
capacity. The acts of such public officers are their own official acts,
and not the acts of the municipal corporation or its agents."156 For
this proposition he cited and quoted outside cases and asserted that
it was also the well-settled law in Michigan. For the latter assertion
he cited no authorities, and in fact there were none. Justice Campbell
made no such dogmatic assertion. His perception was that the Detroit
fire department was a public instrumentality that the legislature had
seen fit to remove from the direct control of the city and place under
a commission governed by law and not subject, in the immediate
government of the force, to the will of the city legislature:
Although in a certain sense it is sometimes called a city agency, yet
its members are in no proper sense city agents, in the usual meaning
of agency. Their duties are not powers delegated by the city, but
powers conferred by the law of the State. They relate to matters which
public policy requires should be placed in the list of municipal affairs, and which are often put entirely within the control of the governing body of the city. But they are of such importance that the
immediate control has been thought proper to be removed from the
other city authorities.157
In Laughna the plaintiff failed to hold the city responsible for the
acts of officials who acted, as the court viewed it, independent of city
control. In O'Leary v. Board of Fire & Water Commissioners158 the
plaintiff was equally unsuccessful in an effort to bring liability home,
not to the city, but to just such an independent board that provided
services to a local community. While the city of Marquette was yet a
village the legislature created for it a board of water commissioners,
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

75
75
75
75
79

Mich.
Mich.
:Mich.
Mich.
Mich.

at 637, 43 N.W. at 20-21.
at 647, 43 N.W. at 23-24.
at 637-38, 43 N.W. at 21.
at 646, 43 N.W. at 23-24.
281, 44 N.W. 608 (1890).
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the members of which were appointed by the common council of the
municipality and empowered to issue bonds, purchase lands, construct a water system, provide fire protection, and levy water rates
upon consumers.159 O'Leary fell into a ditch that had been dug for
the laying of water pipes and sued the board, whose servants had dug
it. While the statute did not expressly declare the board to be a corporation, Justice Campbell agreed that it was a corporation to all
intents and purposes,160 although it was not a municipal corporation
because its members did not directly represent the local constituency
and it had not been favored with general governmental authority. 101
If it had been a municipal corporation, it might have become liable
if it had caused injury by neglect in the process of construction of a
work that was its private property or if its action had been directly
injurious to private property.162 But Justice Campbell could not
believe that the legislature, having created the board to perform a
particular service for the people of Marquette and having failed to
provide it with access to funds from which a judgment might properly be paid, had intended that it should be liable for the tortious
acts of its servants:
It is for the Legislature to determine how far, if at all, a body whose
negligence, if it is so called, is imputed, and in no sense actual, shall
be made subject to suit for the misconduct of its employes. There are
many cases where such liability does not exist, except against the
immediate individual wrong-doer. The person injured is not harmed
any more where there are several persons liable than where there is
only one. Imputed negligence is purely a question of public policy,
and subject to legislative regulation.163
D.

Reprise: The Law in 1890

Thus ended Justice Campbell's association with these questions.
Two months later he died. As he and his brothers viewed the terrain,
it would seem that they saw the city as an instrumentality of government, which, largely for convenience in the performance of certain
159. Act of March 2, 1869, No. 243, [1869] Mich. Acts 104.
160. 79 Mich. at 283-84, 44 N.W. at 609.
161. 79 Mich. at 284, 44 N.W. at 609.
162. 79 Mich. at 285, 44 N.W. at 609, dting City of Detroit v. Corey, discussed in
text accompanying notes 34-36 supra; Pennoyer v. City of Saginaw, discussed in text
accompanying note 41 supra; Ashley v. City of Port Huron, discussed in text accompany•
ing notes 81-82 supra; Defer v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes
84-87 supra.
163. 79 Mich. at 286-87, 44 N.W. at 610. Why O'Leary sued the board and not the
city does not appear. The court noted that "[w]hether the corporation in charge of the
public ways is liable is not before us." 79 Mich. at 282, 44 N.W. at 609.
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service functions for its inhabitants, was also incorporated, but which
did not stand alone in either capacity. Some of the local functions of
central government and some of the service functions of the local
community were entrusted by the constitution and the legislature to
particular officers or public bodies. Some of these were locally elected
or appointed, and some were designated from Lansing, but all of
them operated to some extent on their own responsibility or at least
independent of control by the corporate municipality. Where this
was so, the court saw no reason why the cities should bear legal responsibility for their acts. Hence the city of Detroit was not liable
for the acts of the prison officers at the Detroit House of Correction,164 nor was the township of Niles liable for the neglect of duty
by the local highway commissioners.165
Moreover, the court did not consider the doctrine of respondeat
superior to be part of the law of nature. Whether a public board or
corporation was subject to "imputed" responsibility for the deficient
conduct of persons who were unquestionably its servants was a question of policy, and if the legislature had established a hoard to accomplish a given end and had conferred upon it powers and resources for
the attainment of that end only and no other, this action was likely to
be seen as evidence that the legislature did not intend the corporate
entity to be vicariously liable to tort claimants, who had, after all,
recourse against the primary actors.
On the other hand, this principle would not protect from liability
a public entity, whether municipal corporation or special agency,
which, by its corporate act, i.e., by the decision of its responsible
officers, took action that directly injured, by trespass or nuisance, the
property interest of an individual. In such a case, the liability was
primary, not imputed, and there was, moreover, an element of appropriation of private interests involved.
General principles of affirmative obligation in tort had not yet
been completely worked out, and a conservative approach in this
context was reinforced by a concern that the decision-making powers
of public bodies not be clogged by apprehensions of private liability.
It was difficult for the court to see why a private individual should
have a money claim against a public entity because it had failed or
refused to provide services or to enforce its police regulations, or
which had made some other decision that was of incidental disadvantage to him. Such municipal decisions frequently involved no mis164. See text accompanying notes 150-51 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 14-32 supra.
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feasance and were "legislative," "discretionary," or "political" in
nature. Freedom to make decisions concerning the nature and extent
of public services (absent nuisance or trespass, of course), without
being required to pay compensation to those disadvantaged by them
or being subject to second-guessing by judges and juries, was essential to political governance and a necessary implication of the division
of function between the political and judicial aspects of government.
There was a questionable extension of this principle of judicial restraint to situations that seemed to involve misfeasance, where it
became an immunity from liability for injuries caused by deficiencies
of public works attributable to plan or design decisions unless such
defect constituted an unsafe condition of the public ways.
Finally, the legislature had, in regard to the maintenance of
public ways, specifically overridden the court's refusal to recognize
affirmative tort duties and created a special statutory rule that evolved
into a principle of liability not only for negligent failure to repair,
but, more broadly, for negligent failure to keep the highways in a
reasonably safe condition for travel.
The cases that would test the liability of the municipality for
injuries caused by defective or dangerous premises and by the affirmative tortious acts (other than those resulting in trespass) of municipal
employees had not arisen. There were occasional dicta that the corporation would be liable for negligent "ministerial" acts, and there
were, in some cases, implications that, when a municipal corporation
was sought to be held liable for negligent misfeasances of its servants
or agents, it might make a difference that the employees were engaged
in work related to the corporation's "private property" (e.g., in the
construction of sewers rather than streets).166 Also, Justice Campbell
did say in O'Leary, in most general terms, that a municipal corporation may be liable in such cases and in cases where it causes direct
166. See also Rowland v. Superintendents of the Poor, 49 Mich. 553, 14 N.W, 494
(1883), in which the superintendents of the poor, under statutory authorization, operated a poor farm. Plaintiff claimed that the superintendents borrowed a boar from ltim
for use on their farm, negligently exposed it to swine infected with hog cholera, re•
turned it to him in a diseased state, and thus caused his entire herd to become infected,
The court upheld his claim, stating that "municipal corporations in the care and
management of their property, like an individual, are in duty bound to produce no
injury to others. In clearing up the poor-farm the superintendents could not, nor could
those in their employ, with impunity, negligently set fires, or carelessly permit them
to extend to and destroy the property of their neighbors, nor could they permit the
farm stock. to trespass upon the lands of adjoining proprietors and claim exemption
from all liability therefor." 49 Mich. at 560-61, 14 N.W. at 495, citing Ashley v. City
of Port Huron, discussed in text accompanying notes 81-82 supra; T. COOLEY, TORTS
619-20 (1879). All this was said after the court emphasized that the complaint was
against the defendants as owners and managers of the farm property, authorized to
make it productive and to sell and dispose of the produce.
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injury to a property interest, but that "it is not usually liable in other
cases."167 But there had been, as yet, no assertion of immunity from
liability derived from the governmental nature of the activity or
function, as distinguished from the legislative character of the particular decision, on which the claim was predicated. Hindsight reveals
that that egg had been laid, but it did not hatch until the nineties.
II.

THE

AsCENDANCY OF THE "GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION" DEFENSE

A.

Evolution of the Defense

In January 1890, the common council of Detroit authorized the
construction of a public market building. Before the year was out
the structure had been designed and built, and had collapsed on
Adolphus Barron during a fifty mile-per-hour wind because the iron
columns that supported it had not been anchored to the foundation.
CitingLarkin,168 Beckman,169 and Toolan, 110 the city sought to escape
liability by arguing that the absence of anchoring fixtures had been
a design decision, made first by the city engineer and adopted by the
council when it approved the plans, and that therefore Barron's
action was an attempt to derive liability from a legislative decision.
The court replied, in Barron v. City of Detroit,111 that, while this
contention would be correct "if the city had been acting purely in a
matter of public concern, in its governmental capacity or character,''172 it was not applicable to the instant case because the city had
had no imperative duty to provide a market building and in choosing
to do so had assumed the same responsibility as would a private corporation or individual, whether the negligence occurred at the construction or at the planning stage.173
The decision was progressive, for it would have been unfortunate
to deny compensation to Barron because the mistake was in the engineering of the structure rather than in its construction, but the reverse implication of nonliability if the building had been dedicated
to a "public" or "governmental," rather than to a "private" or "proprietary" use put Michigan law in a new track. The court explained
its position by quoting, from Judge Dillon's treatise on municipal
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

79 Mich. at 285, 44 N.W. at 609.
See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra.
See text accompanying notes 75 8: 78 supra.
See text accompanying notes 76 8: 79-80 supra.
94 Mich. 601, 54 N.W. 273 (1893).
94 Mich. at 604, 54 N.W. at 274.
94 Mich. at 606, 54 N.W. at 275.

220

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. '12:187

corporations, its exposition of the dual character of municipal corporations-"govemmental or public" versus "private or proprietary"
-and by pointing to earlier Michigan cases that distinguished between state and local functions as evidence that the distinction had
been accepted by the Michigan court.174
The following year, in Webster v. County of Hillsdale, 17r; the
court denied to Daniel Webster his claim against the county for injury to his health arising from the unhealthful conditions of the jail
where he had been confined for 207 days, awaiting trial on a charge of
which he was acquitted. The court thought it could not recognize
liability in such a case without overruling Blackeby,176 for if there
were no common law liability for defects in public highways there
could be none for defects in public buildings. The Blackeby court
might have thought the distinction between failure to repair a crosswalk and forcible incarceration in a pest-hole to be not without significance, but reliance was now on Dillon's generalization that "counties
are under no liability in respect of torts, except as imposed by statute," which was explained on the ground that counties are involuntary political divisions of the state.177 The court gratuitously added
the comment that "the same rule appears to apply to municipal corporations when acting under general laws of the state, and not under
special charters which they voluntarily assume, or for private gain."178
In Ostrander v. City of Lansing179 the city sought to defend a
claim brought by a city employee who was injured in a cave-in
while he was digging a trench for a sewer; the city argued that the
injury occurred while the city "was in the exercise of a governmental
function, instead of a private municipal enterprise."180 This plea was
foredoomed by City of Detroit v. Corey, 181 which had referred to
sewers as the "private property" of the city, though only for the purpose of emphasizing the rights of "the public" (meaning all the people of the state) in the safety of the highways. The court cited that
case and threw in the additional comment that "as to the sewers con174. 94 Mich. at 604-06, 54 N.W. at 274-75, citing 2 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoR•
PORATIONS § 66 (4th ed. 1890); People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, discussed in notes 14248 supra and accompanying text.
1'15. 99 Mich. 259, 58 N.W. 317 (1894).
176. See text accompanying notes 46-56 supra.
177. 99 Mich. at 260, 58 N.W. at 317, citing 2 J. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 963 (4th ed. 1890).
178. 99 Mich. at 260, 58 N.W. at 317.
179. 111 Mich. 693, 70 N.W. 332 (1897).
180. 111 Mich. at 695, 70 N.W. at 333.
181. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
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structed under the charter by the city of Lansing, they may also be a
source of revenue,"182 thus introducing the notion that pecuniary
gain from the activity in question was an important factor.
In Gilboy v. City of Detroit183 the city was held to have no liability for a loss to a boarding house proprietor arising from the alleged
negligence of the city board of health in permitting a person exposed to smallpox to go at large and contaminate plaintiff's premises.
The explanation for the ruling was that "such boards and officers are not acting for private, but for public, purposes. They represent the entire State, through the municipality, a political subdivision
of the State; and municipalities, in the absence of express statutes
fixing liability, are not liable for the negligence of such officers and
boards."184 The absence of municipal responsibility for the actions
of certain officers and boards, which in the past had been attributed
to the fact that those officers and boards operated under statutory
authorization independent of municipal control, was thus re-explained as a consequence of the fact that the functions performed by
a board of health have an a priori identification with statewide, rather
than local, objectives.
In Corning v. City of Saginaw 185 plaintiff's claim against the city
for damage to his barge caused by the failure of a bridge tender to
open the draw promptly in response to a signal, which failure allegedly resulted from negligent maintenance of the bridge, was rejected
on the ground that it was settled law in Michigan that legislative
action is required to create any liability in private suit for nonrepair
of public ways. The court added that "it does not appear that the
city derives any benefit from the bridge. It is maintained for the
public good by the city in its governmental or public character, and
not in its proprietary or private character, and the city is therefore
not liable in this action ..• 1 Dill.Mun.Corp. (4th ed.) Sec. 66."186
Most surprising was the decision in Murray v. Village of Grass
Lake.181 The claim was that the village council, on the recommendation of the village board of health, had caused action to be taken that
raised the level of the lake two feet above the level that had been
maintained for twenty years, thus flooding and rendering useless land
182. 111 Mich. at 695, 70 N.W. at 333.
183. 115 Mich. 121, 73 N.W. 128 (1897).
184. 115 Mich. at 122, 73 N.W. at 128.
185. 116 Mich. 74, 74 N.W. 307 (1898).
186. 116 Mich. at 79, 74 N.W. at 309, citing 1
§ 66 (4th ed. 1890).
187. 125 Mich. 2, 83 N.W. 995 (1900).
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that had long been used for pasture and meadow. The act under
which the village was incorporated authorized the council to exercise
the powers conferred by statute on boards of health and further
authorized the council to appoint a board of health. 188 Noting that
the council's action had doubtless been taken under the authority
of these provisions, the court said:
The fact that the wrong was committed by the officers of the village
does not fix the responsibility upon the municipality if the wrongful
act was done under authority of a general statute in the attempt to
perform a public service not distinctively local or corporate. 2 Dill.
Mun.Corp. (4th ed.) sec. 974. It is apparently the established rule
that local health officers, acting under a general statute of the State
conferring their powers, are not performing corporate functions, but
are representatives of the State, and that the municipality is not liable
for the acts of such boards, either of misfeasance or nonfeasance.180
Finally, after ten years of such nibbling at the immunity bait,
giving more attention to external cases and their synthesis by Judge
Dillon than to its own tradition, in 1902 the court opened wide and
swallowed the whole thing. In Nicholson v. City of Detroit100 the
plaintiff's decedent had been a carpenter employed by the city in the
construction of a new hospital at the site of an existing hospital for
contagious disease. The old building and the grounds were alleged
to have been infected with smallpox germs, and the claim was for
death from smallpox allegedly contracted as a consequence of the
city's negligence in exposing the decedent to this contamination.101
The court referred to statutes that imposed upon the city a duty to
take measures for the protection of the public health through a board
of health, that required it to provide a place of reception for persons
afflicted by smallpox, and that authorized it to build permanent hospitals, and then asserted, "It is the well-settled rule that the State is
not liable to private persons who suffer injuries through the negligence of its officers; and the rule extends to townships and cities,
while in the performance of State functions, imposed upon them by
law."192 The argument against this position that evoked the most
extensive rebuttal from the court had been many times implied: that
in its capacity as property owner a governmental unit has the same
duties and liabilities as any other property owner, and that the city's
duties to its employee in this case arose out of its ownership of the
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

1 MICH. COMP. LAws § 2821 (1897).
125 Mich. at 5, 83 N.W. at 966.
129 Mich. 246, 88 N.W. 695 (1902).
129 Mich. at 247, 88 N.W. at 696.
129 Mich. at 248, 88 N.W. at 696.

December 1973]

Governmental Tort Liability

223

property and its contractual relations with him. The court's reply
was that the property was owned in this instance for governmental
purposes, not for the "private purposes of the municipality" or "for
purposes in which the state has no interest." 193 Murray v. Village of
Grass Lake was cited and quoted for the governmental nature of the
powers e..-.cercised by health officers, and the court reiterated that such
officers, though chosen by the city, "do not represent the city, but the
State."194 In providing a hospital under the statutory duty and authority, the city was acting as a governmental agency, just as it did
when "providing a police force for the preservation of the peace, or
a fire department, and prescribing regulations for the same."195
Justice Campbell's suggestion in O'Leary that the application to a
public body of the respondeat superior principle is a question of
public policy was repeated,1 96 and it was argued that such application
was contraindicated because public officers are the representatives
of the injured person as well as of the other taxpayers who must pay
for his judgment and that the selection of prudent officers is as much
his duty as theirs.197 Moreover,
[t]he rule of public liability in such cases offers such opportunities
and inducements for abuse that there is some ground for doubting
the expediency of relieving individuals at public expense in any such
case; and as has been said, it is only in cases where the legislature has
authorized it that the obligation can be enforced against the public,
instead of the individual to whose misconduct the injury is due, and
who should, in justice, be primarily liable in all cases.1us
While in the minds of Justices Campbell and Cooley there was a
presumption against liability of the municipal corporation for the
nonperformance by local officers of duties imposed upon them by
statute, this statement seems to place the whole question of vicarious
liability for any negligence of municipal servants engaged in "governmental functions" peculiarly within the area of legislative decision. The court summed up its position in the following sweeping
terms:
The true theory is that the township or city represents the State
in causing these things to be done, and, like the State, it enjoys immunity from responsibility in case of injury to individuals, leaving
193. 129 Mich. at 250, 88 N.W, at 697.
194. 129 Mich. at 254, 88 N.W. at 698.
195. 129 Mich. at 254, 88 N.W. at 698.
196. 129 Mich. at 250, 88 N.W. at 697, citing O'Leary v. Board of Fire &: Water
Commrs., discussed in text accompanying notes 158-63 supra.
197. 129 Mich. at 249-50, 88 N.W. at 696-97.
198. 129 Mich. at 250, 88 N.W. at 696.
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liability for such injuries to rest upon the persons whose misconduct
or negligence is the immediate cause of the damage. The township
and city must always act through officers. If it builds or repairs a road,
constructs a bridge, collects a State or county tax, erects a town house,
provides for the poor or the infirm, preserves the public peace, or
provides a smallpox hospital, it must do it through persons selected
for the purpose; and whether the law broadly directs that it shall do
these things, or shall select officers whose duties are prescribed by
law, its obligation is the same. The State relieves itself from the
burden of multitudinous detail by delegating to and imposing upon
aliquot parts of the body politic the power, and perhaps the duty, of
doing for the State what it would otherwise have to supervise for
itself. These powers are frequently legislative as well as ministerial.
In this sense the township or city is a political agency, and the persons selected to perform the details whereby the result is accomplished are no more agents of the city or township, and no less the
agents of the State, than as though the legislature had been more
definite in prescribing the duties of the officers, and merely left their
selection to the municipality. In imparting a portion of its powers,
the State also imparts its own immunity.199
Substantially contemporaneous with Nicholson was the court's
decision in Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey,200 in which
the opinion, as in Nicholson, was written by Chief Justice Hooker. It
was a quo warranto proceeding that questioned, on the ground that
it violated the "home rule" principle, the constitutional validity
of a statute incorporating a new school district to take over the
area previously occupied by a number of other districts. 201 Excluding
"municipal corporations proper" from the discussion as not involved
in the case, the court stated that "quasi corporations," including such
units as counties, townships, school districts, and highway districts,
were quite different, for they performed functions "for and about
the business and policies of the State, which has imposed upon them
the responsibility and expense of maintaining highways, schools,
drains, bridges, etc.," and were therefore completely subject to the
power of the legislature except to the extent of any limitations imposed upon that power by the constitution: 202 "The school district
is a State agency." 203
It was a strange time for the emergence in Michigan of this strong
image of the local presence of a central sovereign. Only five years
after Nicholson and Lowrey a constitutional convention was to pro199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

129 at 258-59, 88 N.W. at 700.
I3I Mich. 639, 92 N.W. 289 (1902), a/fd., 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
See People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, discussed in notes 142-48 supra.
131 Mich. at 643-44, 92 N.W. at 290.
131 Mich. at 644, 92 N.W. at 290.
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pose, on the basis of a consensus so broad that the matter was scarcely
debated, the most advanced constitutional home-rule provisions in
the land; 204 they required the legislature to provide by general law
for the incorporation of cities and villages and confer upon the electors of cities and villages the power and authority to frame, adopt,
and amend their own charters; to pass ordinances relating to all
municipal concerns; to acquire, own, and maintain parks, boulevards,
cemeteries, hospitals, almshouses, and all works that involve the
public health or safety; and, subject to certain limitations, to acquire
and operate public utilities. Under the implementing legislation
each city charter was required to provide for the election or appointment of such officers as were deemed necessary, and for the public
peace and health, and for the safety of persons and property, and
was allowed to provide for the establishment of any department
deemed necessary for the general welfare of the city.205
Thus, the special charters and other ad hoc legislative creations
in the local government field, which were responsible for the nineteenth-century court's perception that many local officers were agents
of the state rather than of the city, became obsolete at the same time
that the twentieth-century court began to see almost everything done
by local units as done in the name of the state.
Nevertheless, the die had been cast. Nicholson and Lowrey combined, in Whitehead v. Board of Education,206 to produce a holding
that a painter injured in the employ of the board of education, allegedly as a consequence of the negligence of the board's agents in
providing for his use a defective and unsafe scaffold, had no cause
of action. Applying the Lowrey decision, the court said that "the
learned trial judge was correct in saying that 'the affairs of the board
of education are as purely a State function as those of the board of
health,' and that this case could not be distinguished in principle
from the case of Nicholson v. City of Detroit."207 An attempt was
later made, by the plaintiff in Daniels v. Board of Education,208 to
escape the "quasi-corporation" rubric by setting up the fact that the
defendant board had been incorporated by a special act of the legislature and was not simply operating under the general laws applicable
to all alike, but the court's reply was that the powers exercised by
204. :M1CH. CoNST. art. VIII, §§ 20-29 (1908). See generally Fairlie, The Michigan
Constitutional Convention, 6 MICH. L R.Ev. 533, 541 (1908).
205. Act of June 2, 1909, No. 279, §§ 3-4, [1909] Mich. Pub. Acts 497.
206. 139 Mich. 490, 102 N.W. 1028 (1905).
207. 139 Mich. at 494, 102 N.W. at 1029.
208. 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 23 (1916).

226

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:187

the board were still solely of a governmental nature. The distinction
between "quasi-corporations" and "municipal corporations proper"
was, therefore, not the significant distinction, since "[t]ouching their
immunity from liability in the exercise of strictly governmental functions, the authorities are as a rule applicable to either. " 200 The claim
in this case was for negligence in building, maintaining, and using
for school purposes, a building that contained a stairwell with a railing of inadequate height, over which the eight-year-old plaintiff had
fallen to his injury.
The actions of firemen in flushing a fire hydrant, allegedly the
cause of injury to plaintiff, whose horse was frightened, were held to
be governmental in Brink v. City of Grand Rapids.210 The court,
adverting to the fact that there was no evidence that the particular
hydrant had ever been used for any purpose other than fire protection, said: "The city had no pecuniary interest in establishing or
maintaining this hydrant. It received no compensation for its use.
It was maintained entirely by taxation upon the entire city, and its
use was for the sole benefit of the city. It was constructed, maintained,
and used in a governmental capacity."211 Justice Ostrander, concurring, thought the question of the city's pecuniary interest in the
hydrant was not the material factor. The city's water system was
unitary, though used for miscellaneous purposes, but there was no
liability in this case because the firemen were acting, pursuant to
their duties as members of the fire department, as "independent
public officers."212
209. 191 Mich, at 347, 158 N.W. at 26.
210. 144 Mich. 472, 108 N.W. 430 (1906).
211. 144 Mich. at 475, 108 N.W. at 431.
212. 144 Mich. at 475-76, 108 N.W. at 431. Cone v. City of Detroit, 191 Mich, 198,
157 N.W. 417 (1916), is another example of the problem presented by a mixture of
functions. Plaintiff's decedent was killed, while standing in the entranceway to a store,
when a firetruck, making a run, struck a hole in the street, went out of control, and
ran him down. The city relied on Brink as a defense, but the court permitted liability
to rest upon the city's breach of the highway statute. It commented, however, that the
question whether liability under the statute could extend to a person not on the highway at the time of injury had not been discussed by counsel and would not, therefore,
be considered. 191 Mich. at 200, 157 N.W. at 417-18. The notion of nonliability on the
part of the municipality for the acts of certain public officers who were regarded, in
respect to duties imposed upon them by general statute, as independent agents rather
than as municipal servants, did not die out completely. In 13odewig v. City of Port
Huron, 141 Mich. 564, 104 N.W. 769 (1905), a claim against the city, referred to as a
trespass claim, that the city health officer obtained possession of plaintiff's house by
trick and used it as a place for reception of smallpox cases, was held not maintainable,
under the principle of Murray v. Village of Grass Lake, discussed in notes 187-89 supra,
since it was not claimed that the city authorized or ratified the "trespass," and the city
was not responsible for the acts of the health officer because he was independent of
city control. In Hoek v. Township of Allendale, 161 Mich. 571, 126 N.W. 987 (1910),
it was held that the township was not liable for a trespassory act of the highway com-
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But two years later, -in Davidson v. Hine,213 the court held unconstitutional, as contrary to the home-rule principle, a statute that
created a bureau of public safety for Bay City, included within the
jurisdiction of that bureau not only the police but also the fire department, and provided for appointment of the governing officials
by the governor. The court thought that fire protection, as distinguished from police protection, was a local, rather than a state function, indistinguishable in that respect from sewers and water: All
were "agenc[ies] of local government maintained for the benefit of
the local community."214 A board of health would also be different,
since neglect of duty on its part might produce an epidemic that
would affect the rest of the state, while fire was a problem only for
the local inhabitants.215 Brink, the court said, was not inconsistent
with this conclusion, since it did not rest upon the proposition that
the fire department was a state agency, but on no more extensive a
principle than that a municipality is not liable for injuries negligently caused by members of the fire department engaged in work
pertaining exclusively to the extinguishment of fires because when
so occupied they are engaged in the performance of "a local governmental duty." 216
And so the mutation was complete. The end product was a
strange mixture of uprooted and reshaped conceptions. The homerule principle had originally required that a distinction be made
between local functions of state government, which could constitutionally be placed under the control of state appointees, and functions that were inherently local, carried on for the benefit of the local
inhabitants and not for the benefit of the state at large, which must
be left to the control of officers locally appointed or elected. The
police function was of the former character,217 while the public
missioner, or for such an act ordered by him, since, in the performance of his highway
repair duties, he did not act as the agent of the township. The fact that the highway
statute, ever since 1879, had explicitly provided that "highway commissioners ••• are
hereby made and declared to be the officers of the township ••• wherein they are elected
••• and shall be subject to the general direction of such township ••• in the discharge
of their several duties," see text accompanying 102 supra, was apparently overlooked.
And as late as 1940, a claim against a county for flooding, allegedly caused by the drain
commissioner's action in accelerating the drainage above plaintiff's premises without
doing the same below, was rejected on the ground that the commissioner was acting
on his own in the performance of duties imposed by statute on him rather than on the
county, and that the county had no control over his actions. Maffei v. Berrien County,
293 Mich. 92,291 N.W. 234 (1940).
213. l51 Mich. 294, 115 N.W. 246 (1908).
214. 151 :Mich. at 299, 115 N.W. at 248.
215. 151 Mich. at 301, 115 N.W. at 248.
216. 151 Mich. at 301-03, 115 N.W. at 249.
217. See People ex rel. Drake v. Mahaney, discussed in text accompanying note 139
supra.

228

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:187

works function was of the latter.218 The prison function was also a
state function, and when a local prison was placed under the administration of a board, one member of which was a state official,
not only was the home-rule principle not offended, but the municipal
corporation was not responsible for the acts of the board's servants.210
At a second stage, the health officer function was identified as a
state function. Originally the classification was made because the
function was located in a board of health created pursuant to statutory requirement. But then it was decided that, whether the function
was committed to a special board or was performed by a municipal
corporation through its own officers and servants, the municipal
corporation was not liable for the nonfeasance or misfeasance of such
officers because this was a state function and the duties were imposed
by general statute.220 In performing such statutory duties the corporation itself acted as an agency of state government, and its nonliability was an extension of the state's immunity from liability for the
negligence of its officers.221 "Quasi-corporations," which perform, for
the state, functions that are imposed upon them by law without
their consent, are fully subject to state power and do not fall within
the home-rule principle. The board of education is such an agency. 222
Therefore, since it performs only state functions, it has no liability
for the negligence of any of its officers and employees.228 Since the
same principle is applicable to municipal corporations when they
are engaged in strictly governmental functions, the immunity is derived from the nature of the function rather than from the nature
of the corporate organization of the entity in question. 224 Moreover,
it extends to premises and equipment devoted to a governmental
purpose.225
Finally, firemen engaged in fire protection activities are perform218. See People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, discussed in text accompanying notes
142-48 supra.
219. See City of Detroit v. Laughna, discussed in text accompanying notes 150-51
supra.
220. See Gilboy v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 183·84
supra; Murray v. Village of Grass Lake, discussed in text accompanying notes 187-89
supra; Nicholson v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 190,99 supra.
221. See Nicholson v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 190-99
supra.
222. See Attorney General, ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, discussed in text accompanying
notes 200-03 supra.
223. See Whitehead v. Board of Educ., discussed in text accompanying notes 206-07
supra.
224. See Daniels v. Board of Educ., discussed in text accompanying notes 208-09
supra.
225. See cases cited in notes 221, 223 & 224 supra.
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ing a governmental activity, and the municipal corporation is therefore not responsible for their negligent acts.226 But fire protection is
not a "state" function; rather, it is, insofar as the home-rule principle
is concerned, a "local" function, as are sewers, water, parks, and
streets. The exemption of the municipal corporation from liability
for the negligent acts of employees engaged in such activities is therefore related solely to the "governmental nature" of the activity and is
not dependent on a conclusion that the state has an overriding interest in the performance of the function. And, for the purpose of
determining whether a given activity is "governmental in nature,"
the principal clue that emerges is the fact that it is carried on for the
benefit of the general public, without pecuniary return and supported
by general taxation.
B.

"Governmental" Versus "Proprietary"

The case of the market building that fell on Barron227 was perhaps
the first instance of liability engendered by the "proprietary" nature
of the activity, though at that time the term referred to the fact that
in providing a market the city was doing its own thing, rather than
acting under a state-imposed duty. The sewer trench that Ostrander228
was digging when he was injured was a "private municipal enterprise" rather than a thing done "in the exercise of a governmental
function," in part because sewers had at an early time been used as
an example of an enterprise carried on by the municipal corporation
in its own "private" interest, rather than in the interest of the entire
public, and in further part because, as the court suggested, under the
applicable charter the sewer might become a source of revenue to
the city. The fact that the fire hydrant in Brink229 produced no
revenue was considered by all but one of the judges to be important
to the conclusion that the firemen who flushed it were not engaged in
a proprietary activity. In Hodgins v. Bay City230 a telephone lineman
was electrocuted when he came in contact with a wire that had become charged as a result of broken insulation on a city-owned power
line strung on the same poles. The city had two lines on the pole, one
supplying DC current for street lighting and the other, AC current
for home lighting. It was decided that the claim was good because
226.
supra.
227.
228.
229,
230.

See Brink v. City of Grand Rapids, discussed in text accompanying notes 210-12
See text accompanying notes 168-74 supra.
See text accompanying notes 179-82 supra.
See text accompanying notes 210-12 supra.
156 Mich. 687, 121 N.W. 274 (1909).
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the decedent had been electrocuted by the AC line; it was asserted,
obiter, that the result would have been different if the injury had
been caused by the DC line, since street lighting was a governmental
function. 231
It was "conceded" in Borski v. City of Wakefield 232 that a city
bus line was a proprietary enterprise, and in Foss v. City of Lansing233 the claim of a plaintiff who was hit by a garbage truck was
validated by the argument that if garbage disposal is a governmental
activity, the city was nevertheless liable because it was making an
"incidental profit" by recouping its costs, in part, from a user fee and
from the sale of its garbage-fed hogs. It was expressly asserted in
Foss that in Michigan, if the city is engaged in governmental work
with an incidental profit, it has the same liability as a private corporation.2a4
On the other hand, Kilts v. Board of Supervisors 23 r; held that the
county board of supervisors, when operating a poor farm, was engaged in a governmental activity and was therefore not liable for the
death of a workman employed by a contractor doing work on a
water tower when the platform upon which the workman was standing collapsed because it was insufficiently supported. And, in Heino
v. City of Grand Rapids,236 a city park system and swimming pool,
provided by the city through a park board, supported by taxation,
and open to the public without charge, was held to be a governmental
activity. The court noted the home-rule cases that held that parks are
a local rather than a .state function, but said they were not in point.
Brink237 and Davidson 238 were evidence that a particular activity
might be "governmental" for some purposes and "private" for
others.239
Road and street construction and maintenance activities, whether
performed by the city or by the county road commission, were repeatedly held to be govemmental,240 thus creating the paradox of
231. 156 Mich. at 692, 121 N.W. at 276-77.
232. 239 Mich. 656, 215 N.W. 19 (1927).
233. 237 Mich. 633, 212 N.W. 952 (1927).
234. 237 Mich. at 636-37, 212 N.W. at 953.
235. 162 Mich. 646, 127 N.W. 821 (1910).
236. 202 Mich. 363, 168 N.W. 512 (1918).
237. See text accompanying notes 210-12 supra.
238. See text accompanying notes 213-16 supra.
239. 202 Mich. at 374-75, 168 N.W. at 516.
240. Alberts v. City of Muskegon, 146 Mich. 210, 109 N.W. 262 (1906); Gunther v.
Board of County Road Commrs., 225 Mich. 619, 196 N.W. 386 (1923); Longstreet v. County
of Mecosta, 228 Mich. 542, 200 N.W. 248 (1924); Wrighton v. City of Highland Park,
236 Mich. 279, 210 N.W. 250 (1926); In re Moross v. Hillsdale County, 242 Mich. 277,
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liability for nonfeasance under the highway statute, and immunity
from liability for mis/easance in doing the work required by the
statute. For instance, in Longstreet v. County of Mecosta, 241 where
the plaintiff's car went off the end of an unfinished bridge that allegedly had not been provided with warning lights or barriers, the
board of road commissioners, which was doing the construction work
on the bridge, was exempted from liability by the governmental
nature of its activities, while the county itself, to which the highway
liability provisions originally applicable to wwnships and cities had
been extended in 1909,242 was held liable for having failed in its
statutory duty to keep the highway safe for use.
In these cases the proposition asserted in Foss, that an "incidental
profit" realized in the course of a governmental activity engenders
tort responsibility with respect to that activity, began to cause
trouble, since county boards of road commissioners did much of their
highway construction and maintenance work under contracts with
the state highway commissioner that provided for payments to the
board in connection ·with the work done. For example, the contract
in Gunther v. Board of County Road Commissioners243 provided for
a sharing of expense pursuant to which the state commissioner ultimately paid to the board seventy-five per cent of the total cost of the
work done. In Johnson v. Board of County Road Commissioners244 it
was alleged that the contract called for payment to the county board,
over and above its expenses, of a percentage fee for overhead and
supervision. In neither case did the payment result in liability, but in
Johnson this result was explained by a statement that the burden of
proof was on the plaintiff to show that the payment would result in
a profit to the board and the burden had not been met. 245 While this
explanation can be used to reconcile the outcomes of Johnson and
Foss, the conflict between the two was not resolved.
In Afotthews v. City of Detroit246 plaintiff sustained injuries while
alighting from the miniature railway at the Detroit zoo. The zoo
was a public park, open free of charge, and therefore "governmental,"
but a small fee was charged for a ride on the train, and that particular
218 N.W. 683, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 635 (1928); Johnson v. Board of County Road
Commrs., 253 Mich. 465,235 N.W. 221 (1931); Russo v. City of Grand Rapids, 255 Mich.
474, 238 N.W. 273 (1931).
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

228 Mich. 542, 200 N.W. 248 (1924).
See Act of June 2, 1909, No. 283, ch. IV,
225 Mich. 619, 196 N.W. 386 (1923).
253 Mich. 465, 235 N.W. 221 (1931).
253 Mich. at 470, 235 N.W. at 223.
291 Mich. 161, 289 N.W. 115 (1939).

§

21, [1909] Mich. Pub. Acts 573.
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operation produced a small profit that contributed to the support of
the zoo, which was otherwise mainly supported by taxation. Plaintiff
cited the "incidental profit" argument from Foss, while the city
relied on Johnson and particularly on a statement therein that did
conflict with Foss, that "municipal corporations and other governmental agencies when performing a purely governmental function
do not lose their immunity from liability for its negligent performance merely because they derive an income therefrom, provided the
income is only incidental to the main purpose of so functioning and
aimed at covering the cost of the undertaking."247 Plaintiff's judgment survived an even split on the court, and the opinion for affirmance suggested that Foss and Johnson could be distinguished from
each other on the ground that "the maintenance of roads is peculiarly
a governmental function." 248
The problem became more pressing in cases involving another
activity, which had a strong "governmental" aura. As in the case of
municipal corporations proper, entities primarily engaged in education sometimes become involved in activities with "proprietary" overtones. For instance, a question arose in Robinson v. Washtenaw
Circuit Judge, 249 as to whether The University of Michigan was liable
for the alleged malpractice of a physician on the staff of the University Hospital. Plaintiff contended that "The Regents of the University of Michigan" was by law a body corporate and as such was liable,
like other corporations, for the torts of its agents. The argument and
the decision did not clearly separate the "charitable immunity" defense from that based on "governmental immunity," but the court
took notice of the provisions of the constitution relating to The University of Michigan and its governance and decided that
[w]ith such provisions in our Constitution it seems clear that the
general supervision of the University, and direction and control of
all expenditures from its funds is a governmental activity, and the
board of regents a state agency to carry out the ·will of the people, as
expressed in the Constitution they adopted, in regard to the educational institution committed to its care and supervision.20 0

Moreover, the hospital was a charitable institution, and in the long
run the court thought denial of liability could safely be rested on
either ground.251
247. 291 Mich. at 165-66, 289 N.W. at 117, quoting 253 Mich. at 471, 235 N.W. at
223 (emphasis added).
248. 291 Mich. at 166, 289 N.W. at ll7 (emphasis added). Presumably garbage col•
lection and distribution is a more doubtful case.
249. 228 Mich. 225, 199 N.W. 618 (1924).
250. 228 Mich. at 228, 199 N.W. at 619.
251. 228 Mich. at 230, 199 N.W. at 619-20.
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In Daszkiewicz v. Detroit Board of Education,252 the board, operating as board of control for Wayne University, was held to be free
of liability for the death of a medical student caused by the failure
of the door catch on an elevator shaft, despite the fact that the expenses of operation of the school were partially recouped from tuition
fees. The court said that a board of education or school district cannot be held liable for injuries caused by the negligence of its employees "because they, in furthering the purposes of education, are in
the exercise of a public or governmental function"; 253 the court thus
seemed to leave little room for "proprietary" activities to be identified. Nevertheless, the court, citing Johnson and not mentioning
Foss, went on to observe that since the tuition fees covered only about
thirty per cent of the costs of the school and were therefore "only
incidental" to the main purpose they did not deprive the board of
its immunity.254
Interscholastic athletics put governmentalism to a sterner test.
In Watson v. School District,255 after a football game at the high
school stadium plaintiff's decedent fell into an excavated traffic ramp,
allegedly unlighted and insufficiently protected, in the school parking lot. It was argued that in conducting the athletic contest and
charging admission for it the school was engaged in a commercial
activity, rather than in one that was strictly governmental. The court
split down the middle again and by so doing allowed a judgment
n.o.v. for the defendant to stand. The opinion for reversal relied
largely on Foss and reasoned that even if the activity were governmental, there was nevertheless an incidental profit to justify imposing liability.256 The contrary opinion emphasized the school's obligation to include a physical education program in its curriculum,
relied on Daszkiewicz, and argued that if Foss really stood for the
proposition that a governmental function coupled with an incidental
profit is a source of liability, to that extent it should be overruled.257
252. 301 Mich, 212, 3 N.W.2d 71 (1942).
253. 301 Mich. at 221, 3 N.W.2d at 75.
254. 301 Mich. at 222, 3 N.W.2d at 75, citing 253 Mich. at 471, 235 N.W. at 223.
See also Martinson v. City of Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N.W.2d 148 (1950), arising from
a similar accident in a city-owned hospital. The court analyzed the hospital's financing
to demonstrate that it was not a profit-making enterprise and that it served the entire
region, not just the residents of the city. The test for governmental immunity was said
to be whether the activity was carried on for the common good, without special corporate benefit or profit. 328 Mich. at 598, 44 N.W.2d at 149. Neither the tuition fees
charged by the city medical school, nor charges made by the hospital for operating expenses made it a proprietary activity, since the hospital operated for the purpose of
promoting the general public health. 328 Mich. at 598-99, 44 N.W.2d at 149.
255. 324 Mich. I, 36 N.W.2d 195 (1949).
256. 324 Mich. at 6-8, 36 N.W.2d at 197-98.
257. 324 Mich. at 11-13, 36 N.W.2d at 199-200.
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The same issue was posed in Richards v. Birmingham School District258 by injuries arising from the collapse of the bleachers at a
high school football game. Three of the justices, relying on Daszkiewicz and Watson, thought that there was no claim; 2 llo two others concurred with the outcome on irrelevant grounds without mentioning
this issue.260 Justice Edwards, joined by Justice Talbot Smith,
strongly criticized the immunity doctrine 261 but in the end argued
that the activity in the particular case should be classified as "proprietary. "262 Justice Carr explained Foss away by suggesting that the city
in that case might be regarded as having been engaged in two activities-garbage collection and removal (governmental) and the operation of a piggery for profit (proprietary)-and reinforced that
explanation by reference to Matthews, with its governmental park
and its proprietary railway.263 (He did not explain why the operation
of the truck was to be identified with the proprietary piggery rather
than with the governmental collection function; perhaps the classification was made because the truck was returning from the piggery
when the accident occurred?) Justice Edwards thought that Justice
Carr's approach was a step backward and that the court should take
every opportunity to whittle the defense away; he implied that Foss
had offered one such opportunity. Much of the confusion in the
cases, he suggested, came from the assumption that the terms "governmental" and "proprietary" are mutually exclusive. All things
done by a municipal corporation are in a sense governmental, but
some are more closely related than others to things more normal to
private enterprise than to governmental units. The conduct of the
football game by the school was governmental enough, but there
was no reason why the admission charge, plus other circumstancessuch as the fact that the game was held on a national holiday, that it
was open to the public, and that the collapsing bleachers had been
rented from a supplier in order to increase seating capacity and thus
enhance the pecuniary return-should not be taken into account in
concluding that the school was sufficiently involved in a proprietary
activity to require it to surrender the defense.264 He also recognized
that if his opinion should prevail, it would, for the first time in
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643 (1957).
348 Mich. at 507-10, 83 N.W.2d at 652-53 (Dethmers, C.J., Kelly & Carr,
See 348 Mich. at 512-14, 83. N.W.2d at 654-55 (Black & Sharpe, JJ.).
See 348 Mich. at 514-20, 83 N.W.2d at 655-59.
348 Mich. at 523-24, 83 N.W.2d at 660.
348 Mich. at 505-06, 83 N.W.2d at. 651.
348 Mich. at 521, 83 N.W.2d at 659.
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Michigan, specifically apply the proprietary limitation to an immunity defense asserted by a school district, though he thought there
were sufficient implications in earlier cases to make this result justifiable.20u His opinion was an open invitation for a frontal attack upon
the immunity defense, since he relied on the "proprietary function"
argument only because the more general question had not been adequately briefed and argued. In the following year, in Penix v. City
of St. ]ohns,266 Justice Edwards again voiced his discontent with the
basic rule (with the concurrence, this time, of four other justices)
but went along with its application in the particular case-arising
from the collapse of bleachers at a public park-for the reason that,
unlike Richards, the case offered no basis for a proprietary-function
argument.
On its face this was a conservative record in the use of the proprietary-function idea. Cases in which the supreme court explicitly
held a particular activity to be within the proprietary category were
few. As the problem was worked out, a pecuniary return of some sort
from the activity appeared to be a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition to its characterization as proprietary. The activity was deemed
governmental unless such a return was shown, but if it was shown,
the situation remained ambiguous because the court frequently used
the word "profit" without settling whether it meant a net pecuniary
gain to the unit or merely the realization of some income from the
activity. The implication in ]ohnson267 was that the percentage fee
did not make the road contract proprietary because there was no
proof that it made the activity profitable to the county. There was
specific reference in Daszkiewicz268 and in Martinson 269 to the fact
that the fees and charges collected by the medical schools and the
hospital only partially made up the costs of these enterprises, and
the prevailing opinion in W atson270 made a point of the fact that
the school's athletic program as a whole was conducted at a loss; all
of this would suggest that an operation actually for profit was
required. On the other hand, the comment in Ostrander271 was that
the sewer might become a source of revenue, and in Brink,272 that the
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

348 Mich. at 522, 83 N.W.2d at 659.
354 Mich. 259, 92 N.W.2d 332 (1958).
See text accompanying notes 244-45 supra.
See text accompanying notes 252-54 supra.
See note 254 supra.
See text accompanying notes 255-57 supra.
See text accompanying notes 179-82 supra.
See text accompanying notes 210-12 supra.
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fire hydrant never had been. The bus line in Borski273 and the commercial power line in Hodgins214 were assumed to be proprietary
·without attention to whether they were "profitable" activities, and it
appears that the proceeds of the piggery in Foss21o only partially recouped the costs of the operation. In Matthews 216 the train operation
did tum a profit and was therefore deemed by half the court to be
separable from the zoo operation of which it was a part.
In later decisions this ambiguity appears to have been resolved.
In Dohm v. Township of Acme217 it was held that a plaintiff who
£ell on the steps of the township hall during a wedding anniversary
party there in progress might recover against the township because
the second floor of the building was leased out to private parties, and
the first floor, though used primarily as a town hall, was occasionally
rented to persons who wished to hold private functions there. The
purpose of the building was primarily governmental, but the anniversary party was a purely private transaction, which had nothing to
do with a governmental use. The fact that the fee was small and the
rentals infrequent did not change the nature and purpose of the use
when the injury occurred. Foss and Matthews were both cited with
approval278 and thus gained a new lease on life. The principle was
extended by Munson v. County of Menominee270 to a situation where
the county permitted the state welfare department to use an office
in the courthouse in return for a payment covering the expense of
maintenance and the amortization of some costs for modifications
to fit the state office's needs. Plaintiff, an employee in the state office,
was injured when a window shade fell on her head. The fact that the
county did not anticipate a profit from the transaction was held not
to be controlling; rather, the opinion seems to say, the county had
involved itself in the rental business by supplying a facility for a
consideration and in so doing was performing a function proprietary
in nature.280 The fact that the state department was performing a
governmental function in the office did not alter the county's relation
to the situation; furnishing space to the state office was not a governmental function vested by law in the county.281
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
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280.
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text accompanying note 232 supra.
text accompanying notes 230-31 supra.
text accompanying notes 233-34 supra.
text accompanying notes 246-48 supra.
Mich. 447, 93 N.W.2d 323 (1958).
Mich. at 451, 93 N.W.2d at 326.
Mich. 504, 124 N.W.2d 246 (1963).
Mich. at 512, 124 N.W.2d at 250.
Mich. at 514, 124 N.W.2d at 250.
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Carlisi v. City of Marysville 282 opened a complementary route of
expansion. Dohm and Munson established that where governmental
property is devoted primarily to a "governmental" use, the governmental unit may nevertheless be subject to the same liability as a
private occupier toward persons on the premises in connection with
a secondary, "nongovernmental" use. Carlisi established that where
the premises are devoted primarily to a "proprietary" use, the governmental unit is subject to the same liability as a private occupier
toward visitors on the premises even though their presence is not
connected with, and their injuries are not caused by, the "proprietary" activity carried on there. In such cases, "[t]he city stands as an
individual possessor of land with the duties imposed by law."283
The case arose from the drowning of two girls who were overwhelmed by the turbulence created by a passing ship when they went
wading in the St. Clair River off premises owned by the city. The
tract in question was across the road from a public park, but was
itself occupied by the city waterworks; there was, however, a grassy
area frequented by sightseers for the purpose of viewing traffic on the
river. At thf: time of the accident a "no swimming" sign ordinarily
posted at the location had been temporarily removed for repair.
Reversing the city's judgment n.o.v., the court reasoned that, like
Matthews and Munson, the case involved a dual use of property and
that in such cases the rule is that, if the legislature's purpose in conferring the power to engage in the activity carried on there was
exclusively public, the municipality will be deemed to be acting governmentally, but if it was "for private advantage or emolument,"
then, even if the public draws some incidental benefit, the municipality stands on the same footing as any private occupier.284 In this
instance the primary use was the waterworks, a "proprietary activity"
carried on for the "private advantage and emolument" of the city;
the use of the premises by sightseers was only incidental. Consequently, the applicable rule was that of the Restatement of Torts
pertaining to privileged visitors, and the city became liable for a
failure to warn of known dangers. 285
282. 373 Mich. 198, 128 N.W.2d 477 (1964). Although the decision was subsequent
to Williams v. City of Detroit, discussed in text accompanying notes 1-5 supra &: 42021 infra, the accident occurred prior to that decision and was therefore not subject to
the principle of that case.
283. 373 Mich. at 208, 128 N.W.2d at 483.
284. 373 Mich. at 205, 128 N.W.2d at 482.
285. 373 Mich. at 208-09, 128 N.W.2d at 483, citing RESrATEMENT OF TORTS § 345
(1934).
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The Nuisance-Trespass Claim

During the period in ·which the governmental-function defense
gained its ascendancy, the nuisance-trespass concept, while it remained a viable basis of claim, was held in check by close attention
to its origins. In later years, when recollection of the common law
forms began to fade and the governmental-function defense came
under fire, the concept lost some of its definition and was accepted
by the court in some situations that are difficult to reconcile with
the original category.
The original cases, it has already been noted, were Pennoyer v.
City of Saginaw,286 Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo, 281 and Ashley v.
City of Port Huron. 288 Pennoyer sued the city for maintaining ditches
that cast surface water upon his land. The trial judge, for reasons that
did not appear, excluded from evidence the record of the proceedings
in the city council that would have shmvn that the contract for the
digging of the ditches existed prior to plaintiff's acquisition of his
title. Holding this ruling to be erroneous, the supreme court said,
"If on the ground that it was of proceedings anterior to the plaintiff's
title, and his possession of the land-as stated in the brief submitted
by defendant's counsel-it is only necessary to say that the city, by
creating the nuisance, which the evidence offered tended to prove,
is prima facie liable for its continuance."289 In Sheldon, the village
board of trustees, by resolution, directed the village marshal to remove plaintiff's front fence, which was believed to be within the
limits of the highway, and he obeyed their command. It was held
that the act was a trespass and a taking of private property; moreover, it had been commanded by the corporate body itself. The court
could see no reason why the corporate entity should escape responsibility for the consequences. 290 In Ashley, again, the claim was that
the city had cut a sewer, the necessary result of which was that water
was cast upon plaintiff's land that would not otherwise have flowed
there. In response to a defense that the city was exercising its legislative authority in ordering the sewer to be built, the supreme court
answered that a municipal corporation enjoys no exemption from
responsibility for a direct injury in the nature of a trespass accomplished by an act of the corporation itself.291
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

See text
See text
See text
8 Mich.
See text
See text

accompanying note 41 supra.
accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
accompanying notes 81-82 supra.
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The court was dealing, in these cases, with an act, directed by the
corporate decision-making body, that was, or the necessary consequence of which was, a physical intrusion on plaintiff's land. It was
not a case of "mere neglect" on the part of the public authorities to
perform some duty imposed upon them by law, nor was there any
necessity to "impute" to the corporate entity responsibility for the
acts of an underling, for the corporate body itself had ordered the
thing done. Moreover, in Sheldon at least, the act impliedly laid
claim to and appropriated possession of land that plaintiff claimed
belonged to him. In these circumstances, neither the plea that the act
was legislative in character, nor the contention that it was the act of
the officers themselves, rather than that of the corporation, was applicable.
A case in which a conclusion of no liability was reached elucidates
the court's reasoning further. In Fuller v. City of Grand Rapids,292
plaintiff claimed that a contractor engaged in a street improvement
project under contract with the city had deposited some earth on her
land. Noting that the amount of earth deposited, if any, was trifling
and that it was doubtful that plaintiff was entitled to maintain an
action of trespass quare clausum fregit under her pleadings, the court
said, "However this may be, the act of depositing earth upon her land
was unnecessary, and not the natural result of making the improvement. The trespass, therefore, was one for which the contractor, and
not the city, was liable."293
Four years later, in Ferris v. Board of Education, 294 personal injuries "proximately" caused by the "trespass" were included under this
rubric. A Detroit school building was constructed in such a location
and in such a fashion that ice and snow would naturally slide from
its roof onto plaintiff's back steps. On one occasion plaintiff, informed
by his wife that it had happened again, went out to survey the situation, slipped upon the deposit from defendant's roof, and fell.295 It
was held that the board of education had no more right to build its
building in such a way that ice and snow would inevitably slide from
the roof onto plaintiff's premises than it would have to accumulate
water and permit it to be discharged in a body across the boundary
line. There would have been no question if the claim had been for
damages to the premises, and the personal injury was the proximate
consequence of the erection of the building, designed as it was, with292.
293.
294.
295.
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529, 63 N.W. 530 (1895).
at 534-35, 63 N.W. at 531.
315, 81 N.W. 98 (1899).
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out devices on the roof to prevent such slides. This was not a claim
for "neglect in the performance of a corporate duty rendering a public work unfit for the purposes for which it was intended, but rather
for the doing of a wrongful act, causing a direct injury to the
person of the plaintiff, while outside the limits of the defendant's
premises." 296
Ferris was the genesis of various strategies, most of which proved
unsuccessful, for outflanking the governmental-function defense.
A court that had not been mesmerized by the latter idea might have
recognized in Ferris and the cases that stood behind it the basis for
a principle of liability on the part of governmental agencies for injuries resulting from the misfeasances of governmental officers and
employees, which would have interfaced with the older principle
of nonliability for mere failure to perform affirmative duties imposed
by statute. But this line of development was blocked by Alberts v.
City of Muskegon,291 wherein plaintiff claimed that the loss of his
house by fire was caused by the negligent emission of sparks from a
steam roller used by city employees in street construction work. The
court held the work was governmental in character and rejected a
misfeasance argument based on Sheldon, Ashley, and Ferris. The
case was not one, it was said, in which the misfeasance claimed
amounted to a direct trespass; rather, the basis of the claim was negligence, substantially the basis of all liability in this country for damage caused by fire. The cases cited were inapplicable, for "it cannot
be said that the burning of plaintiff's property was the necessary result of employing the roller as equipped upon the road. The machine
and the agents of the city were properly employed in performing a
public work. This employment involved no injury to plaintiff's property."2os
In other cases the avoidance strategy was an attempt to pin the
"nuisance" label on dangerous or defective conditions of public
premises, which were injurious, not to outsiders, but to visitors on
the premises, but the Ferris principle was held to be not applicable:
to a claim that the board of education or its agents had supplied to
plaintiff, a painter, a defective scaffold to be used on school premises;299 to a claim that a school building contained a stainvell dan296.
297.
298.
299.

supra.

122 Mich. at 319, 81 N.W. at 100 (emphasis added).
146 Mich. 210, 109 N.W. 262 (1906).
146 Mich. at 215-16, 109 N.W. at 264 (emphasis added).
Whitehead v. Board of Educ., discussed in text accompanying notes 206-07
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gerous to the children who used it;300 in Kilts v. Board of Supervisors,801 to a ·wrongful death claim arising from the collapse of a platform on a water tower on which plaintiff's decedent was working;
and in Royston v. City of Charlotte,802 to a wrongful death claim
arising from the collapse of a swing in a public park.
In Kilts808 the distinction was clearly drawn between, on the one
hand, a condition of the premises that threatens harm to persons off
the premises, which is a public nuisance if the threat is to users of
the public ways or a private nuisance if the threat is to neighboring
property or persons thereon, and, on the other hand, a condition that
is dangerous only to persons on the land. The court said that one
who erects a weak structure upon his own land far enough from the
perimeter that it can cause no injury to outsiders may become liable
for negligence in some instances to those who enter and are harmed
by it. But those who so enter have no right to have such structures,
which are in no way related to property rights of their own, abated,
and to hold the structures to be nuisances would undermine the law
of negligence, for juries would then be asked to find all dangerous
structures to be nuisances.304 The same reasoning prevailed in Royston, where a child was killed when a post that served as a support
for a swing broke off because it was decayed at its base, and the iron
bar from which the swing was suspended fell upon the child. Plaintiff claimed the swing was a public nuisance, but the court replied
that if the municipality performed a governmental function in erecting and maintaining the swing in a public park and was therefore not
liable for negligence in its erection or maintenance, it would be
inconsistent to say that the same negligence made the swing a public
nuisance. Acts in discharge of a governmental function that create a
nuisance per se do not come within the immunity, but want of care
in maintenance presents a question of negligence only. To adopt the
principle relied upon by plaintiff would abrogate the doctrine of
governmental immunity by classifying as nuisance the result of the
negligence of municipal agents and employees in the maintenance
of any governmental instrumentality, thus immunizing the negligence but not its result.305
300.
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Daniels v. Board of Educ., discussed in text accompanying notes 208-09 supra.
162 Mich. 646, 127 N.W. 821 (1910). See text accompanying note 235 supra.
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Bator v. Ford Motor Co.306 involved damage to plaintiff's premises resulting from the digging of a large water tunnel seventy feet
below the surface of the street on which the premises were located.
The work was done by a contractor working for the Ford Motor
Company, pursuant to an arrangement whereby the tunnel would
become the property of the city of Detroit and be used to furnish
water to the Ford plant in Dearborn. As the tunnel shield passed
through a plastic subsoil at this point, the earth was disturbed in such
a way that subsidence occurred for a period of eighteen months,
causing damage to the buildings abutting the street. The jury found
that the work had been carried on with due care and skill, and there
was evidence that the disturbance to the soil was the inevitable result
of doing the job in the way that it was done. Judgment for plaintiff
was entered upon a count asserting essentially a trespass theory, and
the court held that the absence of negligence was no defense if it
were true that it was impossible to carry on the construction without
damage to the abutting property. The court said that there would
have been no justice in requiring the plaintiffs, who were in no way
interested, to bear part of the cost,307 and that Ashley308 and Defer! 00
made it unnecessary to determine whether plaintiff's title ran to the
center of the street, for the claim could be sustained without finding
that the tunnel actually passed through his land.310
In McDonell v. Brozo311 plaintiff was injured when, while passing
by a school playground on a public sidewalk, she was bowled over by
a fourteen-year-old physical education student running a dash under
the supervision of school personnel. In support of her claim against
the board of education, plaintiff relied on Ferris and argued that the
distinction between Ferris and Daniels 312 was that the injury in
Ferris had occurred off, rather than on the school premises. But the
court held that the immunity was not limited to on-premises injuries.
The instant case did not involve trespass to the land of another, and
there was no nuisance, since there was no continuing danger to the
lives or safety of the public or to the property or personal rights of
persons so located as to be peculiarly subject to such a danger. 313 On
306.
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Mich. 38, 280 N.W. 100 (1938).
text accompanying notes 208-09 & 300 supra.
Mich. at 43-44, 280 N.W. at 102.
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the other hand, Pound v. Garden City School District314 fell easily
into the Ferris category. The claim was for a fall on the public sidewalk attributed to an icy condition caused by the discharge of water
across the sidewalk by a school downspout. The trial judge's conclusion that the immunity defense was applicable was corrected by
the supreme court, which explained that the immunity decisions
relied on by defendant were all cases in which the injury did not
occur, as it did in Ferris, outside the limits of the school premises,
but rather in areas subject to school control.315
The loss of definition began to appear in Donaldson v. City of
Marshall, 316 wherein it was claimed that plaintiff lost the use of a
portion of his land because the city failed to keep clear of debris a
tile drain under a street so that "it became clogged and was unable
to carry off the water that accumulated on plaintiff's land."317 Recovery was allowed, and Seaman v. City of Marshall318 was cited as the
controlling authority. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate
that the water had been introduced upon the plaintiff's premises by
the city drainage system, and it was said that
[t]he city of Marshall was under no obligation to drain the plaintiff's
land, but when it established a drain in that vicinity it became its
duty to maintain it in such a way as to carry off the natural flow of
the water, and if by reason of its failure to do so water accumulated
on plaintiff's land which otherwise would not have been there the
city would be liable for any damages sustained.3 19
The distinction between the intrusion that is the intended or
necessary result of the defendant's act and that which is accidental
was again blurred in Robinson v. Township of Wyoming. 320 Plaintiff's claim was for loss of a garage building by fire allegedly caused
by a short circuit produced by water that fl.owed into the garage after
escaping from a reservoir in a park owned by the township. Plaintiff
asserted that "it was the duty of the township to so construct and
operate its park and impound the waters ... in such a manner that
they would not be a nuisance and would not trespass upon and damage" his property.321 The township raised the governmental-function
314.
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defense and objected to the court's failure to dismiss the case for lack
of proof of negligence and its failure to instruct the jury on that
point. The court said that the governmental-function defense is available where negligence is charged but not in a case of trespass; moreover, it said, in a trespass case it is not necessary to prove negligence.
From the evidence the jury could find that the township had so constructed its park and lake that the flooding of plaintiff's property was
a "natural" result of surplus water escaping from a break in the embankment by which the water was contained.322
In Rogers v. Kent Board of County Road Commissioners 323 the
claim was that plaintiff's decedent died of injuries received when his
mower ran into a steel stake that defendants placed upon his land in
order to support a snow fence; they acted under a license granted by
the deceased. The agreement between the defendants and the deceased allegedly contained an undertaking by the defendants that the
fence and all its attachments would be removed from the land at the
end of the winter season. The plaintiff's claim was styled as one based
on trespass and negligence, but the trial court dismissed it on the
ground that it was clearly a negligence claim and hence barred by
the immunity defense. The supreme court, however, held that the
claim could be maintained as one for trespass under the principle
that one who, at the end of the term, fails to remove from the land
of another a thing placed there pursuant to a license, becomes guilty
of a trespass at that time. 324 Since there was no allegation that the
defendants were aware of the continuing presence of the stake upon
the land, this conclusion seems debatable.
The idea was even more loosely applied in De/net v. City of Detroit.326 The claim was for property damage resulting from the subsidence of the soil on plaintiffs' residential premises, which was allegedly caused by a broken connection in a sewer under a portion of
their lot that had formerly been a public alley. The alley had been
vacated with no reservation of rights in the city before plaintiffs
acquired title to the lot, but nothing had been done to block off or
remove the sewer. Its existence was not revealed by plaintiffs' abstract,
but they learned of it when they received their deed, at which time
the grantor told them the sewer had been blocked off. The truth was
not discovered until some years later when the damage occurred and,
after a number of complaints, the city investigated and discovered
322.
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that the sewer still served a number of houses in the vicinity. The
break was also discovered and repaired at that time. The trial judge
decided that the city, in maintaining the sewer, was engaged in a governmental function and was therefore not liable for the damage
caused by the faulty connection. The supreme court reinstated the
plaintiffs' verdict on the ground that "the maintenance of an active
sewer since 1915 beneath the plaintiffs' lands constitutes a trespass,"328 and "[t]he city cannot excuse its tortious taking of private
property by invoking the shibboleth of governmental function.'' 827
Further evidence of the increasing ambiguity of the "trespass"
basis of claim is provided by two cases arising out of one incident. To
eliminate frequent overflows of a county road by the runoff of snowmelt and storm water from nearby high land, the Chippewa County
Road Commission raised the grade of the road where the flooding
occurred and increased the size of the culvert under the road by an
amount grossly inadequate to accommodate the water that was thereafter impounded behind the higher grade in times of freshet. In May
of 1959, during a period of unusually heavy rainfall, water accumulated in the pocket created by the convergence of this and other
highways in such quantities that it eventually broke through one of
the roads and poured in a torrent toward nearby Lake Superior. In
the process it washed out a gully, into which a lakeside cottage and
its occupants were precipitated. Actions against the road commission
for the death of one of the guests in the cottage, and for the damage
to the property, were dismissed by the trial court on a motion that
set up a claim of immunity. That order was appealed in both cases,
but Herro v. Chippewa County Road Commissioners,328 the wrongful death case, was the vehicle for the supreme court's ruling. The
complaint alleged that the defendant was on notice of the dangerous
situation that it had created by reason of an accumulation of water
in unprecedented quantities in the month preceding the incident in
question. It also asserted a duty on the defendant's part, in constructing and maintaining its roads, to provide adequate escape routes for
the water impounded, so that it "would not be a nuisance and would
not trespass" upon the property "occupied" by plaintiff's decedent
and to prevent the artificial creation of a dangerous body of water
above the property and its sudden discharge in large and unnatural
quantities on the plaintiff's decedent.829 Justice Black called this an al326.
327.
328,
329.

327
327
368
368

Mich.
Mich.
Mich.
Mich.

at 258, 41 N.W.2d at 541.
at 258, 41 N.W.2d at 541-42.
263, 118 N.W.2d 271 (1962).
at 266-68, 118 N.W.2d at 272-73.
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legation of "actionable trespass" resulting directly in decedent's death
by drowning and held that it was governed by the Ashley-FerrisRogers-Robinson line of cases.330 In re Morass v. Hillsdale County 831
and 1vlaffei v. Berrian County 332 were distinguished on the ground
that they were based, "mistakenly it would seem," on claims of negligence rather than trespass,383 and it was asserted that in no Michigan
case had a city, township, village, county, or any administrative subdivision thereof, been held immune from liability for destructive
flooding of private property occasioned by trespass, provided that the
trespass was pleaded and proved as it was in Ashley.834 It was asserted
further that the latter case stood for the proposition that "even the
State 'could not intrude upon the lawful possession of a citizen.'"88 1l
The complaints were therefore sustained against the immunity defense on the ground that a trespass had been alleged. While there do
not appear to have been allegations equivalent to those in the early
cases that the water intrusion was "the necessary and natural result"
of the defendant's acts, the assertions relative to the probability of
such an occurrence and the notice of the situation that the defendant
had received before the disaster put a less severe strain on the original
principle than Robinson did.
But thereafter, in Smith v. Board of County Road Commissioners,886 the property owner's claim was tried, and it succumbed to a
jury verdict after the jury received an instruction based on an act-of•
God defense. The judgment based on the verdict was affirmed. The
majority of the court thought that the defense was supported by evidence tending to prove that the breakout would not have occurred
but for the unusual rainfall that preceded it,387 although, as was
pointed out in Justice Black's dissent, it seems to have been indisputable that the change in the grade of the road had the inevitable
effect of diverting from its natural drainage course the water that
could not pass through the culvert and causing it to flow in an opposite direction. Therefore, the change in grade was a but-for cause of
330. 368 Mich. at 265, ll8 N.W.2d at 271.
331. 242 Mich. 277, 218 N.W. 683, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 635 (1928). See text accom•
panying note 240 supra. While the facts in Morass would arguably have supported a
trespass claim, the argument was apparently not made, and the claim succumbed to
the court's conviction that road building is a government activity.
332. 293 Micl1. 92, 291 N.W. 234 (1940). See note 212 supra.
333. 368 Mich. at 271, 118 N.W.2d at 274.
334. 368 Mich. at 272, 118 N.W.2d at 275.
335. 368 Mich. at 272, 118 N.W.2d at 275, citing 35 Midi, at 300 (emphasis added).
336. 381 Mich. 363, 161 N.W.2d 561 (1968).
337. 381 Mich. at 368, 161 N.W.2d at 563,
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plaintiff's inundation.888 The court in these cases seems to be including under the "trespass" heading unintentional intrusions on
land caused by negligent or extrahazardous activity. While this may
be consistent with current usage,839 it is not what the court meant
by the term in Ashley and Ferris. The situation contemplated in
those cases would scarcely have been subject to an act-of-God defense.
What seems to be taking place in this area, through the blurring of
the original outlines, is an acceptance of liability on the part of the
governmental unit for intrusions on land (and their proximate consequences) caused by the unit, either intentionally or by negligent or
extrahazardous activity.
It may be that the development is also being extended, though by
a different logic, to include such harms caused by negligent omission.
The claim in Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. State 340 was for
damages caused by a fire that spread to plaintiff's premises from a
neighboring property owned by the state. The state property was an
abandoned factory, title to which was acquired by the state through a
tax sale. The plant was dilapidated, subject to vandalism, and a
recognized fire hazard, and the state had notice of these facts through
citations issued by the city department of building and safety engineering. The fire occurred in 1963, at which time the state's "sovereign immunity" was intact. The claim was based on an assertion
that, since the factory was a fire hazard, it was a nuisance, and the
supreme court upheld that assertion against a contention that the
gist of the claim was negligence.341 But, probably because of the
court's established view that exceptions to the rule of "sovereign immunity" are created only by statute where the state is concerned,842
the court apparently felt that liability could not be rested upon the
"nuisance" characterization, which derives from case law and has no
statutory endorsement. In order to sustain the claim, therefore, the
court was forced to characterize the situation as one involving a
"taking" of private property, for which the constitution requires that
compensation be made.843 As I have criticised this holding else338. 381 Mich. at 379-80, 161 N.W.2d at 568.
339. See, e.g., w. PROSSER, TORTS 64 n.17 (4th ed. 1971). Although in both Herro
and Smith the claims were called "trespass," Justice Black, at least, thought they were
governed by the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. l Ex. 265 (1866), afjd., L.R. 3
H.L. 330 (1868). See 381 Mich. at 280, 161 N.W.2d at 568.
340. 383 Mich. 630, 178 N.W.2d 476 (1970).
341. 383 Mich. at 633-38, 178 N.W.2d at 478-80.
342. See text accompanying note 382 infra.
343. 383 Mich. at 641-43, 178 N.W.2d at 482-84.
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where,344 I will here only offer the opinion that this characterization
of the situation represents a fiction of the most obvious and most unwise variety, since it obfuscates distinctions that are significant and
useful, and further because it draws an indefensible line between
personal injuries and property losses caused by governmental negligence. If the defendant were a subordinate governmental unit not
covered by the state's "sovereign immunity," the liability would apparently have been deemed supported by the "nuisance" characterization alone. While this holding would do no great violence to the
general concept of nuisance, again it represents an extension of liability beyond that which the Michigan cases had heretofore recognized. Pennoyer v. Saginaw 345 stated a continuing liability for damage
resulting from a nuisance created by the city; Buckeye Union recognizes liability for damage resulting from a nuisance on governmentowned property that the owner did not create, but which it failed to
abate. Liability is therefore extended to an additional group of situations wherein the government, as owner of land, failed to take precautionary measures that ought to have been taken for the protection
of persons outside the land; the gist of the liability in these situations
is negligence, but negligence of the government qua landowner.
Finally, with all the emphasis upon the word "trespass" and upon
injury "caused by a direct act," it seems strange that an attempt apparently was never made to formulate an argument for liability in
instances of personal trespass, the most obvious instance being aggressions by the police. There was an opening for expansion beyond
the limits of trespass to land in Tzatzken v. City of Detroit,346 where
the claim was that the city police had entered plaintiff's home without
a warrant and wrongfully seized his private stock of fifty-three bottles
of high quality brandy. The court, while regretting this high-handed
action, held that the police were acting in a governmental capacity
and that the city was therefore not liable even if a conversion had
occurred.847 There was no reference at all to the fact that there was
both a "trespass" and a "taking." The opinion asserted that the
police department operates as an arm of the state in its sovereign
capacity, rather than as an agency of the municipality, and that this
is so whether the department is organized by the direct act of the
legislature or under a home-rule charter.848 The decision is appar344. Cooperrider, Torts, 1971 Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 18
503, 520 (1972).
345. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
346. 226 Mich. 603, 198 N.W. 214 (1924).
347. 226 Mich. at 604, 198 N.W. at 214.
348. 226 Mich. at 608, 198 N.W. at 215.
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ently an echo of the nineteenth-century perception that some local
officials are actually state officers in disguise.
On the same day that it decided Williams v. City of Detroit849 the
supreme court rejected a wrongful death claim against the city
wherein it was .charged that Detroit police officers "negligently and
carelessly exerted unnecessary force in effectuating the arrest of the
deceased, as a result of which serious injury, ultimately causing his
death, were [sic] inflicted."850 All the justices agreed that the claim
had been properly dismissed; they cited only their opinions in Williams. And in Hirych v. State Fair Commission,851 a claim for assault
and battery and false arrest against the state, the state fair commission, the city. and others. which arose out of a melee at the state fair
grounds that had been broken up by police action (the incident occurred prior to the Williams decision), the claims against the state
and the commission were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the
claim against the city was dismissed as based on a governmental
activity.
D.

Claims Against the State-Motor Vehicle Liability-A Willing
Legislature and an Unyielding Court

The glib statement in Nicholson that "[i]n imparting [to municipalities] a portion of its powers, the State also imparts its own immunity"852 was a vacuous reference so far as Michigan decisions were
concerned. Prior to that time, 1902, the question of responsibility
on the part of the state in tort situations had never been directly
raised, since the court's position was that there was no judicial forum
in which it could be raised. This, of course, was not an immunity that
had been shared by the state with its subordinate units, for they were
routinely subject to judicial jurisdiction.
At an early date the court expressed the view that a state cannot
be sued in its own courts unless it has explicitly consented to submit
itself to their jurisdiction.853 While references were made to Blackstone and Puffendorf for their explanation of the position of the subject who seeks to hold the crown responsible in its own court, and to
the absence in Michigan of a procedure corresponding to the English
petition of right, this proposition, for the Michigan court, was a de349. See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra &: notes 420-21 infra.
350. Wardlow v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 291, 292, 111 N.W.2d 44, 45 (1961).
351. 376 Mich. 384, 136 N.W.2d 910 (1965).
352. See text accompanying note 199 supra.
353. Michigan St. Bank v. Hammond, I Doug. 527 (Mich. 1845); Michigan St. Bank
v. Hastings, I Doug. 225 (Mich. 1844), afjg., I Walker Ch. R. 9 (Mich. Ch. 1842).
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duction from constitutional and statutory allocations of jurisdiction
in Michigan, rather than a doctrinal notion concerning the attributes
of sovereignty.
In the early years the legislature was very much involved in the
everyday business affairs of state government. It received and acted,
by bill or resolution, upon numerous individual claims against the
state, following procedures that were at first wholly legislative, but
which evolved into a generally applicable administrative practice.
Routine claims for services and supplies were routinely approved by
the standing committees on claims; those that involved a more complex account, or some element of controversy, were typically referred
to an ad hoc commission with power to act. 354
In 1842, a Board of State Auditors was created; it was composed
of the Secretary of State, the State Treasurer, and the Attorney General, and was authorized and directed to settle the accounts of state
officers charged with the handling of state funds. 31m In the following
year that Board was directed to investigate and settle all unsettled
claims for damages arising from the construction of "works of internal
improvement" prior to April I, 1842.356 The Board, in entertaining
such claims, was directed to sit "as a legal body" and to swear and
examine witnesses. Its determinations were declared to be final, the
claims described were declared barred if not submitted to the Board
after a prescribed notice had been given, and the Board's certificate
was made a sufficient voucher for the Auditor General to draw a warrant for payment on the state treasury. Thereafter it became normal
practice for the legislature, by joint resolution, to refer individual
claims of a miscellaneous nature to the Board with directions to make
a final settlement and authorize payment.357
This general procedure for the handling of claims not otherwise
provided for apparently proved satisfactory, for the new constitution
in 1850 provided that "[t]he Legislature shall not audit nor allow

.

354. E.g., Joint Resolution of March 4, 1840, No. 8, [1840] Mich. Acts 240 (Auditor
General, State Treasurer, and Secretary of State directed to audit the claims of Joel
Clemons for labor and materials and contingent damages as construction contractor
for the central railroad, and to allow such sum as they deemed just and equitable). See
also Act of Feb. 15, 1842, No. 28, [1842) Mich. Acts 47; Act of Feb. 15, 1842, No. 29,
[1842] Mich. Acts 48; Act of Feb. 16, 1842, No. 55, [1842] Mich. Acts 78; Act of March
6, 1843, No. 45, [1843] Mich. Acts 53; Act of March 8, 1843, No. 61, [1843] Mich. Acts
138.

355. Act of Feb. 4, 1842, No. 12, [1842] Mich. Acts 13.
356. Act of March 8, 1843, No. '14, [1843] Mich. Acts 153.
357. E.g., Joint Resolution of Feb. 23, 1843, No, 11, [1843] Mich. Acts 226: Joint
Resolution of March 6, 1843, No. 13, [1843] Mich. Acts 227; Joint Resolution of March
8, 1843, No. 15, [1843] Mich. Acts 228.
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any private claim or account"358 and further provided for a Board
of State Auditors, composed of the Secretary of State, the State Treasurer, and the Commissioner of the State Land Office and vested with
jurisdiction "to examine and adjust all claims against the state, not
otherwise provided for by general Iaws."359 After the 1850 constitution was adopted, the duties and procedures of the Board were elaborated by law. The Board was forbidden to allow any claims against
the state except those established by competent testimony and was
directed to keep a record of its proceedings that contained an itemization of each claim and an abstract of the evidence taken. The members of the Board were given the power to administer oaths to claimants and witnesses, to examine such persons under oath, to issue
subpoenas and attachments for failure to attend, and to set off against
the claims asserted any legal or equitable claims in favor of the
state.800
Not until 1875 was the supreme court required to comment upon
the Board's claims function. Then, in People ex rel. Dewey v. Board
of State Auditors861 it held that under the constitution the Board was
a separate and independent tribunal over which the court had no
supervisory control. This position was reiterated three years later in
People ex rel. Ambler v. Auditor General362 and again in People
ex rel. Ayres v. Board of State Auditors.863 In the latter case Justice
Campbell explained the matter at some length:
Except in regard to those ordinary claims against the State which
became fixed by the action of various auditing officers, and involved
no important inquiry, no claim against the State could, under the
old Constitution, be allowed except by the Legislature. The State
has never, before or since, allowed itself to be sued in its own courts,
and no officer could lawfully subject it to suit....
We had no Petition of Right and no court of claims. The policy
of the State, (as at that time of the United States also), left the sole
power to allow claims against the State to the Legislature. In providing for a different method of determining claims against the State, it
was not deemed proper to include it within the judicial power; and
the inquiry not being subject to judicial action, any interference by
this court with the auditing body in the exercise of its constitutional
358. MICH. CoNsr. art. IV, § 31 (1850),
359. MICH, CONsr, art. VIII, § 4 (1850).
360. Act of April 7, 1851, No. 142, [1851] Mich. Acts 173 (codified at
LA.ws ch. 7, § 205 (1857)).
361. 32 Mich. 191 (1875).
362. 38 Mich. 746 (1878).
363. 42 Mich. 422, 4 N.W. 274 (1880).
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functions, would have been practically entertaining a suit against the
State to compel the disposition of a claim which they had already
rejected as not a claim entitled to consideration, and which he had no
right to pass upon in one stage more than another.364
Thus, while the common law immunity of the crown from ordinary judicial process was in the background, the court's thinking
again appears to have been more importantly influenced by indigenous practice. The court's emphasis was not upon the theoretical
unreachability of the sovereign, but rather upon the distribution of
functions within the local version of republican government. As a
matter of original Michigan policy, claims against the government
were seen as falling within legislative rather than judicial cognizance
and as subject to legislative conscience rather than to judicially administered rules of law. When this original policy was changed, in the
constitution of 1850, "it was deemed not proper to include [the
cognizance of claims against state government] within the judicial
power"; instead, an administrative body was established £or that
purpose. It was this constitutional allocation of jurisdiction that
placed these matters beyond the original and revisory jurisdiction of
the courts.365
The advent of the motor vehicle created an entirely new set of
problems, which quickly brought all these rules under a pressure that
had not been felt before. The legislature quickly recognized this fact
and at an early date moved to regulate the use of motor vehicles and
establish responsibility on the part of owners for the harm that re364. 42 Mich. at 427-28, 4 N.W. at 277-78, See also Smith v. Aplin, 80 Mich. 205, 45
N.W. 136 (1890); Aplin v. Van Tassel, 73 Mich. 28, 40 N.W. 847 (1888); Board of Supervisors v. Auditor General, 68 Mich. 659, 36 N.W. 794 (1888); McElroy v. Swart, 57 Mich.
500, 24 N.W. 776 (1885).
365. In just one case during this era did the court's action at all suggest a position
concerning tort responsibility on the part of the state. The legislature passed a joint
resolution for the relief of a person who claimed to have been imprisoned after con•
viction of a crime of which he was allegedly not guilty. The resolution directed the
Board of State Auditors to investigate the claim and, if it found the facts asserted to be
true, to authorize a payment to be made to the petitioner. The resolution was pre•
sented to the Board, which refused to consider the claim, and the supreme court denied
the petitioner's subsequent application for a writ of mandamus requiring the Board
to entertain the claim. Allen v. Board of State Auditors, 122 Mich. 324, 81 N.W. 118
(1899). In his opinion Chief Justice Grant heatedly denied that the legislature lmd
power to establish a tribunal for the retrial of the crime and asserted that the resolution
provided for a gratuity and therefore an appropriation for private purposes, which
required an extraordinary majority for enactment. Further, he said that the petition
did not contain a "claim" within the meaning of article VIII, section 4 of the constitu•
tion, and that the legislature was only empowered to authorize the Board to pass on
"claims," as distinguished from requests, petitions, and claims for appropriations, which
would represent mere gratuities or would be based on sentimental or moral grounds,
122 Mich. at 326-29, 81 N.W. at 113-14.
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suited from it. The Motor Vehicle Act of 1915366 was concerned
largely with the registration and identification of vehicles used on
the public highways, but it also contained a requirement that vehicles
be equipped with certain safety devices, including an adequate
horn, 367 and a civil liability provision making owners responsible for
the negligent use of their vehicles when driven with their consent or
knowledge:
The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for any injury occasioned by the negligent operation of such motor vehicle, whether
such negligence consists in violation of the provisions of the statutes
of this State or fo. the failure to observe such ordinary care in such
operation as the rules of the common law require: Provided, That the •
owner shall not be liable unless said motor vehicle is being driven by
the express or implied consent or knowledge of such owner.368
The language defining the statute's coverage was ambiguous with
regard to municipally owned vehicles, but it was not that ambiguity
that defeated a claim for injury caused by the negligent operation
of a city-owned truck engaged in street maintenance activities,
wherein it was also asserted that the truck was not equipped with a
horn or other signalling device. The court, in Wrighton v. City of
Highland Park,869 assumed that the horn requirement was applicable
but disregarded the civil liability provision and stated that the question was whether, "because a municipality is required to place a horn
on its vehicles while it is discharging governmental functions, •.• it
thereby consents to be sued if this provision is violated?"370 Its
answer to that question was:
It is conceivable that the legislature might require the city to carry
a horn on its vehicles in the interest of public safety without in any
manner making itself liable for negligence while performing governmental operations. Concededly there would be no liability except for
the automobile law, and from that law no legislative intention can be
implied abrogating this old and well established rule of law. We think
if the legislature had intended to change that rule of law it would not
have done so in the uncertain way suggested by counsel.3 71
366. Act of May 19, 1915, No. 302, [1915] Mich. Pub. Acts 533 (codified at 1 MICH.
LAws ch. 89, §§ 4797-832 (1915)).
367. Act of May 19, 1915, No. 302, § 16, [1915] Mich. Pub. Acts 538 (codified at 1
MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 89, § 4812 (1915)).
368. Act of May 19, 1915, No. 302, § 29, [1915] Mich. Pub. Acts 543 (codified at 1
MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 89, § 4825 (1915)).
369. 236 Mich. 279, 210 N.W. 250 (1926).
370. 236 Mich. at 281, 210 N.W. at 251.
371, 236 Mich. at 281, 210 N.W. at 251.
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When the law was amended in 1925 the civil liability provision
was retained, and the coverage of the statute was redefined in such a
way as clearly to include vehicles owned by the state and by municipalities.372 Nevertheless, in a claim arising thereafter based on a collision with a police cruiser, the court thought there was still no reason
to conclude that the legislature had intended to recognize liability
on the municipality's part for accidents arising in the performance of
a governmental function. Citing Wrighton for the proposition that
when the legislature intends to change a common law rule of law it
does so in terms of certainty, the court, in Butler v. City of Grand
Rapids,878 said, "We see no reason to change the rule followed in
Massachusetts and Michigan which holds that, there being no liability
at common law, a statute is required to impose such liability before
the same can be asserted. In the case at bar, the 1925 act does not
impose such liability."374 The decision was perverse. The statute said
"The term 'motor vehicle' as used in this act shall include all vehicles
impelled on the public highways of this state, by mechanical power"
(with certain exceptions which explicitly included vehicles owned by
the federal government but not those owned by municipal corporations or by the state);375 it specifically required vehicles owned and
operated by the state or any municipality to be marked so as to identify the department or institution by which they were employed370
and also provided that the "owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable"
for any injury occasioned by its negligent operation if the vehicle was
being driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge.a11
A few years later, in Miller v. Manistee County Board of Road
Commissioners, 318 Justice McAllister calmly ignored the Butler decision and sustained a claim against the county and the county board
of road commissioners for injury caused by the negligent operation of
a vehicle owned by the latter; he rested his decision in part on the
civil liability provision of the 1915 Act and in part on a section of
the Uniform Motor Vehicle Act, adopted in 1927, which stated that
372. Act of May 13, 1925, No. 287, § l(a), [1925] Mich. Pub. Acts 418 (codified at
1 MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 73, § 4632(a) (1929)).
373. 273 Mich. 674, 263 N.W. 767 (1935).
374. 273 Mich. at 679, 263 N.W. at 769.
375. Act of May 13, 1925, No. 287, § l(a), [1925] Mich. Pub. Acts 418 (codified at l
MICH. COMP, LAWS ch. 73, § 4632(a) {1929)) (emphasis added).
376. Act of May 13, 1925, No. 287, § l(a), [1925] Mich. Pub. Acts 418 (codified at 1
MICH. COMP. LAws ch. 73, § 4632(a) (1929)).
377. Act of May 13, 1925, No. 287, § 29, [1925] Mich. Pub. Acts 424 (codified at 1
MlcH. CoMP, LAws ch. 73, § 4648 (1929)).
378. 297 Mich. 487, 298 N.W. 105 (1941).
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the provisions of that Act, the "rules of the road," were applicable
"to the drivers of all vehicles owned or operated by this State or any
county, city, town, district or any other political subdivision of the
State."379 But this aberration was quickly corrected. In the following
year, in Mead v. Michigan Public Service Commission,389 the court
had before it, on appeal from the recently created court of claims, a
motor vehicle claim against the state public service commission. The
trial judge had thought that Miller provided a basis for the liability
asserted against the state. The court reconsidered its position, noted
that the section cited by Justice McAllister from the Uniform Motor
Vehicle Act applied to drivers rather than to owners and decided
again that "it would be contrary to the great weight of authority to
hold that by enacting" the civil liability provision of the 1915 law
"the legislature intended to deprive the State of immunity from liability incident to the negligent use of its automobiles; and in that
respect place the State on a par with private or corporate owners."381
By this time the idea that the immunity defense is peculiarly a
possession of the legislature had taken firm hold. In the early municipal corporation cases Justice Campbell had not, it is true, been persuaded that when the legislature imposed an affirmative duty upon
certain local officials, as it did by general statutes upon the township
highway commissioners and by special charter upon city street commissioners, it necessarily intended that the local governmental unit
should be responsible in damages for the failures of such officials to
perform their duties. 1£ that was what the legislature intended, he
expected it to tell him so in explicit language. It told him so in the
particular instance of duties relating to the repair of the public ways,
and that came to be seen as the exception that proved the rule.
Through frequent uncritical repetition of expressions of this attitude,
there evolved a position that in Mead, with regard to the state's
immunity, was put in the following words:
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been firmly established in the common law of this State, and it may not be held to have
been waived or abrogated except that result has been accomplished
by an express statutory enactment or by necessary inference from a
statute.... Irrespective •.. of how impelling the argument may be
that governmental agencies with large numbers of motor vehicles on
the highway should not be absolved from liability to innocent victims
of the carelessness of the drivers of such vehicles, a change in the
379. Act of June 1, 1927, No. 318, § 32, [1927] Mich. Pub. Acts 591 (codified at 1
ch. 74, § 4724 (1929)).
380. 803 Mich. 168, 5 N.W.2d 740 (1942).
381, 803 Mich. at 172, 5 N.W.2d at 741.
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established law of immunity of such governmental agencies as owners
of such vehicles cannot be brought about by judicial fiat. It can only
be done by the legislature.s82

Thus, a principle that was originally nothing more than a judicial
rule of interpretation came to be treated like a proposition written
into the statute books in black-faced type. What the legislature had
willed, only the legislature could waive, and only by language that
could be given no other meaning. The curious thing is that the legislature had never expressed such a will in the first place. Indeed, one
would be hard put to demonstrate from its actions, including the
various versions of the highway statute and the civil liability provision in the Motor Vehicle Act, any intent to defend the principle of
irresponsibility that had captured the court's thinking.
The Board of State Auditors was retained by the constitution of
1908,883 but during the twenties its general claims function was
largely transferred to a new entity, the State Administrative Board,
which consisted of the governor and other high ranking state officers.
The new Board was given authority to authorize payment of emergency claims,884 to inquire into, settle, and pay claims for injuries to
persons while they were in the employ of the state or any of its departments or institutions,385 and to do the same for claims for compensation of dependents of state police officers killed in the line of
duty386 and claims for injuries received in the line of duty by members of the Michigan National Guard.887 Of greater interest was the
authority conferred upon the Board, by a statute that became section
238 of the Compiled Laws, to entertain and pay claims for damages
arising from negligence in the construction, improvement, or maintenance of state trunk line highways,888 and by another that became
section 237 of the Compiled Laws, which vested it with discretionary
power to hear and determine claims against the state arising from
"negligence, malfeasance or misfeasance of any state officer, employee,
commission, department, board, institution, or other governmental
382. 303 Mich. at 173-74, 5 N.W.2d at '142,
383. MICH. CoNsr. art. VI, § 20 (1908).
384. Act of June 15, 1921, No. 29, [1921] Mich.
COMP. LAWS ch. 11, § 227 (1929)).
385. Act of May II, 1927, No. 133, [1927] Mich.
COMP. LAWS ch. 11, § 230 (1929)).
386. Act of May II, 1927, No. 134, [1927] Mich.
COMP. LAws ch. 11, § 232 (1929)).
387. Act of April 29, 1927, No. 93, [1929] Mich.
COMP, LAws ch. 11, § 235 (1929)).
388. Act of May 27, 1925, No. 374, [1925] Mich.
CoMP. LAWS ch. 11, § 238 (1929)).

Pub. Acts 803 (codified at l M1cu,
Pub. Acts 191 (codified at 1 M1cu.
Pub. Acts 192 (codified at l M1cu.
Pub. Acts 235 (codified at 1 M1cu.
Pub. Acts 736 (codified at 1 M1cu,
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division" and to allow the same and order payment, provided that
such payments should not in the aggregate exceed 25,000 dollars in
any one year.389
These provisions would seem to evidence a developing willingness by the legislature to accept responsibility on the part of government for injuries arising from its activities, but that willingness was
still not shared by the court. Indeed, section 238 may have been the
legislature's reaction to the decision a year earlier in Longstreet v.
Mecosta County,890 which held that an action against the state highway commissioner was an action against the state and that there was
nothing in the extensive powers the commissioner enjoyed over the
construction and maintenance of state highways to indicate a legislative intent to waive the immunity of the state from suit arising from
any failure to perform such duties. The claim in that case was that
a partially completed bridge on a state highway had been left unprotected by barriers or lights, so that a passenger car was driven off
the end and into the water, with fatal consequences.
A further step was taken in 1939, when the legislature adopted a
statute that created a court of claims and conferred upon it exclusive
jurisdiction "to hear and determine all claims and demands, liquidated and unliquidated, ex contractu and ex delicto, against the state
and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or
agencies."891 Section 24 of the statute provided that "this act shall in
no manner be construed as enlarging the present liabilities of the
state and any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions,
arms or agencies."892 The legislature's purpose in conferring jurisdiction upon the court to hear ex delicto claims while at the same time
barring a construction that would enlarge the state's "present liabilities" is less than clear. In Manion v. State Highway Commissioner,893
an injury claim against the state on behalf of a seaman employed by
the highway commissioner on one of the Mackinac ferries, a majority
of the court reconciled the twn cla'l!ses by concluding that the state
enjoyed two immunities-one from suit and one from tort liability
while engaged in a governmental function-the first of which had
been waived without relinquishing the second.894 Justice Bushnell
389. Act of May 22, 1929, No. 259, [1929] Mich. Pub. Acts 621 (codified at 1 Mica.
LAws ch. 11, § 237 (1929)).
390. 228 Mich. 542, 200 N.W. 248 (1924).
391. Act of May 23, 1939, No. 135, § 8(1), [1939] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 249 (codified
at 4 MICH. COMP. I..Aws § 691.108 (1948)) (emphasis added).
392. Act of May 23, 1939, No. 135, § 24, [1939] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 252.
393. 303 Mich. 1, 5 N.W.2d 527, cert. denied~ 317 U.S. 677 (1942).
394. 303 Mich. at 19, 5 N.W.2d at 528.
COMP.
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noted in his prevailing opinion that, while the Court of Claims Act
did not expressly repeal sections 237 and 238 of the Compiled Laws, it
did appear to have assigned all claims jurisdiction exclusively to the
new court.395 The following year, in McNair v. State Highway Department,896 an appeal from a court of claims action against the highway department for negligence in the maintenance of a state highway, it was argued by the plaintiff that the claim could rest on sections 237 and 238, though it came before the court of claims instead
of the administrative board. The court's laconic response was:
From an examination of the above acts relied upon by the petitioner, we are unable to find an express or implied intent upon the
part of the legislature to abolish the defense of sovereign immunity.
The authority to waive such defense is in the legislature and until
there is legislative action authorizing an officer or agent of the State
to waive such defense, it may not be done by any officer or agent.897
Thus, by holding that the jurisdiction to hear claims against the
state had been lodged exclusively in the court of claims, while reject~
ing the thought that that jurisdiction extended to claims of a type that
had formerly been entertained by the administrative board under
sections 237 and 238, the court managed to read those provisions out
of the books and to attribute to the legislature, in its adoption of a
systematic claims adjudication procedure, the intent, not just to
assume no new liabilities, but to reduce the state's ability to respond
to claims in tort situations.
Two weeks after that decision was handed down the legislature
adopted a statute that made certain amendments to the Court of
Claims Act, including the following substitute for section 24:
Upon the happening of any event subsequent to November I, 1943,
which gives rise to a cause of action, the state hereby waives its im. munity from liability for the torts of its officers and employees and
consents to have its liability for such torts determined in accordance
with the same rules of law as apply to an action in the circuit court
against an individual or a corporation, and the state hereby assumes
liability for such acts, and jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the
court of claims to hear and determine all claims against the state to
recover damages for injuries to property or for personal injury caused
by the misfeasance or negligence of the officers or employees of the
state while acting as such officer or employee. Such claim must be
895. 303 Mich. at 20, 5 N.W.2d at 528-29.
896. 305 Mich. 181, 9 N.W.2d 52 (1943).
897. 305 Mich. at 187, 9 N.W.2d at 55. The reference in the last sentence is to the
fact that the attorney general had not pleaded or otherwise raised the defense below,
which plaintiff argued was a waiver if none was found in the statutes themselves,
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submitted pursuant to procedural provisions of the court of claims
act. The provisions of this act shall not apply to (a) any claim for
injury to or death of a prisoner, or for services rendered while an inmate of a penal institution; (b) any claim arising out of the injury
to or death of an inmate of any state institution in connection ·with
the rendition of medical or surgical treatment; (c) any claim for propperty damage or personal injury caused by the Michigan state troops
and/or the national guard when called into the service of the state.898
But then the legislature flinched. In 1945, it repealed this general
waiver of the state's immunity, and assumption of liability, and
adopted in its place a statute providing that "[i]n all actions brought
in the court of claims against the state of Michigan to recover damages resulting from the negligent operation by an officer, agent or
employe of the state of Michigan of a motor vehicle of which the
state of Michigan is owner ... the fact that the state of Michigan was
in the ownership or operation of such motor vehicle, engaged in a
governmental function, shall not be a defense to such action." 899 At
the same session the defense was abolished "[i]n any civil action
brought against a political subdivision of the state of Michigan, including all municipal corporations, to recover damages resulting
from the negligent operation by any officer, agent or employee of
such political subdivision, of a motor vehicle of which said political
subdivision is owner."400 Thus, the legislature finally overrode thirty
years of judicial resistance and gave the court the express directive
that it had insisted upon. The motor vehicle liability problem was
solved, though in the process the responsibility for other forms of
governmental negligence, which, in so far as the state was concerned,
had existed in rudimentary form before the administrative board
and in general form for a brief period before the court of claims,
was abandoned. In later years a majority of the supreme court was
persuaded that this retreat at the state level was in fact an advance
to the rear; it was construed as a legislative adoption of the "sovereign
immunity" principle, qualified only by the statutory acceptance of
liability in motor vehicle cases.
398. Act of April 21, 1943, No. 237, [1943] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 390.
399. Act of April 11, 1945, No. 87, [1945] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 84 (codified at 4
MICH. CoMP. LAws § 691.141 (1948)). This provision was amended in 1960, to include
within its coverage negligent operation of state-owned aircraft. Act of April 14, 1960,
No. 33, [1960] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 28. The statute, with minor word changes, is now
contained in MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6475 (1968).
400. Act of April 27, 1945, No. 127, § 1, [1945] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 132 (codified
at 4 MICH, CoMP. LAws § 691.151(1) (1948)). This provision was repealed by Act of May
19, 1964, No. 170, § 14, [1964] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 221.
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WILLIAMS AND ITS AFTERMATH

The Court's Struggle with the Problem

A brief recapitulation of what Michigan lawmakers had done, as
distinguished from what they had said, prior to the decision in
Williams v. City of Detroit,401 would disclose the following pattern:
After initial resistance by the court, the legislature established the
principle of local government responsibility for unsafe conditions of
the public ways.402 Later, again after stiff resistance from the court,
the legislature also established the principle of general governmental
responsibility for the negligent operation of government-owned
motor vehicles by government employees.403 The court recognized
governmental responsibility for activities by governmental officers
that constituted or necessarily caused physical intrusion on or disturbance of private premises,404 for maintenance on governmental
premises of conditions that endangered and caused harm to persons
or property outside those premises,405 and for injury caused by
revenue-earning activities of local government units.400 On the other
hand, the governmental-function defense was applied by the supreme
court to negate liability in cases involving road construction and
maintenance activities (though the area of immunity in this respect
was greatly reduced in importance after 1945 by the statutory liability for negligent operation of motor vehicles),407 activities of firemen and police officers,408 and, in one instance, injury to a third
party that was attributed to negligent supervision by school personnel of students engaged in school activities.409 But the great
majority of all cases in which the governmental-function defense had
been successful in the supreme court involved injury caused by the
401. 864 Mich. 281, Ill N.W.2d I (1961).
402. See text accompanying notes 90-136 supra.
408. See text accompanying notes 852-400 supra.
404. Herro v. Chippewa County Road Commrs., 368 Mich. 268, 118 N.W,2d 271
(1962); Bator v. Ford Motor Co., 269 Mich. 648, 257 N.W. 906 (1984); Ashley v. City of
Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296 (187'1); Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo, 24 Mich. 883 (1872),
See text accompanying notes 286-851 supra.
405. Pound v. Garden City School Dist., 372 Mich. 499, 127 N.W.2d 390 (1964);
Robinson v. Wyoming Twp., 312 Mich. 14, 19 N.W.2d 469 (1945); Ferris v. Board of
Educ., 122 Mich. 315, 81 N.W. 98 (1899). See text acccmpanying notes 286-351 supra.
406. See text accompanying notes 227-85 supra.
407. Corning v. City of Saginaw, 116 Mich. 74, 74 N.W. 807 (1898). See text accompanying notes 185-86 supra.
408. Wardlow v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 291, Ill N.W.2d 44 (1961); Tzatzken v.
City of Detroit, 226 Mich. 608, 198 N.W. 214 (1924); Brink v. City of Detroit, 144 Mich,
472, 108 N.W. 430 (1906). See text accompanying notes 210-12, 346-48 8: 850 supra.
409. McDonnell v. Brozo, 285 Mich. 38, 280 N.W. 100 (1988). See text accompanying
notes 311-13 supra.
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claimant's encounter on government premises with a condition dangerous only to visitors to those premises. The defense was first clearly
articulated in Nicholson v. City of Detroit,410 wherein the claim was
for negligent exposure of plaintiff's decedent to government premises infected by smallpox. The instances in this category included
those involving a defective scaffold used by plaintiff on school premises,411 a dangerous stairway in a school building,412 a defective platform on a water tower on county premises,413 a swimming pool in a
public park (the case also involved charges of negligent supervision),414 a defective swing in a public park,415 defective elevator
mechanisms in public buildings,416 a dangerous ramp in a school
parking lot,417 and collapsing bleachers on school and park
premises.418
Since cases of this kind, including Williams itself, which was
another dangerous elevator problem, were the source of the court's
nascent dissatisfaction with the governmental-function defense, one
wonders how subsequent developments might have differed if, instead of challenging the entire position, the court had quietly· concluded that the time had come to recognize a community responsibility (generally corresponding to the responsibilities of private
occupiers) toward persons entering public premises in circumstances
that would entitle them to be characterized as "public invitees."419
Such an opening in the governmental-function barrier might have
been developed cautiously, ·with initial recognition of responsibility
410. 129 Mich. 246, 88 N.W. 695 (1902). See text accompanying notes 190-99 supra.
411. Whitehead v. Board of Educ., 139 Mich. 490, 102 N.W. 1028 (1905). See text
accompanying notes 206-07 &: 299 supra.
412. Daniels v. Board of Educ., 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 23 (1916). See text accompanying notes 208-09 &: 300 supra.
413. Kilts v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Mich. 646, 127 N.W. 821 (1910). See text
accompanying notes 235, 301 &: 303 supra.
414. Heino v. City of Grand Rapids, 202 Mich. 363, 168 N.W. !H2 (1918). See text
accompanying notes 236-39 supra.
415. Royston v. City of Charlotte, 278 Mich. 255, 270 N.W. 288 (1936). See text
accompanying notes 302-05 supra.
416. Martinson v. City of Alpena, 328 Mich. 595, 44 N.W.2d 148 (1950); Daskiewicz
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 301 Mich. 212, 3 N.W.2d 71 (1942). See note 254 and text
accompanying notes 252-54 supra.
417. Watson v. School Dist., 324 Mich. 1, 36 N.W.2d 195 (1949). See text accompanying notes 255-57 supra.
418. Penix v. City of St. Johns, 354 Mich. 259, 92 N.W.2d 332 (1958); Richards v.
Birmingham School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643 (1957). See text accompanying
notes 258-66 supra.

419. A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a
member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
llEsTATEMENT (SECOND} OF Ton.TS §

332(2) (1965).
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for such unreasonable dangers as defective elevators, collapsing
bleachers, and pitfalls in unlighted parking lots, without raising the
specter of unlimited and unpredictable liability for injuries that
might arise in remote corners of publicly owned land or that might
be attributed to failures of public services or to high-risk activities,
such as those of the police and fire departments.
But the conservative approach was not the style of the time. Instead of deciding the case before it, the court plunged into a legislative thicket from which it has not yet emerged. The plurality
opinion in Williams, accepted by four of the eight members of the
court, purported to hold that "[f]rom this date forward the judicial
doctrine of governmental immunity from ordinary torts no longer
exists in Michigan."420 The intent of these justices was that the ruling should apply to all governmental entities, including the state,
and should govern the Williams case itself, although not other cases
arising from incidents that had occurred prior to the date of the
decision; but the ruling gained whatever precedential effect it was
ultimately to be accorded only from the additional support it received from Justice Black, who limited his concurrence to the wholly
prospective abolition of the defense and that only in so far as it applied to claims against municipal corporations.421 Since he did not
support the application of the new ruling to the instant case, the trial
court's dismissal of the claim was affirmed.
Justice Black's limitation on the scope of the ruling was nailed
down three months later in McDowell v. State Highway Commissioner,422 an action against the commissioner, the highway department, and the state, for injuries that arose from an automobile
accident allegedly caused by defects in a state highway. A majority
of the court distinguished between the immunity rule applicable to
municipal corporations, which, it said, had been overruled by Williams, and the rule of sovereign immunity applicable to the state,
which, it was held, continued to exist by virtue of the legislature's
1945 decision to repeal the general waiver of immunity that had
been incorporated in 1943 in the Court of Claims Act. 428 The majority thought it had no power to overturn this legislative choice, a
belief that is rather curious, since the only surviving legislative expression on the subject was a law that deprived the state of its governmental-function defense in actions arising from the negligent
420.
421.
422.
423.

364 Mich. at 250, Ill N.W.2d at 20.
364 Mich. at 271,111 N.W.2d at 10.
365 Mich, 268, 112 N.W.2d 491 (1961).
365 Mich. at 270-71, 112 N.W.2d at 492.
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operation by state employees of state-owned vehicles and aircraft
but said nothing about what the rule should be' in other cases.
While they concurred in the decision on the ground that the accident in question had occurred prior to the date of the Williams
decision, Justices Edwards and Souris vigorously rejected the distinction between municipal corporations and the state.424 That disagreement became a dissent by Justice Souris in Sayers v. School District
No. 1, Fractional,425 an action arising out of a playground injury,
wherein a majority of the court upheld the immunity defense. The
rationale offered by a plurality opinion was that under Michigan
decisions "the school district as an agency of the State has been
clothed with the State's immunity from liability."426 Consequently,
the school district's immunity was, under McDowell reasoning, also
beyond the court's power of revision. A sense of deja vu at this point
is understandable. The immunity rationale was identical to the
theory that produced the governmental-function defense in the first
place.
Another step down this slope was taken in Lewis v. Genesee
Count:y,427 wherein the reasoning was applied to a claim against a
county and its board of welfare for injuries sustained by a patient
in a county hospital. The board had been established pursuant to a
general statute that subjected it to supervision by the state department of welfare in the administration of certain programs. The
court held: "It clearly appearing that the defendants in the performance of the functions involved in the instant case were acting as
State agencies, they were entitled to claim immunity from liability
based-on alleged negligence of employees."428
At this point it might have appeared that the determination expressed in Williams was rapidly slipping away, since it had encountered rebuffs in all subsequent cases. It was, however, reaffirmed in
so far as cities were concerned in Sherbutte v. City of Marine City.429
The issue in that case was whether the city might properly be joined
as defendant in an action against a city policeman for excessive force
in making an arrest. The answer depended upon the court's inter424. 365 Mich. at 271-73, 112 N.W.2d at 493.
425. 366 Mich. 217,114 N.W.2d 191 (1962).
426. 366 Mich. at 219, 114 N.W.2d at 192, citing Whitehead v. Board of Educ., 139
Mich. 490, 102 N.W. 1028 (1905); Daniels v. Board of Educ., 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W.
23 (1916); Richards v. Birmingham School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643 (1957)
(emphasis added). See text accompanying notes 206-09, 258-65 & 299-300 supra.
427. 370 Mich 110, 121 N.W.2d417 (1963).
428. 370 Mich. at 114, 121 N.W.2d at 419.
429. 374 Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920 (1964).
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pretation, in the light of Williams, of a pre-Williams statute430 that
permitted the city to indemnify a police officer for any judgment
recovered against him based on a claim of tort committed in the performance of his duties but barred the joinder of the city as defendant in any such action. A bare majority of the court was able to
agree that Williams had eliminated any immunity that the city
would formerly have enjoyed in such a case and that the reason for
the joinder prohibition had therefore disappeared.431 The case was
remanded for reinstatement of the city as a defendant.
Thereafter the court descended into chaos. The question of a
county's liability on a claim arising from its operation of a hospital
was raised again in Myers v. Genesee County Auditor.432 A summary
judgment favorable to the defendant was reversed, and the case was
remanded for further proceedings, although no more than two justices were in agreement on any single rationale. Justice O'Hara,
·with Chief Justice Kavanagh's concurrence, asserted that, until
Myers, the state and its agencies had been absolutely immune from
tort liability, with only statutory. exceptions; that subdivisions of
government other than incorporated cities were immune when performing governmental, but not proprietary, functions; and that
"municipal corporations" (by which he meant incorporated cities)
were without immunity.433 He could see no reason, however, in a
distinction between cities, on the one hand, and counties, townships,
and villages, on the other. The county might be differentiated historically, but it was a body corporate under the constitution, and
there was no real difference between a "body corporate" and a
"municipal corporation."434 He noted also that the legislature had
recently sought to provide a uniform rule for all governmental entities and concluded that this purpose would be served if the court
eliminated the distinction benveen cities and other local units even
before the law went into effect.435 He therefore asserted that the rule
of Williams was extended to "all political subdivisions of government."436 The state and its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms, and agencies remained unaffected. The change would
430. Act of May 24, 1951, No. 59, [1951] Mich. Pub.&: Loe. Acts 78.
431. 374 Mich. at 53, 130 N .W.2d at 922.
432. 375 Mich. I, 133 N.W.2d 190 (1965).
433. 375 Mich. at 8-9, 133 N.W.2d at 192.
434. 375 Mich. at 9-10, 133 N.W.2d at 193.
435. 375 Mich. at 10, 133 N.W.2d at 193, citing Act of May 19, 1964, No. 170, [1964]
Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 221 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1401-.1415
(1968), as amended, MICH. Co111P. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1404, .1406, .1407 (Supp. 19'73)).
436. 375 Mich. at 11, 133 N.'W.2d at 193.
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be effective for the instant case and for "pending and future cases."437
Justice Souris, with Justice Adams• concurrence, asserted that the
effect of the decision was to overrule Lewis and that he assumed that
Williams had already abrogated the immunity rule for all municipal
corporations-including incorporated villages, fourth-class cities,
special charter cities, home rule cities, charter tmvnships, and school
districts (though school districts should perhaps be stricken from the
list by reason of Sayers).438 Justices Dethmers and Kelly dissented,
still maintaining their disagreement with Williams.439 Justice Smith
did not participate in the decision. Justice Black "concurred in the
result," i.e., in the reversal and remand for further proceedings.440
Keenan v. County of Midland, 441 which arose out of a drmvning
at a county beach, was before the court when Myers was decided
and was therefore within the "pending and future cases" formula
adopted by the O'Hara opinion. Four justices thought that the immunity defense was therefore not applicable, since in Myers a majority of those sitting had, in effect, abrogated the immunity rule as to
counties, "thus overruling Lewis," and had also held the abrogation
applicable to pending cases.442 Justice Souris concurred in the plurality's action, but disagreed with its reasoning to the extent that it
found a precedent in the concurrence in Myers of less than a majority of the entire court. His view was that Keenan for the first time
put together a majority in favor of the abrogation of the immunity
rule where counties were concerned.443 The significance of this fact,
he thought, was "that, in addition to all pending cases, only those
claims against counties for negligent injury which arose after the
commencement of the three-year statutory limitational period preceding our decision today and prior to July l, 1965, the effective
date of PA 1964, No. 170, rather than those which arose within the
three-year period prior to our decision in Myers, in March of 1965,
will be freed from the common-law defense of county immunity to
actions for negligent injury, which defense we abrogate today by
overruling Lewis."444 And the end was not yet.
437. 375 Mich. at"ll, 133 N.W.2d at 193.
438, 375 Mich. at 12-13, 133 N .W.2d at 194.
439. 375 Mich. at 13,133 N.W.2d at 194.
440. 375 Mich. at 12, 133 N.W.2d at 194.
441. 377 Mich. 57, 138 N.W.2d 759 (1966).
442. 377 Mich. at 60, 138 N.W.2d at 759-60.
443. 377 Mich. at 61-65, 138 N.W.2d at 760-62.
444. 377 Mich. at 65, 138 N.W.2d at 762. Query this reference to "pending" cases.
The Keenan opinions carried no such qualification, and if Myers did not establish a
precedent, presumably its assertion with respect to the cases affected by it was also
a nullity.

266

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 72:187

Smith v. Ginther,445 a claim against a city and a volunteer fireman, arose out of a collision that involved the fireman, who was driving his own car to the scene of a fire. Four justices held that the case
was controlled by Williams, Sherbutte, and Myers and that a claim
was stated.446 Justice Brennan, in dissent, ·wrote a notable critique of
the decisional techniques used by the court in these cases. He reminded the court of the limits upon its function and upon its ability
to control future decisions, facts that have rarely been demonstrated
more convincingly than in this sequence of cases.
Appellate judges make law by creating useful precedents, Appellate judges do not have the power to legislate, they do not have the
power to declare what the law ·will be in the future, nor by resolution
to decide how various classes of cases will be treated in the future.
The function of an appellate court, as the function of all courts, is
to decide cases. When an appellate court has decided a particular
case in a particular way, that decision constitutes a precedent. The
judges or justices participating in the decision cannot declare that
their decision will not be a precedent. Such a declaration would constitute an attempted disavowal of the entire process of common-law
jurisprudence. The distinction benveen what a court does and what
it says must be kept clearly in mind if one is to read the reports of
appellate courts ·with profit.
The function of the court is to decide cases. It decides cases by
applying the law to the facts. The rules which the court applies to
the facts and which result in the decision are the applicable law.
Rules of law which are not necessary to the decision are mere dicta
and have no precedential value.447

His assessment of the precedents was that Williams had made no
change in the law since Justice Black's vote for affirmance, in effect,
maintained the immunity rule in that case. The views expressed,
that the rule should be changed prospectively, were mere dicta. The
immunity rule, therefore, survived at least until Sherbutte, when
six justices joined in an opinion that held that the city enjoyed no
such defense.448 Justice Brennan felt that Sherbutte was wrongly decided and should be overruled because it disregarded the explicit
provisions of an unrepealed statute.449 He conceded, however, that if
Williams, had not changed the law, Myers had, since in that case a
majority of the justices had "applied the same rule of law to the
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

379 Mich. 208, 150 N.W.2d 798 (1967).
379 Mich. at 212, 150 N.W.2d at 799.
379 Mich. at 214-16, 150 N.W.2d at 800.
379 Mich. at 216-17, 150 N,W.2d at 801.
379 Mich. at 218-20, 150 N.W.2d at 802.
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facts at hand, and the decision therefore constituted a precedent for
the proposition that a county does not enjoy immunity." 450 His conclusion was not affected by the differences in the reasons given or by
Justice Black's limitation of his concurrence to "the result." 461 He
then noted
that young Sharon Myers was already dead almost 7 months when
Mr. Justice EnwARDs made his now famous fiat on the subject of
immunity. It would appear that in September of 1961, not a single
member of the Court would have granted Sharon's administratrix
the relief the Court ultimately saw fit to give her. This aside is included here to point out what we have already said about the limited
function of an appellate court. Pronouncements about all future
cases and pending cases, or all cases arising before or after the date
of this or that opinion are, in the nature of things, meaningless
poppycock. Each case will be decided when it gets to Court. It will
be decided according to the best judgment of the Justices then sitting.
It ·will be decided according to their view of and respect for the
precedents which have been set.462
None of the opinions in the case considered the interesting question
whether, under normal agency principles, the city should be responsible for the acts of a volunteer fireman driving his own car.

B.

The Legislature's Response

In the midst of this confusion the legislature, in 1964, adopted
Public Act No. 170.453 Effective July I, 1965, the Act preserved the
existing statutory liabilities in highway and motor vehicle cases;
accepted liability for negligence in regard to dangerous or defective
conditions of public buildings held open for public use; extended
these liabilities uniformly to all units, including the state and its
agencies; accepted liability for the state and its agencies when engaged in the performance of a proprietary function, as defined in
the statute, and, for the first time, affirmatively claimed the benefit
of the immunity principle by restoring the governmental-function
defense in all other cases for all governmental units. The immunity
provision was set forth in section 7 of the statute:
Except as in this act othenvise provided, all governmental agencies
shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein said government agency is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a govem450. 379 Mich. at 221, 150 N.W.2d at 803.
451. See 379 Mich. at 217-18, 150 N.W.2d at 801-02.
452. 379 Mich. at 221, 150 N.W.2d at 803.
453. Act of May 19, 1964, No. 170, [1964] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 221 (codified at
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 691.1401-.1415 (1968), as amended, MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 691.1404, .1406, .1407 (Supp.1973)).
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mental function. Except as othenvise provided herein, this act shall
not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the
state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is
hereby affirmed.454
The statute was drafted by a special committee of the Michigan
Association of Municipal Attorneys and lobbied through the legislature with the strong backing of that association's parent organization, the Michigan Municipal League. One member of the special
committee interpreted the legislative appeal of the proposed measure:
In lobbying for this legislation, its proponents traded heavily on the
paradoxical state of existing law which found the State and its
agencies, including school districts, still enjoying the defense of governmental immunity, while municipal corporations could no longer
employ this defense. We sought to achieve legislation that would
put all government on the same basis....
. . . This statute puts all agencies of government on the same footing
with regard to tort liability. It is the feeling of those who were active
in securing passage of this legislation that the problems concerning
governmental immunity from tort liability in Michigan have been
settled for many years to come.455

The prediction contained in the final sentence proved to be
overly optimistic, for the assault upon the new statutory immunity
was not long deferred. In Maki v. City of East Tawas,456 section 7
was held unconstitutional because, while it purported to establish
immunity from tort liability, the statute was entitled "An act to
make uniform the liability of municipal corporations, political subdivisions, and the state, its agencies and departments, when engaged in
a governmental function, for injuries to property and person caused
by negligence."457 The discrepancy between "negligence" in the title
and "torts" in the immunity provision led to a conclusion that the
statute violated the constitutional prohibition that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title.4 M
Since the defect had already been corrected by amendment of the
454. Act of May 19, 1964, No. 170, § 7, [1964] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 223. With
minor changes in phrasing the section is now continued in MICH. COMP, LAws ANN,
§ 691.1407 (Supp.1973).
455. Communication from City Attorney Allen G. Hertler, of Royal Oak, Mich,,
reported in 28 NIMLO MUNICIPAL L. REv. 463, 464 (1965). Another account of tile same
effort appears in id. at 592.
456. 385 Mich. 151, 188 N.W.2d 593 (1971), more fully discussed in Cooperrider,
Torts, 1971 Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 503, 519-23 (1972).
457. Act of May 19, 1964, No. 170, [1964] Mich. Pub. &: Loe. Acts 221 (cmpllasis
added).
·
458. 385 Mich. at 159, 188 N.W.2d at 596. See MICH. CoNsr. art. 4, § 24.

December 1973]

Governmental Tort Liability

269

title at the time of Maki's final disposition, the net effect of the decision seems to have been to suspend the operation of section 7 until
August I, 1970, the effective date of the amendment.459
In tvm other recent cases, Grubaugh v. City of St. ]ohns4 60 and
Reich v. State Highway Department,461 a majority of the court
seemed to be positioning itself for a ruling that the statutory immunity provision lies beyond the legislature's constitutional power,
which would indeed be a switch from the dogma of the past. The
liabilities recognized by the statute for defective highways and
buildings are both conditioned upon a filing by the claimant, within
a specified period after the accident, of a notice of the injury and
defect that constitute the basis of the claim.462 In the case of the
highway claim provision, this requirement is the descendant of
similar provisions that appeared first in the special charters of municipal corporations,463 and later in statutes of more general application.464 In 1915, with the expressed intent of establishing uniform
procedures, the legislature added to the general highway statute a
provision requiring notice of a claim to be filed within sixty days of
the accident.465
Notwithstanding the fact that the notice provision in question,
which was pleaded by the city in defense to a claim based on the
highway statute, had been enacted forty-six years before the plaintiff
suffered his injury and had antecedents of even greater age, an opinion in Grubaugh466 subscribed by three justices asserted that the
provision was unconstitutional on the strange ground that the statute
deprived the plaintiff of a "vested right" (the right "vested" on
March 14, 1961; the statute was enacted in 1915) without due proc459. See Act of Aug. 1, 1970, No. 155, [1970] Mich. Pub. & Loe. Acts 496, amending
MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 691.1401, .1407 (Supp. 1973); Kriger v. South Oakland
County Mutual Aid Pact, 49 Mich. App. 7, 211 N.W.2d 228 (1973); Curry v. City of
Detroit, 49 Mich. App. 240, 211 N.W.2d 559 (1973).
460. 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970).
461. 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972).
462. MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. §§ 691.1404, .1406 (1968), as amended, MrcH. CoMP.
LA.wsANN. §§ 691.1404, .1406 (Supp. 1973).
463. See, e.g., Davidson v. City of Muskegon, 111 Mich. 454, 455, 69 N.W. 670, 670
(1897); Springer v. City of Detroit, 102 Mich. 300, 302, 60 N.W. 688, 689 (1894); Dundas
v. City of Lansing, 75 Mich. 499,500, 42 N.W. 1011, 1011 (1889).
464. See, e.g., Act of May 27, 1895, No. 215, ch. XXII, [1895] Mich. Pub. Acts 441
(codified at 1 MICH, COMP. LA.ws § 2775 (1897)) (incorporation of fourth-class cities).
465. Act of May 19, 1915, No. 301, § 8, [1915) Mich. Pub. Acts 531 (codified at 1
MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 4591 (1915); 2 MICH. CoMP. LA.ws § 242.8 (1948)).
466. Two other justices "concurred in the result,'' without explaining their concurrence. Chief Justice Brennan dissented. Justice Kelly did not participate. This case and
its immediate background are more fully discussed in Cooperrider, supra note 456, at
525-28.
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ess of law.467 The justices cited as authority Minty v. Board of State
Auditors,468 wherein the question was whether the repeal in 1945 of
the 1943 waiver of sovereign immunity should be related back to
destroy a claim that had arisen in the interim. The problem in
Grubaugh arose from plaintiff's claim that physical and mental incapacitation caused by the accident, which he attributed to a defective street, prevented him from taking the action necessary to comply with the statutory requirement within the term provided. In
Reich the court extended the Grubaugh reasoning to cover claimants
under disability by reason of minority, but also went on to hold
the sixty-day notice provision469 generally invalid as a violation of
equal protection.470
The scope of the court's claims in these two cases can only be
demonstrated by extensive quotation from the opinions. Apparently
referring to the provision of the general highway statute that imposed on municipalities (but never on the state) liability for damage
caused by unsafe highway conditions,471 Justice T. M. Kavanagh's
opinion in Grubaugh asserts:
The statute in question by waiving immunity from liability, puts
the state and its municipalities upon the same legal footing and subject to the same substantive rules which are applied to any controversy involving a negligent tortfeasor.
The substantive right to proceed against the governmental tortfeasor, as distinguished from merely procedural requirements, must
arise under the same conditions and undiminished by any special
exemption as any other comparable cause of action.4 72

The opinion then refers to an earlier explication by the court of
the reasons behind notice provisions of this variety-that they are
designed " 'to furnish the municipal authorities promptly with
notice that a claim for damages is made, and advise them of the time,
place, nature, and result of the alleged accident, and a sufficient
467. 384 Mich. at 175-76, 180 N.W.2d at 783-84.
468. 336 Mich. 370, 58 N.W.2d 106 (1953).
469. By this time the statute that was the subject of the Grubaugh opinion lmd
been superseded by the provisions of the 1964 statute, so that the attack was now upon
that statute.
470. 386 Mich. at 623-24, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
471. The provision dates from 1879. See Act of May 29, 1879, No. 244, [1879] Mich.
Pub. Acts 223. Neither in words nor in substance was it a "waiver of immunity."
Rather it was the creation by the legislature of a statutory claim in a situation wherein
the court had earlier held that none existed, not because of "immunity," but because
the court thought no duty was owed by the municipality to individuals in regard to
the condition of the public ways, either at common law or by statute. See text accom•
panying notes 90-105 supra.
472. 384 Mich. at 173-74, 180 N.W.2d at 783.
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statement of the main facts, together with names of witnesses, to
direct them to the sources of information so that they may conveniently make an investigation' " 473-and proceeds to the following
evaluation:
Even if we assume the above original policy considerations were
once valid, today they have lost their validity and ceased to exist due
to changed circumstances. In recent years most governmental units
and agencies have purchased liability insurance as authorized by
statute. MCLA § 691.1409 (Stat Ann 1969 Rev § 3.996 [109]). In
addition to insurance investigators, they have police departments and
full-time attorneys at their disposal to promptly investigate the
causes and effects of accidents occurring on streets and highways. As
a result these units and agencies are better prepared to investigate
and defend negligence suits than are most private tortfeasors to whom
no special notice privileges have been granted by the legislature.474
In Reich the important language in Justice Adams' opinion, this
time subscribed by a majority of the court, is the following:
The object of the legislation under consideration is to waive the
immunity of governmental units and agencies from liability for injuries caused by their negligent conduct, thus putting them on an
equal footing with private tortfeasors. However, the notice provisions
of the statute arbitrarily split the natural class, i.e., all tort-feasors,
into two differently treated subclasses: private tort-feasors to whom
no notice of claim is owed and governmental tort-feasors to whom
notice is owed.
This diverse treatment of members of a class along the lines of
governmental or private tort-feasors bears no reasonable relationship
under today's circumstances to the recognized purpose of the act. It
constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable variance in the treatment
of both portions of one natural class and is, therefore, barred by the
constitutional guarantees of equal protection.
Just as the notice requirement by its operation divides the natural
class of negligent tort-feasors, so too the natural class of victims of
negligent conduct is also arbitrarily split into two subclasses: victims
of governmental negligence who must meet the requirement, and
victims of private negligence who are subject to no such requirement. Contrary to the legislature's intention to place victims of
negligent conduct on equal footing, the notice requirement acts as
a special statute of limitations which arbitrarily bars the actions of
the victims of governmental negligence after only 60 days. The victims of private negligence are granted three years in which to bring
their actions. See MCLA § 600.5805; (MSA 27A.5805). Such arbitrary treatment clearly violates the equal protection guarantees of
473. 384 Mich. at 175, 180 N.W.2d at 784.
474. 384 Mich. at 176,180 N.W.2d at 784.
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our state and Federal Constitutions. The notice provision is void and
of no effect.475
I find the argument advanced in these two cases astounding. It
must be clear that the legislature had no intention whatever to "put
governmental units on an equal footing with private tortfeasors";
such an intention is irreconcilable with the specific definition and
circumscription of the liabilities recognized by the statute. Moreover, there are real and vital differences between the situations of
governmental units and of private parties as potential tort defendants. The legislature's appreciation of one such difference is evidenced by the fact that it did not incorporate a notice-of-claim requirement such as that contained in the highway and building
claims sections in that section of the statute relating to motor vehicle
claims.476 There the governmental defendant is on a substantial par
with other vehicle owners and operators, but no private party has a
tort responsibility comparable to the governmental unit's responsibility for injuries allegedly caused by defective or unsafe conditions
of highways. The confidence expressed in the ability of the modern
municipality to protect its own litigational interests may be justifiable so long as the municipality becomes aware in some fashion of
the potential claim, or of the condition from which it arises, in time
for an effective investigation, but if there is no requirement of
notification at any time prior to the filing of suit, the unit's efforts
to uncover the facts relating to that condition as of the time of the
accident may be fruitless. Taking into account the extent of the
governmental unit's liability exposure where public ways and public
buildings are concerned, and of the difficulties of keeping in current
touch with all those conditions that might become a source of liability, surely there is nothing constitutionally unreasonable about a
notice requirement that is not applicable to other tortfeasors and
other claimants. It may be conceded that the notice provisions as
enacted-those originally contained in Public Act No. 170, as well as
those that antedated it-were too simplistic and therefore unduly
harsh in their application to some situations. This harshness may in
some part be attributed, in turn, to the rigorous construction that
the court gave them prior to its sudden conversion to the view that
they are wholly unconstitutional. That rigor was perhaps not ineluctable; at least Justice Souris was able to suggest an alternative
construction that would have avoided the harshness of the situation
475. 386 Mich. at 623-24, 194 N.W.2d at 702.
476. See MICH, COMP. LAws ANN,§ 691.1405 (1968),
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to which Grubaugh was addressed.477 If, because the court from time
to time is transfixed by the plain-meaning rule, construction could
not be used to smooth do·wn the rough edges, a determination that
the notice provision is unreasonable when strictly applied to persons
under disability in a situation where the defendant has suffered no
prejudice would have been a tolerable outcome.478 But the ruling
that the legislature is constitutionally deprived of power to enact,
for cases involving governmental liabilities in the area subsumed
under the rubric "tort," substantive rules different from those that
apply to other tortfeasors is a startling curb on the lawmaking
powers of the legislature. Moreover, if maintained, it is likely to
make the entire problem of governmental tort responsibility unmanageable, for it is a problem that does require special rules.479
The only question is whether it will be the legislature or the court
that makes those rules.
Justice Adams concluded his opinion in Reich with a pausegiving footnote that may be a clue to the source of his reasoning:
"For a recent case in which the entire doctrine of sovereign immunity was overruled as in violation of the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Krause v. Ohio (1971), 28 Ohio App 2d I; 274 NE2d 321
(1971)." 48° Krause was a wrongful death action arising out of the
Kent State incident. The intermediate appellate court, in the
opinion cited by Justice Adams, rejected the state's sovereign immunity defense and stated one of the issues as follows: "The underlying contention in the appellant's proposition of law has two
branches; first the doctrine of sovereign immunity violates equal
protection of law because it establishes nvo categories of claimants,
those offended by state action and those offended by private action,
with different protections but ·without a foundation in reasonable477. See Trbovich v. City of Detroit, 378 Mich. 79, 95-109, 142 N.W.2d 696, '101-08
(1966) (Souris, J., dissenting).
478. Moreover, the legislature was not unresponsive to these problems. Before
Grubaugh was finally disposed of, the statute had already been amended to extend
to 120 days (180 days in the case of minors) the period during which notice could be
filed in highway claims, and to provide a grace period of 180 days after termination
of the disability for persons physically or mentally incapable of giving notice. Act of
Aug. 1, 1970, No. 155, [19'10] Mich. Pub. & Loe. Acts 496, amending MICH. COMP. LAws
ANN.§ 691.1404 (Supp. 19'13).
479. Indeed, the exhaustive study made by the California Law Revision Commission
in 1963 is in large part an effort to spell out the differences between the problems of
governmental and private tort liability, and to develop intelligent solutions to the
questions that those differences pose. See 5 CAL. LAW REvlsION COMMN., REPORTS,
RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 267-332 (1963),
480. 386 Mich. at 624 n.3, 194 N .W.2d at 702 n.3.
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ness."481 That decision, however, was reversed by the Ohio supreme
court, and an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States was
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.482
It is interesting in this connection to recall that in his opinion in
Williams even Justice Edwards said:
There is, of course, no doubt of legislative authority to act in this
area. The Michigan legislature may, if it sees fit to do so, reinstitute
governmental tort immunity by statute. Or, as it has already done in
some instances, it may specify the terms and conditions of suit, Our
holding in this case does not affect any existing statute in the field
concerned, or imply any limitation on legislative power to act where
to date it has not acted.483
It may also be recalled that in McDowell, 484 Attorney General
(later Justice) Adams' brief was quoted for the following proposition
in the opinion that excluded the state's sovereign immunity defense
from the fate suffered by the city's governmental-function defense
in Williams:
"[I]he doctrine of sovereign immunity which presently exists in
Michigan is not the archaic, obsolete, "king can do ·wrong" edition of
1066, but consists of a pattern of deliberate legislative choices which
achieved its present form, so far as the State itself is concerned, by
the enactment of PA 1945, No 87, and the amendment thereof by
PA 1960, No 33. Since PA 1960, No 33, took effect after the events
which gave rise to these actions, that act cannot serve to establish or
abolish rights with respect to appellants herein. However, the fact
that the legislature amends a statute in 1960 does show that the legislature is giving continuing consideration to, and acting with respect
to, the doctrine of sovereign immunity. I£ the express reestablishments [sic] of the doctrine of sovereign immunity by the legislature in
1945 is obsolete, illogical, harsh, cruel, et cetera, then the legislature
should be called upon to modify or abolish the doctrine.
So far as the State itself is concerned, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as it presently exists in Michigan is a creature of the
legislature."485
In that opinion Justice Black, for the court, after quoting the above
passage from the Attorney General's brief, added that "[t]he
judiciary has no right or power to repeal statutes. As said by the
481. 28 Ohio App. 2d 1, 2-3, 274 N.E.2d 321, 322 (1971), revd., 31 Ohio St. 2d 32,
285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972).
482. Kraus v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 32, 285 N.E,2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
1052 (1972).
483. 364 Mich. at 260-61, Ill N.W.2d at 25.
484. See text accompanying notes 422-24 supra.
485. 365 Mich. at 270-71, 112 N.W.2d at 492, quoting Brief for Defendants.
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attorney general, the legislature has willed that the present defendants be and remain immune from liability for torts such as these
plaintiffs have alleged. There they must stand, legally, until the
legislature wills to the contrary."486
The contrast between these expressions in 1961 and the positions
asserted in Grubaugh and Reich is some measure, not only of the
court's current trespass upon the legislature's domain, but also of
the low estate to which its own pronouncements of even the recent
past have fallen.
C. Further Evolution of Categorical Liabilities
Pending the resolution of any questions that may remain concerning the validity of the 1964 statute, the scope of the governmental-function defense continues to be contracted through a corresponding expansion of the liabilities recognized by the statute, an
expansion to some extent along lines foreshadowed by earlier cases.
It was established as early as 1889487 that the municipality's responsibility under the highway statute was not limited to repair and
maintenance of the road surface but extended also to negligent
failure to remove obstructions and other hazardous road conditions
created by others. In Rufner v. City of Traverse City 488 and Cabana
v. City of Hart,4 89 liability was recognized for deaths of persons in
the street caused, respectively, by the fall of a rotten street light pole
and by electrocution through contact with a metal street lamp post
that was not properly grounded. Then, in Mechay v. City of
Detroit,490 it was held that a painter, working under contract with
the city, was entitled to recover under the statute for injuries received when the street light pole on which he was working broke
and threw him to the ground. The city argued that its statutory duty
"to keep in reasonable repair, so that they shall be reasonably safe
and convenient for public travel, all public highways, streets, etc."
extended only to travelers and was therefore of no avail to a person
in the plaintiff's position,491 but the court held that this provision
related to the standard of care and did not delimit the persons to
whom the duty was owed.492 The cause of action was created by
486. 365 Mich. at 271, 112 N .W.2d at 492-93.
487. Joslyn v. City of Detroit, 74 Mich. 458, 42 N.W. 50 (1889), discussed in text
accompanying notes 130-34 supra.
488. 296 Mich. 204,295 N.W. 620 (1941).
489. 327 Mich. 287, 42 N.W.2d 97 (1950).
490. 364 Mich. 576, 111 N.W.2d 820 (1961).
491. 364 Mich. at 578, 111 N.W.2d at 821. See MICH. CoMP. LAws § 242.3 (1948).
492. 364 Mich. at 578-79, 111 N.W.2d at 821-22.
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other language that provided that "[a]ny person or persons sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets of
this state by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or
streets •.• in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe for
travel" is entitled to recover damages from the responsible unit.498
Since the defective pole made the street unsafe for travel, plaintiff
was entitled to recover even though he was not using the street for
travel at the time of the injury.
In Miller v. Oakland County Road Commission,404 the court of
appeals recently reversed a summary judgment dismissing a claim
against the county for injury suffered by plaintiff when a dead elm
tree fell on the truck that she was driving on a county road. The
complaint alleged that the road commission had been warned that
trees were a hazard to the road in question and had negligently
failed in its statutory duty to protect the safety of the highway. The
defense was based on a clause in the statute that provided that "[t]he
duty of .•• the county road commissions to ... maintain highways,
and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks,
crosswalks or any other installation outside of the improved portion
of the highway designed for vehicular travel"490 and on the observation that the complaint did not identify the location of the tree
prior to its fall. The court thought this omission irrelevant: "Plaintiff alleged that the tree was alongside Andersonville Road, that defendants were advised that it constituted a potential hazard, and
that the tree ultimately fell on plaintiff and her truck as she was
traveling on Andersonville Road. These facts are sufficient to allege
a cause of action in negligence. " 496
As presently interpreted, therefore, the statute provides a basis
of liability toward persons on the highway at the time of injury,
which may arise not only from travel risks as such, buf also from
collateral hazards. In other words, it may not be too much to say that
the governmental unit's highway liability has become a species of
premises liability.
There are also signs that the statutory liability for defective
public buildings will be maximized. By a per curiam opinion in
Green v. Department of Corrections4 91 that provision was applied to
493,
494.
495.
496.
497.

MICH, COMP. LAWS§ 242.1 (1948),
43 Mich. App. 215, 204 N.W.2d 141 (1972).
MICH, COMP, LAws ANN. § 691.1402 (1968).
43 Mich. App. at 219, 204 N.W.2d at 144.
386 Mich. 459,192 N.W.2d 491 (1971).
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permit recovery against the state by an inmate of the Detroit House
of Correction for the loss of a finger attributed to the absence of
proper safety devices on a planing machine in the prison shop. The
court's theory was that, since the machine was permanently attached,
it was a fixture and therefore a part of the building.498 The relevant statutory language is "[g]overnmental agencies have the obligation to repair and maintain public buildings under their control
when open for use by members of the public. Governmental agencies
are liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from a
dangerous or defective condition of a public building..• ,"499 The
attorney general's contention that the situation was not within the
intent of the statute because the prison was not a building held open
to the public at large was rejected. Thus, an area of liability that
had been excluded even by the short-lived general waiver of immunity adopted in 1943500 was opened. If, as the reasoning adopted by
the supreme court has it, the statutory term "public building" means
any "building owned by a public body," and the clause "open for
use by members of the public" includes prison buildings occupied
by prisoners because they too are "member[s] of the public community, whether in or out of jail,''501 it is difficult to conclude that
any publicly owned building, no matter how restricted the entry
may be, will be excluded.
The future application of the proprietary-function category was
made somewhat uncertain by the 1964 statute. Drafted under the
apparent assumption that the state and its agencies enjoyed a total
sovereign immunity from tort liability and were never subject, as
were municipalities, to the proprietary-function exception, section
13 of the statute waived the state's immunity from liability for damage "arising out of the performance of a proprietary function." 502
That term was given an explicit definition applicable to the state
(including the state's "agencies, departments, and commissions ...
and every public university and college of the state") 503 but not to
other governmental agencies. That definition-"any activity which
498, Cf. Cody v. Southfield-Lathrup School Dist., 25 Mich. App. 33, 181 N.W.2d 81
(1970), wherein the court of appeals rejected a claim for injury to a school child on a

trampoline in the school gymnasium, because the trampoline was not attached.
499. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1406 (1968), as amended, M1CH. COMP. LAws
ANN. § 691.1406 (Supp. 1973).
500. Among three specific exclusions in that statute was "any claim for injury to or
death of a prisoner." Act of April 21, 1943, No. 237, [1943] Mich. Pub. & Loe. Acts
392. See text accompanying note 398 supra.
501. 386 Mich. at 464, 192 N.W.2d at 493.
502. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1413 (1968).
503, MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 691.1401 (1968).

278

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:187

is conducted primarily for the purpose of producing a pecuniary
profit for the state, excluding, however, any activity normally supported by taxes or fees" 504-with its emphasis on a profit-making
primary purpose, appears to have been drafted with the intent of
confining the state's exposure narrowly. Whether it will have that
effect seems doubtful; indeed, it may turn out to have two edges.
Bofysil v. Department of State Highways 505 was a claim £or injury
suffered by a teenager who struck his head on an undenvater obstruction when he dived into a lake created by the accumulation of
water in an excavation that had been made by the highway department for the purpose of obtaining sand and gravel for a highway
construction project. The lake was an intended consequence of the
excavation, so that the parcel on which it was located would be more
salable after it had served its highway purpose, and the parcel was
in fact sold at a profit subsequent to the accident. The department
had been aware that the bottom of the excavation was irregular, and
that people had been swimming in the lake, but it had failed to post
warnings or take other precautions. The accident occurred prior to
the enactment of the 1964 statute, but the court of appeals held that
the state was subject to liability for negligence in the performance
of a proprietary function according to the law in existence prior to
the statute. 606 This was a question that had never been settled, and
the court's position was supported only by dicta, particularly from
cases that discussed the liabilities of school districts, which have, of
course, repeatedly been described as "state agencies" and therefore
identified with the state's immunity. It was necessary £or the court
to disregard dicta in some of the post-Williams opinions that had
described the state's sovereign immunity as total, subject only to
statutory exception. 607 Nevertheless, these latter expressions were
not themselves well-reasoned, and the snub they received was perhaps deserved.
There remained the question of whether the highway department's activity in Bofysil was, in fact, proprietary. The court's answer was that, although highway construction is clearly governmental, "it is equally clear that a state agency may be engaged in a proprietary function at the same time it is engaged in a governmental
504. M1cH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1413 (1968).
505. 44 Mich, App. 118, 205 N.W.2d 222 (1972), leave to appeal denied, 389 Mich.
768 (1973).
506. 44 Mich. App. at 128-29, 205 N.W.2d at 229,
507. See, e.g., Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, discusssed in text accompanying
notes 432-40 supra.
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function. When such a dual use of property is in evidence, the proprietary function must be separated from the governmental function and the governmental agency loses its immunity as to the
proprietary use." 608 When it created the lake to make the land salable
and then sold it at a profit, the highway department was engaged
in an activity not different from that of any business improving land
to make a profit. It would seem that the statutory definition of proprietary function would in no way interfere with this conclusion,
since it does not preclude the analysis of governmental operations
for the purpose of finding among the fragments a profit-making
activity. Carried as far as it will go, this technique may change many
of the answers that were reached in the past. For instance, would
not the school football games in Watson and Richards clearly fall
within the proprietary category today? 509 If so, the statutory reincarnation of the governmental function is less robust than its case law
progenitor.
The 1964 statute does not mention the nuisance-trespass theory
of liability and that silence is a source of some difficulty. The first
sentence of section 7 of the statute51O negates tort liability on the
part of any governmental agency engaged in the exercise or discharge
of a governmental function, unless the statute itself provides otherwise. As the statute contains no language preserving the nuisancetrespass basis of claim, a literal reading would lead to the conclusion
that it had been abolished. In historical context, however, the existence of such a legislative intent seems scarcely credible. The Michigan court has recognized this head of liability from the very beginning. It seemed so obvious to the nineteenth-century court that it
was practically taken for granted, and it antedates the governmentalfunction defense by decades. It reflects one of the strongest claims
for relief that can be asserted, for it is built around the paradigm of
damage that is the direct and intentional consequence of the munic508, 44 Mich. App. at 130,205 N.W.2d at 229, citing Carlisi v. Marysville, 373 Mich.
198, 128 N.W.2d 477 (1964); Munson v. Menominee County, 371 Mich. 504, 124 N.W.2d
246 (1963); Dohm v. Acme Twp., 354 Mich. 447, 93 N.W.2d 323 (1958). See text accompanying notes 277-85 supra.
509. See Richards v. Birmingham School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643 (1957);
Watson v. School Dist., 324 Mich. I, 36 N.W.2d 195 (1949); text accompanying notes
255-65 supra. But see Smith v. Board of Commrs., 49 Mich. App. 280, 212 N.W.2d 32
(1973), holding a metropolitan park authority immune from liability for injury arising
from its operation of the "Island Queen," a sightseeing boat, on a lake within the park,
on the ground that, although a nominal fee was charged for excursion rides, the
"Queen" had not turned a profit in the four years preceding the accident. Cf. Matthews
v. City of Detroit, 291 Mich. 161, 289 N.W. 115 (1939), discussed in text accompanying
notes 246-48 supra.
510. See text accompanying note 454 supra.
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ipality's act, with principles of unjust enrichment also frequently
relevant. There is nothing in their public expressions to indicate
that those who drafted the statute had any such change in mind;
indeed, one of them summed the statute up in these terms: "The net
effect of Act 170, 1964, is to largely return to municipal corporations the position they enjoyed prior to the decision of the Williams
case."511 This is surely a situation where the legislature should be
expected to express an intent to make an important change in the
law in words incapable of being misunderstood, rather than relying
upon implication. On this basis the sentence can justifiably be construed to avoid the consequence that the words, in the abstract, seem
to suggest. The term governmental function has no clear and indisputable core of meaning. It is a term of art, definable only by reference to the instances to which it has been applied. It has never been
applied by the Michigan court to protect any governmental agency
against liability in a situation recognized to be within the nuisancetrespass category. This sentence, I submit, should be seen as a restoration of the governmental-function defense as it existed in the case
law, alongside the nuisance-trespass head of liability.
But what then of the second sentence in section 7, which prohibits any construction of the statute that would reduce the immunity from tort liability enjoyed by the state, except as provided in
the statute itself? No Michigan case prior to the enactment of the
statute had directly held the state subject to liability under the
nuisance-trespass heading. Such a holding may have been intended
in Buckeye Union Fire Insurance Co. v. State, 612 which was decided
in 1970 but related to an occurrence prior to the enactment, but the
obscurity of the reasoning in that case and the apparent felt necessity to redescribe the fire-hazard nuisance as a "taking of private
property for public use" leaves its significance uncertain. As has been
noted, 513 dicta in post-Williams opinions have asserted that the
state's sovereign immunity has no exceptions other than those
created by statute. On the other hand, there is evidence that the
nineteenth-century court assumed that the nuisance-trespass situation
was an appropriate basis of claim against the state,614 although no
511. 28 NIMLO MUNICIPAL L. REv. 464 (1965). See also discussion in text accompanying note 455 supra.
512. 383 Mich. 630, 178 N.W.2d 476 (1970). See text accompanying notes 340-45
supra.
513. See text accompanying notes 433 8: 507 supra.
514. See text accompanying note 59 supra, quoting Sheldon v. Village of Kalamazoo,
24 Mich. 383, 385-86 (1872). See also Ashley v. Port Huron, 35 Mich. 296, 301 (1877);
Herro v. Chippewa County Rd. Commrs., 368 Mich. 263, 272, 118 N.W.2d 271, 275
(1962).
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judicial jurisdiction existed ·within which such a claim could be
entertained.515 For the latter reason, the question could not be raised
in court until after the adoption of the Court of Claims Act in 1939.
As the court of appeals points out in Bofysil, the cases decided immediately thereafter, which denied to that legislation the effect of a
waiver of the state's sovereign immunity to tort liability, assumed
that immunity existed "when the sovereign is engaged in a governmental function." 516 If the analysis that in Michigan the nuisancetrespass claim is older than and not subject to the governmentalfunction defense is valid, nothing in Michigan law would require
a decision that the state was not subject to such claims prior to the
effective date of the 1964 statute. This conclusion is bolstered by the
fact that it has been clear ever since 1899 that the claim is good
against boards of education,517 notwithstanding the contemporaneous
identification of such units, as "agencies of the state," with the state's
immunity.518 Finally, the apparent legislative intent in 1964 to create
uniformity of liability and immunity among all governmental units
argues in favor of a construction of section 7 that would bring the
state's liabilities into line with those of other units, if this objective
can be achieved ·without violence to the language of the statute. I
am persuaded that such a construction is possible and historically
valid, and that it would preserve the traditional nuisance-trespass
category as a viable basis of claim against all governmental units.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The system described above leaves something to be desired, but
it is a reasonable base from which to work. Given its consolidation
in statutory form, the time may be ripe for an attempt to sharpen
some of the terms, for there is no doubt that indefinition has been
an impediment to progress. Since the turn of the century the court
has viewed the scene always in its negative rather than its positive
515. See text accompanying notes 353-65 supra.
516. 44 Mich. App. at 125-26, 205 N.W.2d at 227, quoting Manion v. State Highway
Commr., 303 Mich. 1, 19, 5 N.W.2d 527, 528 (1942) (emphasis added). See also Mead v.
Public Serv. Comm., 303 Mich. 168, 171, 5 N.W.2d 740, 740-41 (1942).
517. See, e.g., Ferris v. Board of Educ., 122 Mich. 315, 81 N.W. 98 (1899); Whitehead
v. Board of Educ., 139 Mich. 490, 102 N.W. 1028 (1905) (dicta); Daniels v. Board of
Educ., 191 Mich. 339, 158 N.W. 230 (1916) (dicta); McDonnell v. Brozo, 285 Mich. 38,
280 N.W. 100 (1938) (dicta); Pound v. School Dist., 372 Mich. 499, 127 N.W.2d 390
(1964).
518. Attorney General, ex rel. Kies, v. Lowrey, 131 Mich. 639, 92 N.W. 289 (1902);
Sayers v. School Dist. No. 1, Fractional, discussed in text accompanying note 425 supra;
Bofysil v. Dept. of State Hwys., discussed in text accompanying notes 505-08 supra;
authorities cited in note 517 supra.
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aspect, choosing invariably to discuss the government's immunity
rather than its responsibility. That habit was the product of a conceptualism that posited immunity as an attribute of sovereignty,
part of the nature of things and the norm to which responsibility
was always an exception. Accuracy of perception would be advanced
if the habit were now abandoned, for the conceptualism has been
destroyed by intervening criticism, and, in reality, immunity no
longer dominates the scene. Rather, in respect to harmful activities
of its officers and employees, government has a liability equivalent
to that of nongovernmental entities for harms that are proximate
consequences of motor vehicle operation, of proprietary activities
generally, and of intrusions that are intended or highly probable
consequences of government action; toward outsiders, for injury
causally related to conditions of premises, government has substantially the liability of a nongovernmental occupier in respect to
public buildings, premises devoted primarily to a proprietary use,
and secondary proprietary uses of premises devoted primarily to a
governmental function; and toward persons using the public ways,
not necessarily for travel, government also has a species of premises
liability.
While the 1964 statute retains the term "immunity" in respect to
"all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise
or discharge of a governmental function," those terms are of judicial
origin and presumably subject to judicial refinement, for the statute
makes no attempt at definition. "Immunity," no longer a logical
necessity, has become a policy question, and "governmental function" may properly be understood as a designation for situations
where the government should be able to act or to remain passive
without compensating citizens adversely affected by the decisiona species of privilege extending to those instances where there are
sound policy reasons for nonliability despite the existence of circumstances that would subject a nongovernmental defendant to
liability.
The word "function" has been used in a departmental sense:
The "function" that is characterized as "governmental" usually encompasses all the activities of the police and fire departments, roadbuilding, parks, and schools, except to the extent that a department
has involved itself in an isolated profit-making action. Moreover, it
has been assumed that if the function is not "proprietary," it must
necessarily be "governmental." Neither usage appears necessary. The
search now is for reasons why a particular act or omission that would
cast liability upon another entity should not have that effect if a
governmental unit is the defendant. It would seem that the answer
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should be found in the nature of the act or omission, rather than in
the over-all public or governmental objectives of the department by
which the actor is employed, for, as Justice Edwards pointed out in
Richards v. Birmingham School District, 519 in one sense all functions performed by governmental units are "governmental." He
went on to say that some are more proprietary than others. He might
have said that some are more governmental than others, for this
today is the characterization that needs justification. It would seem
appropriate, then, to focus upon the particular employment rather
than upon the departmental purpose and, within that focus, to
reverse the traditional presumption that a function is governmental
unless some excuse can be found for calling it proprietary, adopting
in its place the approach that a function is not governmental for the
purpose of the privilege unless the activities that it entails are uniquely associated with governmental enterprise and circumstantially
different from those carried on by nongovernmental actors, or unless liability would be an unacceptable interference with government's ability to govern.
The principal argument against the immunity doctrine is that
government, like enterprise, should pay its way; that the special
burdens created by the miscarriage of governmental activities should
be borne by the community rather than by the unfortunate individuals upon whom those burdens fall. That principle argues most
strongly for liability in situations where harm is caused by the
affirmative actions of government officers and employees. Such liability exists where the act in question is the operation of a government vehicle, a "direct trespass," part of a proprietary enterprise, or
when it creates a dangerous and injurious condition in a public way
or building. On the other hand, the governn;iental-function defense
negates liability for harms caused by law enforcement and by protective actions of employees such as policemen, firemen, inspectors,
and custodial employees, who are by law compelled to act directly
upon persons and property, overcoming resistance if necessary. Mistakes are an inevitable consequence of such activity, and it may he
that resultant losses should, to some extent, be absorbed by the community, but the problems of separating instances where compensation would be appropriate from those in which it would not is complex, and it is difficult to see how, with any fidelity to language, it
could be held that these employments are anything but governmental. I would suppose, therefore, that if there is to be liability in
this area it should come through legislation, wherein the criteria and
the limits can be specified, and the basic policy questions resolved
519. 348 Mich. 490,521, 83 N.W.2d 643,659 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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in the appropriate forum. The defense, as presently understood, also
covers the acts of such employees as construction, maintenance, and
sanitation workers and medical and administrative personnel, the
nature and circumstances of whose activities are not materially
affected by the fact that they work for a governmental employer.
Here the argument for nonliability of the unit is at its weakest.
There is nothing peculiarly governmental about the activities of a
doctor employed on the staff of a public, rather than a private, hospital, nor about the activities of a worker employed on a street project, rather than on building a private driveway for a private employer. Employments such as these might well be deemed not to be
governmental in character for the purpose of determining the applicability of the defense.
The defense, by exempting the governmental occupier of premises from liability in cases of injury causally relatable to conditions
of premises not devoted to a proprietary use (other than public ways
and buildings), covers a wide range of situations. On one hand,
premises, such as playgrounds, compact urban parks, and premises
surrounding school and government buildings, may be developed in
contemplation of intensive public use. In respect to such premises
the governmental occupier is in much the same position as nongovernmental occupiers: The public is actively encouraged, or perhaps
even required, to enter. Remembrance of some of the past cases involving school premises and parks520 suggests the need for a liability
principle. Problems of inspection and maintenance seem manageable, considerably more so, indeed, than in the case of public ways,
for which responsibility already exists. The decisions that must be
made by judge and jury in order to determine whether reasonable
procedures have been followed in this respect do not excessively intrude into the area of policy-making that belongs to other officials.
I would suggest that the "function" here is the provision of facilities
for frequent and intensive use by the public and that there is nothing uniquely governmental about it. The relationship between the
occupier, the premises, and the public is in no essential respect different from the same relationship where nongovernmental occupiers
are concerned.
On the other hand, the defense also covers injuries causally relatable to conditions of publicly mmed premises that, while left
open for entry by the public, are not developed for intensive use.
This would include areas such as large rustic parks, forest and other
520. See Penix v. City of St, Johns, 354 Mich. 259, 92 N.W.2d 332 (1958); Richards
v. Birmingham School Dist., 348 Mich. 490, 83 N.W.2d 643 (1957); Watson v. School
Dist., 324 Mich. 1, 36 N.W.2d 195 (1946); Royston v. City of Charlotte, 278 Mich. 255,
270 N.W. 288 (1936); text accompanying notes 255·66 &: preceding note 305 supra.
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lands left substantially in their natural condition, and public waters
other than supervised beach areas. The private sector offers no anal~
ogy here, for no private party is the occupier521 of premises remotely
comparable in extent. Moreover, a private occupier of similar premises would rarely invite the public to enter and would therefore
normally enjoy the limitations on responsibility that the law pro.:
vides in respect to visitors who are at best licensees. In opening such
areas for use and enjoyment by the public, the governmental unit
does not hold out that measures have been taken to make them safe
for entry. They are offered and enjoyed as and because they are
approximations of nature in the raw, and nature in the raw is frequently unsafe.
To assume applicability to this situation of conventional premises-liability principles based on knowledge or constructive notice
of the existence of dangerous conditions and a jury judgment upon
the measures taken in response to that knowledge would be to create
an unpredictable liability exposure, to imply an unmanageable operational duty, and to introduce a major negative factor into the decision-making process by which such areas are opened for public use.
It may be argued that a jury can take such factors into account in
deciding whether the usual reasonableness standard has been
breached, but I would maintain that here the unit should not be
subject to a jury risk. Such an area is offered for use without warranty, the user may fairly be said to have assumed the risk, and the
applicable general principle should be one of nonliability. The function of providing public access to such areas, I would contend, is
uniquely governmental.
The governmental-function defense also serves at the present
time to exclude a miscellany of claims relating, not to what government did to the claimant, but rather to what it did not do for him,
to losses it failed to prevent. Within this general class involving assertions of failure to perform an affirmative duty there is, of course,
liability for failure to perform a duty arising in the exercise of a
proprietary function and for failure to repair or make reasonably
safe public ways and buildings; and, of course, a negligent omission
may be the culpable factor in the context of actions for which the unit
is otherwise subject to liability. But aside from these instances, were
there no such defense, there would be an essentially unpredictable
exposure to miscellaneous accusations of nonfeasance. Government's
ubiquity in modern life makes it vulnerable, in a legal milieu
wherein the search for a plausible loss-bearer is candidly recognized,
521. The term itself seems out of place in this context. Is the state the "occupier"
of the woods, fields, lakes, and streams under its ownership?
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to blame for individual misfortunes that are in no real sense the
product of its enterprise. The principle that government should pay
its way could shade imperceptibly into a principle that it should pay
our way. Such a principle may well be appropriate in given circumstances. Perhaps modern government should absorb, to a greater
degree than it does, the burdens of personal misfortune arising from
its failure to shield individual citizens from harmful occurrences,
such as crime and flood, that citizens are in a poor position to
avoid or to lay off in other ways, but that type of decision belongs
to the political rather than to the judicial process.
There is again a range of possibilities. It would include, on the
one hand, the failures of public services already in place-such as
the sewer or drain that becomes clogged, the fire department that
is slow or ineffective in its response or that appears on the scene with
defective or inadequate equipment, and the police department that
fails to take steps deemed reasonably adequate to protect against
crime or negligently permits a felon to escape. On the other hand,
given the applicability of contemporary attitudes in regard to fault,
causation, and damages, legally plausible claims might be constructed
for harms causally relatable to the asserted failure of the authorities
to provide services of a quality or quantity that a jury might reasonably believe should have been provided-such as the absence of
sufficient sewerage or drainage or of an adequate police or fire establishment. Still further down the scale might be assertions of harms
causally relatable to a failure to adopt or to enforce laws or regulations that a jury might reasonably conclude ought to have been
adopted or enforced and that might have prevented the loss from
occurring. If the governmental-function defense did not foreclose
these questions, the remaining control would lie in judicial manipulation of the duty question, which would mean that in those instances in which he permitted the claim to go to the jury, the judge
would frequently be permitting the jury to substitute its judgment
concerning the extent of public services and their deployment for
that of the political and administrative authorities to whom such
judgments belong.
Similar considerations apply to another type of claim that is
presently blocked by the governmental-function defense. Were it not
for that principle, damage claims might be advanced for economic
disadvantages asserted to have been caused by miscellaneous governmental decisions, such as those relating to street grades, location
of public facilities, zoning, building regulations, licensing and the
regulation of licensed activities, dissemination of information, and
decisions made in individual cases by educational authorities. In-
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dividual rights are safeguarded in this area by liabilities for nuisance,
trespass, and the taking of private property for public use, and by
normal review processes and preventive relief obtainable where the
political and administrative authorities seek to exceed their authority. To open such decisions further to challenge in damage actions
would reduce government to a bargaining process, if not to substantial immobility. Such decisions, along with the decisions of
"whether" and "how much" noted above, are of the essence of government, and the function of making them is surely governmental.
Justices Campbell and Cooley were feeling their way toward acceptable principles for dealing with claims of this kind during their
tenure on the court. They phrased those principles in terms of nonliability for "mere neglect" to perform a statutory duty, absent indication of contrary legislative intent, and nonliability for "legislative" or "discretionary" decisions of authorities to whom the making
of such decisions is entrusted. Unfortunately, the growth of these
ideas was stunted at an early stage when they were overshadowed by
the rank growth of the "governmental-function" cliche.
In sum, the purpose of these conclusory paragraphs is to suggest
that the statutory "governmental-function" reservation, in contemporary context, may appropriately be interpreted as a limited privilege serving as a defense in a class of cases, miscellaneous in nature
and difficult to define, wherein it is important to preserve the elbowroom that must be available for political decision-making, wherein
tort liability would imply duties of care that would be impossible or
impracticable to perform or would require government to absorb
losses that are not the product of its intervention, and wherein the
acts that governmental agents must perform within the scope of their
normal duties have no common analogy in the private sector because they reflect the imperative element in government, the implementation of its right and duty to govern. A return to considerations
such as these would make the term "governmental" functionally intelligible and give it a core of meaning as a term the purpose of
which is to facilitate the drawing of distinctions between the activities of governmental and nongovernmental actors that say something
rational about the conditions of tort liability. Such an interpretation would, I believe, not be unfaithful to Michigan legal tradition
in historical depth. It would correct for an aberration that occurred
when the professional stopped thinking about these problems and
resorted instead to a facile but mindless formula.
This suggestion for modification of existing doctrine will not be
taken, I trust, as a proposal for another revolution. The court's
adventures in this area since 1961 are to me persuasive evidence
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that legislative techniques are better left to legislatures. The community will be no better served by the assumption that governmental activity, for tort liability purposes, is no different from nongovernmental activity than it was by the opposite assumption. What
is jurisprudentially sound when General Motors is the defendant
is not necessarily so if the defendant is the state of Michigan, the
city of Detroit, or the township of Leoni. What is needed at this
point is not a broad brush technique, but careful consideration of
the factors that differentiate injury and liability problems in this
context from those that occur in other spheres.
After the most extensive and careful study of these problems
that has yet been made, the California Law Revision Commission
made the following point in its report to the California legislature:
The problems involved in drawing standards for governmental
liability and governmental immunity are of immense difficulty. Government cannot merely be made liable as private persons are for
public entities are fundamentally different from private persons.
Private persons do not make laws. Private persons do not issue and
revoke licenses to engage in various professions and occupations.
Private persons do not quarantine sick persons and do not commit
mentally disturbed persons to involuntary confinement. Private persons do not prosecute and incarcerate violators of the law or administer prison systems. Only public entities are required to build and
maintain thousands of miles of streets, sidewalks and highways. Unlike many private persons, a public entity often cannot reduce its
risk of potential liability by refusing to engage in a particular activity, for government must continue to govern and is required to
furnish services that cannot be adequately provided by any other
agency. Moreover, in our system of government, decision-making has
been allocated among three branches of government-legislative,
executive and judicial-and in many cases decisions made by the
legislative and executive branches should not be subject to review in
tort suits for damages, for this would take the ultimate decisionmaking authority away from those who are responsible politically
for making the decisions. 622

In the study that backs up that report there is a detailed consideration of the various kinds of situations from which questions of governmental tort liability may arise, and of the policy factors relevant
to their appropriate solution. Further consideration of these problems in Michigan might well start there.
522. 4 CAL. LAW REVISION CoMMN,, REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 810

(1963). The study on which the Commission's recommendations were based is contained
in 5 id.

